SCHOOL OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES

CHALLENGES OF PEACEBUILDING IN MATEBELELAND NORTH AND SOUTH PROVINCES-ZIMBABWE (1980-2010)

BY

DAVID FOYA
PHD 6831003

SUPERVISOR:
PROFESSOR ROYSON MUKWENA

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2016
Declaration

I David Foya do declare that:

- The research reported in this thesis, except where otherwise indicated, is my original research.

- This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.

- This thesis does not contain other persons’ data, pictures, graphs or other information, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other persons.

- This thesis does not contain other persons’ writing, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other researchers. Where other written sources have been quoted, then:
  
a. their words have been re-written but the general information attributed to them has been referenced:

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is entitled “The Challenges of Peacebuilding in Matabeleland North and South Provinces. Zimbabwe (1980-2010).” The main objectives of this study include to establish the major factors contributing to failure of peace-building in the Matabeleland North and South Provinces. Another objective of the study is to evaluate the approaches that can be used to achieve sustainable peace building in the two provinces. Some of the research questions were: What are the major reasons for the failure of peacebuilding and reconciliation processes in Matabeleland North and South Provinces?

The rational for the study is that some of the findings of the study will assist government and non-state actors to learn peacebuilding process to avoid similar mistake like those that were committed in the dark period of 1982 to 1990 in the western Zimbabwe. More importantly, other beneficiaries in the government include The Organ on National Healing and Reconciliation, Trauma Centre. It will assist researchers as well as policy makers, institutions such as those dealing with peace, governance, conflict on how to deal with post conflict situations.

The design of the study was qualitative because the topic dealt with emotions and feelings of the people who were involved in the conflict. The research used purposive sampling technique in selecting the majority of respondents. Data was gathered through interviews, questionnaires and focus group discussions.

The major findings do indicate that the government has not been sincere in peacebuilding efforts and reconciliation was not properly implemented and that the communities in Matabeleland provinces remain divided. There were no laws that were instituted to deal with reconciliation and peacebuilding matters. In addition, properties of the opposition PF ZAPU were confiscated by the government in 1982 under the pretext of arms caches discovery. The study concludes that the government has not made any apology for all the killings which were done by government forces. The study recommends that government should make full acknowledgement of all the killings and compensate the regions affected. In addition, there is need to establish Truth and Reconciliation Commission to handle all the cases of violence. Finally establish framework for dealing with national healing of the nation and to unify all the citizens.
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List of Acronyms

CCJP……….Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace.
CIO…………Central Intelligence Organisation.
LRF………..Legal Resources Foundations
MDC……….Movement for democratic Change
MoD……….Ministry of Defence
PAPST…….Public Affairs and Parliamentary Support Trust
PF ZAPU…..Patriotic Front Zimbabwe African Peoples Union
SPT………..Solidarity Peace Trust
ZANU PF ……Zimbabwe African National Union
ZLHR…………Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights
ZNA…………Zimbabwe National Army
ZPP…………..Zimbabwe Peace Project
ZRP…………..Zimbabwe Republic Police
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction
This chapter details and sets the foundation of the thesis by outlining the major issues that will be addressed therein. In this regard, major issues that will be discussed include the background of the study which will enable readers and examiners to appreciate the core issues that will be raised in this thesis. The chapter will further outline the significance of the study, research objectives that explain what will be covered followed by the research questions. Finally, the delimitation of the study will be given which will show the population and geographic set up of the area under spotlight.

This study seeks to investigate the challenges of peace building in volatile Matabeleland North and South Provinces in Zimbabwe which has not supported government since 1980 up to now.

There has been very little written about this issue of peacebuilding from a Zimbabwean perspective and it is the desire of this researcher to dig a little bit deeper into these issues so that by the end of this research a lot of challenges which are affecting peacebuilding in the volatile provinces of Matebeleland North and South will be unearthed and discuss the problems that led to failure of the reconciliation process in these provinces and in Zimbabwe in general.

The study will also assist in broadening the understanding of issues of peacebuilding in Zimbabwe as well as the Sub Saharan Region.

1.2 Background of the study
Zimbabwe was a British Colony from September 1890 until Independence on 18 April 1980. Then it became part of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland from mid 1960s until mid1970s. The country has two major ethnic groups which are the Shona and Ndebele who have historically been at logger heads and that was exacerbated by the colonial policy of divide and rule till the attainment of independence in April 1980. This was further worsened by the liberation’s ideological differences and power struggles. The Zimbabwean war of liberation was a protracted liberation struggle of independence from 1966 to 1980 when
Zimbabwe attained its political independence. There were three major armies that were fighting in the war of liberation, two of these on the same side that is ZANU and its ZANLA army and ZAPU and its ZIPRA army which later formed Patriotic Front and the Rhodesian Army. ZAPU was predominantly made up of Ndebele people though the high command was multiracial or multi-ethnic in its composition. On the other hand, ZANU was predominantly made up of Shona. These parties had different political ideologies and it therefore follows that in the areas where they operated they influenced people in the way they saw or understood and interpreted issues.

As Patriotic Front, (that is from 1976) these two political parties and their armed wings namely ZANLA and ZIPRA were of different ideological leanings and were supported by China and USSR respectively. Hanlon (1992) has argued that at some point USSR supported both liberation movements. The patriotic front was supposed to go into 1980 elections as a united front. However, this was not to be. Following the attainment of independence on 18 April 1980, a government of National Unity composed of former Rhodesian Front, ZANU PF and PF ZAPU was formed. This was followed by the creation of new Zimbabwe National Army made up of forces from former Rhodesian Army, ZANLA and ZIPRA. The integration of the army had its share of challenges too. There were serious divisions and suspicions, mistrust among these three armies right from the assembly points. The process of demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration had major political problems; hence seeds of the future unrest and or civil conflict were sown.

In the early stages of independence, there were sabotages in the military establishment at Inkomo Barracks and Thornhil Air-force base in Gweru. And subsequently discovery of arms caches at ZAPU farms triggered retribution on ZAPU leadership and let to the civil war from 1982 to 1987 mainly against ZAPU which was accused of supporting the Dissidents- (Woods 2007)

C.C.J.P. and LRF (1988) authoritatively claim that over 20 000 mainly people of Ndebele origin and those associated with ZAPU were massacred by the North Korean trained Fifth Brigade mainly composed of former ZANLA forces. Gradually PF- ZAPU was weakened, swallowed by the 1987 Unity Accord with ZANU (PF). In other words, PF- ZAPU was
destroyed. According to Woods (2007) the Ndebele people have not forgiven ZANU (PF) leadership for the Gukurahundi Massacres over which the President of Zimbabwe did not apologise and describes as “as a moment of madness.” As a result, the Ruling party ZANU PF has never won any elections in the Matebeleland Provinces since 1980s save for the supposed rigging that is said to have taken place in the harmonised election of 31st of July 2013. (European Union2013)

Legal Resources Foundation (1986) argue that ZANU (PF) attempted to introduce one party state in Zimbabwe and to achieve this, they did everything their power to dismember the opposition PF ZAPU and anyone who was associated by it. Legal and Extrajudicial approaches were used to deal with opponents. There were many arrests of leading ZAPU members such as Lookout Masuku, Dumiso Dabengwa, Kembo Mohadi and several others. As a result, ZAPU suffered irreparable damage politically socially and economically and also lost all the properties it had bought with the proceeds from the demobilizations of its combatants. Even in the subsequent Government of National Unity after the Unity Accord of 1987, ZAPU emerged a loser and far weaker and it thus died a natural death-(Todd 1984)

Scarnecchia (2013) argues that failure of unity between PF ZAPU and ZANU (PF) has to be understood in the in the context of the Cold War and the policies of apartheid South Africa in the southern Africa. He goes further to say Harare government was not in a position to confront Pretoria militarily as Super ZAPU was created as reaction of the Fifth Brigade by ZANU (PF) Government.

In January 1983 The Fifth Brigade of the ZNA consisting of between 2500 to 3500 soldiers was deployed in Midlands and Matabeleland provinces to “crush” the dissidents. The Brigade was entirely made up of former ZANLA combatants. This Fifth Brigade was called Gukurahundi in the Shona Language meaning” the early rains that washes away the chaff before spring rains.” The Brigade proceeded to terrorise the population of the Midlands and Matabeleland Provinces leaving approximately twenty thousands of civilians dead, several thousand- displaced and many others traumatised by their terror tactics.

It has been argued that Western powers could have known about these events but kept quiet to give room to Mugabe Government and make Zimbabwe a successful story in Southern
Africa. Furthermore, Hanlon (1998)-strongly argues Mugabe’s ability to contain information about Gukurahundi was one reason why the international community was not able to keep an eye as the media was severely curtailed to operate in the area. Hence, there was no outcry about the atrocities. In addition, there was a lot of sympathy for Mugabe in the Western capitals as a result of his role in the Front Line States in fighting Apartheid system in South Africa. So the Fifth Brigade campaign was a deliberate, systematic and determined plan to wipe out the dissidents, to liquidate Nkomo’s PF ZAPU party accused of directing dissidents and to cause such terror among ordinary civilians that their support (for ZAPU) would suffer irreparably.

1.3 Statement of the problem
Matabeleland North and South Provinces of Zimbabwe suffered many conflicts including the liberation struggle and the post-independence civil war which was unleashed by government in order to crush PF ZAPU. This led to death of over thirty thousand people mainly Ndebele speaking and PF ZAPU supporters, displacement of over five thousand people including professionals and created a class of citizens without identity documents and serious marginalization of the provinces. The net effect of this has been the polarization of the situation in these provinces. As a result of these developments, there have been serious challenges with regards to peace building in these Matebeleland North and South Provinces. The areas where this study is being carried out has suffered politically, economically and socially from 1980 up to date. These provinces are peculiar in that it has a mixed population but mainly the Ndebeles and other minority ethnic groups and to some extent Shona speaking people. (Catholic Commission for Justice & Peace 1989, ZimStat2012).

1.4 General Objectives
The general objective of this study is to investigate challenges of peacebuilding in Matebeleland North and South Provinces of Zimbabwe in the period 1980 to 2010.

Specific Objectives
The specific objectives of this study are as follows:

To examine and explain the major reasons that led to failure of peacebuilding and reconciliation process in Matebeleland North and South Provinces.
Determine the major causes of strained/broken relationships between the government and the citizens in these provinces.

To establish why the approaches adopted if any did not yield the desired results in positive peace-building in the Matabeleland North and South Provinces.

Evaluate the approaches that can be used to achieve sustainable peace building in the Matabeleland North and South Provinces.

Examine the role of non-actors in peacebuilding processes in Matabeleland North and South.

1.5 Research questions
The following are key research questions for this thesis:

What are the major reasons for the failure of peacebuilding and reconciliation processes in Matabeleland North and South of Zimbabwe?

Why has there been strained relationship between the government of ZANU PF and the people of Matabeleland Provinces?

Describe the nature of approaches that were adopted in carrying out peacebuilding and reconciliation processes in these provinces.

To what extent were the approaches adopted useful in solving the problems encountered in the area?

To what extent was government responsible to the killings thousands of people mainly Ndebeles who were murdered by the Fifth Brigade in these Provinces?

To what extent were non state actors involved in this process of peace-building?

1.6 Significance of the study
This research is significant to various stakeholders in many different ways which include the following:

The study will assist government and Non-Governmental Organizations to learn peacebuilding process to avoid similar mistakes as those that were committed in the dark
period of 1982 to 1990 in the western Zimbabwe. More importantly, other beneficiaries in the
government include The Organ on National Healing and Reconciliation, Trauma Centre.

This study aims to assist the traditional leaders as well as religious leaders who work with
grassroots to understand more about the process of peacebuilding and reconciliation and in
that process, they will be better prepared to bring the people they deal with together through
various programmes that can be undertaken in the Regions of Matabeleland and the whole
country of Zimbabwe. Furthermore, it can assist other stakeholders in similar circumstances
across the African continent that has been suffering from protracted conflict since most of
these countries attained independence in the early sixties.

The study will avail detailed factual information on the truth of events that took place in the
dark period of Zimbabwe in the Tsholotsho District.

It will assist researchers as well as policy makers, institutions such as those dealing with
peace and governance issues in post conflict situations.

The researcher hopes that the study will profoundly assist the issues of peacebuilding the
world over since there are many countries that have been experiencing conflicts in the region
and the whole continent and beyond.

Finally, this study will be able to stimulate debate among scholars and researchers in the area
of post conflict peacebuilding.

1.7 Delimitation

Figure 1: Map of Zimbabwe

The following maps shows Zimbabwe as a country to enable the readers to have a picture of
the country and possibly its neighbours and the second and third map shows the provinces
where this study was carried out.
Figure 2: Matebeleland North -Districts.

This is the map of Matebeleland North Province where Gukurahundi was first carried out by ZANU PF Government in early 1980s. The most affected of these districts were Tsholotsho, Nkayi and Lupane. These were the theatre of Gukurahundi operations.

Figure 3: Map of Matebeleland South Province

Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/01/Matabeleland_North_districts.png accessed 24 March 2016
Matebeleland South like Matebeleland North suffered heavy from the conflict and the most affected areas of the province include Bulilimangwe, Matobo, Umzingwane and Gwanda.

The map of Midlands province has been added because there are issues that are going to be discussed in this thesis that have a bearing to the said province. There is spill over effect of issues between provinces as the Gukurahundi also took place in the Midlands provinces tough it’s not the subject of this discussion.

Matebeleland North Province has nine districts namely: Binga, Bubi, Hwange Rural, Lupane, Nkayi, Tsholotsho, Umguza, Hwange, Victoria Falls and the province has a total area of 69,455.87 square kilometres, total population of 749,017 (360,776 males and 388,241 females) registered voters 399,178 and a total of 193 wards and 13 constituencies.

Matebeleland South Province has six districts which are: Bulilimamangwe, Matobo, Beitbridge, Umzingwane, Insiza and Gwanda which happens to be the capital of Matebeleland South province. It has a population of 683,893 as of December 2012 census. The province has a total area of 54,172 square kilometres with a population density of thirteen people per square kilometre.

The researcher will investigate why the peacebuilding has failed in the district and why the district was hard hit by the conflict between 1980 and 1990.
1.8 Limitations
The researcher faced two major challenges and these were the dispersed nature of some key informants. This problem was solved by extensive travelling to areas outside Matebeleland North and South Provinces in order to interview these respondents. Furthermore, this challenge was alleviated by funds that were availed by the university for the purposes of travelling.

Another issue was availability of vast data from the respondents which needed time to sift all the details and analyse the data. The issue of using a recording device assisted the researcher to have all the interviews in the MP3 format and could easily listen to it in the process of writing and analysing data.

1.9 Definition of terms

**Peacebuilding** - is the set of initiatives by diverse actors in government and civil society to address the root causes of violence and protect civilians before, during, and after violent conflict. It could also be regarded as anything ale violence or post-violence, makes the concept analytically and operationally useless.

**Conflict** - is a situation where two or more parties have goals that are incompatible and view each other as an obstacle to achieving their desired outcomes.

**Ndebele** - These are the people who originally migrated from Zululand in South Africa during the time of Tshaka. The group include minor groupings such as Tonga, Nambiya, Sotho and Venda.

**Actors** - these are people or individuals who are involved in the conflict situation.

**Gukurahundi** - this is the civil unrest that was waged by ZANU PF Government to clear off or eliminate all perceived and or real enemies of their party.

**Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration**: Collectively, the process of DDR allows ex-combatants to become civilians once again and simultaneously deconstructs the mechanisms that would allow for conflict to continue. The objective of DDR is to contribute towards the stability of the post-conflict environment in order for development and recovery to take place.
**Disarmament:** Is the collection, documentation and controlled disposal of all arms and ammunition from both combatants and often from civilians as well.

**Demobilisation:** This can be defined as the process whereby former non-state armed groups are disbanded and discharged. Successful demobilisation processes create the space for full reintegration and for the inclusion of ex-combatants back into society. Thus, it is the process of dismantling the armed forces involved in the conflict and of providing temporary support to the ex-combatants.

**Disarmament:** The process of disarmament involves the relinquishing of arms by rebel groups and ex-combatants. Without a thorough removal and destruction of these weapons, they could possibly be recycled in future conflicts.

**Early Recovery:** The transition period between humanitarian relief and long-term recovery.

**Economic Reconstruction:** This is a broad term used to describe the structural reform and stabilisation of post-conflict economies, as well as the building of institutions and capacities to support sustainable development.

**Economic Recovery:** Refers to the goal of closing the gap between relief and development and restoring the capacity of government and communities to both rebuild and recover from conflict and sustain peace.

**Economic Rehabilitation:** This refers to large-scale reconstruction to reinvigorate the economic structures of a particular country.

**Everyday violence:** Often comes in forms of oppression which are justified in the name of punishment or retaliation, in response to a particular form of behaviour and perceptions of deviance. Violence against particular groups tends to permeate institutions of both state and society and to be reproduced on a daily basis through these institutions. This form of violence is often normalised by labels that remove it from the political sphere into criminal, domestic, or social spheres.

**Forced migration:** This is a general term that refers to the movements of refugees and internally displaced people due to situations of conflict, as well as to people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famines, and development projects.
Gender Ideologies: This refers to system of values which underpin gender roles and identities and which validate gendered power structures in systems of social relations, framed within particular cultures.

Humanitarian Assistance: This refers to a response to an emergency situation intended to alleviate human suffering by providing basic immediate needs. This is not limited to violent conflict and post-conflict contexts; however it is a response priority in these situations. Humanitarian and peacebuilding actors can both collaborate and contribute to a conflict sensitive, timely and sustainable resolution of conflict.

Impacts: In terms of measuring results, this is the highest level of analysis. The focus is on the contribution of inputs to the achievement of broad and sustainable goals, such as poverty reduction and educational development.

Local ownership: This refers to the degree of control that domestic actors wield over domestic political processes. In post-conflict contexts this notion conveys the common sense wisdom that any peace process not embraced by those who have to live with it is likely to fail.

Negative Peace: This is a situation where there is an absence of violence and war.

Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. (Secretary General’s policy Committee, May 2007)

Positive peace: This is a situation where open conflict as well as the threat of conflict is absent and the underlying root causes of conflict have been addressed, often through the creation of a more just social order.

Political Process: This can be defined as the process of the formulation and administration of public policy by interaction between social groups and political institutions or between political leadership and public opinion. It is vital to have functioning, legitimate political processes in a country in order to ensure the lawful governance and rule of law of a newly peaceful country.

State-building =“is an enogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations. Positive state-building processes involve
reciprocal relations between a state that delivers services for its people and social and political groups who constructively engage with their state.” (OECD, 2008)

1.10 Thesis structure
The first chapter laid the foundation of the thesis that is the background of the study statement of the problem, objectives, research questions and the significances of the study. The chapter went further to elaborate the new terms as they will be applied in the study to enable examiners and other readers to follow the issues raised well.

Chapter two will deal with literature review of the relevant ideas and concepts that deal with issues of peacebuilding. Theories of peacebuilding will be examined and critiqued by the researcher for their relevance for the current issues under discussion in the thesis as well as their applicability in the study.

Chapter three will deal with the theoretical framework of the study and describe the theory on which the study is anchored and also critique the issues as well as propose another approach of peacebuilding in view of the strengths or weaknesses of the ones that will have been visited.

Chapter four will deal with research methodology where the researcher discusses how the research will be carried out. The sampling techniques used will be explained and justified. In addition, the researcher will also discuss and elaborate on research instruments that will be used and their justifications. It will further critically discuss who will be interviewed, given questionnaire as well as those who will be in the focus group discussion with the researcher.

Chapter five will be dealing with presentation and analysis. The data will be presented in mainly in descriptive manner. Furthermore, there will be critical analysis of the data that will be presented in order to come up with policy implications.

Chapter six will be conclusions and recommendations as derived from the study. It also discusses the new information or new knowledge that has been discovered as a result of this research. The chapter will highlight all critical areas that will have been found from the study.
1.11 Conclusion
This chapter covered key introductory issues such as background of the study, statement of the problem, significance of the study, objectives and research questions, and it laid firm foundation for the thesis and the subsequent chapters.
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction
This chapter critically analyses the literature on the topic of peacebuilding, evaluates several methods of peacebuilding and discuss these in the context of the topic. It will outline the different aspects of peacebuilding and show how they are inter-linked yet have different functions. This chapter will further assist readers to understand how peacebuilding can be used in different situations.

As such, this chapter will focus on the major aspects of peacebuilding which include approaches to the process, models and the importance of peacebuilding in post conflict situations/countries such as was the case in Zimbabwe. It will further present a brief historical overview, followed by a discussion on two ways in which peacebuilding can be determined, namely in the context of specific programmes as well as an overall systemic approach. Finally, the chapter will present emerging trends in the peacebuilding field.

2.2 What peacebuilding entails
The United Nations Organization visualizes peacebuilding as a coherent integration of security, political, economic, and social and human rights efforts. In this regard, peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives” (UNPSO Peacebuilding Orientation, 2010:5).

This is related to this study in the sense that the process of peacebuilding in Zimbabwe did not include a coherent integration of many facets as argued in the above paragraph by UN. It is thus the strong view of this researcher that Zimbabwean Government failed to carry out this process from the time of attainment of independence on the 18\textsuperscript{th} of April 1980. It is not
surprising that by early 1982, the civil conflict had already started in the province under study.

Boutros Boutros Ghali (1998) argues that peacebuilding involves preventing ‘negative peace’ dynamics, such as escalation of armed conflict and violence, and promoting ‘positive peace’ dynamics, as with meeting the full range of needs of individuals and groups. Since mid-1990s, the UN has strengthened efforts to promote peacebuilding in post-conflict countries during the critical first two years after cessation of hostilities. As they note: “The immediate post-conflict period offers a window of opportunity to provide basic security, deliver peace dividends, shore up and build confidence in the political process, and strengthen core national capacity to lead peacebuilding efforts thereby beginning to lay the foundations for sustainable development” (Boutros Boutros Ghali 1998:78).

It does appear to this researcher that in post conflict Zimbabwe in 1980, the major emphasis was on reconciliation at racial level that is whites and blacks. It ignored all the fundamental aspects of reconciliation as well as reforms in terms of legal, political economic and structural aspects that were a prerequisite for the establishment of permanent peace in the post-independence conflict.

This emphasis on effective early intervention promotes sustainable peace and prevents conflict escalation. However, considerable literature on peacebuilding recognizes that it also requires long term interventions that can take decades and generations to fully implement. The primary features and implementation phases of the UN model are worthwhile to examine. This is in general terms but however, it probably would apply to this study as well in the Zimbabwean context.

UN (1990) recognizes that some peacebuilding efforts may have occurred during the course of conflict as well as in first phase and second phase. There is also need to have leverages public interest in rebuilding that exists after the peace agreement and involves a range of interventions depending on the country’s priorities and existing capacities and resources. Frequent early needs include safety and security (DDR and rule of law), political processes (elections, reconciliation and conflict resolution mechanisms), basic services (water, sanitation, health, education), reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees, restoration of key government functions (public administration, finance) at national and
subnational levels, infrastructure and economic rebuilding (employment, livelihoods) especially for youth and demobilized combatants (UNPSO Peacebuilding Orientation, 2010; UNPBC Report of the SG on Peacebuilding 2009).

Dan Smith (2004:10) summarizes four primary purposes of peacebuilding:
- provide security,
- establish the socio-economic foundations of long-term peace,
- establish the political framework for long-term peace and
- generate reconciliation, a healing of the wounds of war and justice.

Simmons (1996) goes further to argue that there is deeper criticisms concerning the lack of consideration for the collective identity of the citizens of the country, uncritical implementation of free market policies, and an overrepresentation of national issues compared to local concerns and deeper forms of human emancipation, such as individual-level emancipation and social values (Richmond 2007; Ramsbotham et al 2011). As in this regard, Richmond (2007:461) argues that the emancipatory approach to human security: means that individuals are empowered to negotiate and develop a form of human security that is fitted to their needs – political, economic, and social, but also provides them with the necessary tools to do so. This, by necessity, focuses on a broad notion of human security and on its external providers, but is aimed at local agency as its ultimate expression. Human security is therefore focused on emancipation from oppression, domination, and hegemony, as well as want. It is thought of as a universal project, but one that is capable of being shaped by, and reflecting local interests and particularities.

The major concern of this study is that the situation in Zimbabwe after the main conflict at the end of 1979 was that a lot of critical issues that were supposed to be attended to were not done or started or done until the conflict broke out between the two major parties that had fought for the liberation of this country that is ZANU and ZAPU.

Thus this deeper level of human security could be interpreted as the end goal of peacebuilding, and identifies possible evaluation criteria for education in peacebuilding such as local agency, human needs, and removal of forms of oppression. UN Peacebuilding Commission in 2012 did emphasize “enhancing its impact in the field and strengthening its
relations with key actors at the Headquarters.” (UNPBC Road Map 2012:1). They include such areas as impact in the field, headquarters actions, working methods, policy development, and implementation and tracking. Two current priorities for UN peacebuilding efforts are resource mobilization and mapping of relevant actors.

Resource mobilization involves expanding the range of resources, including finance and technical assistance, through better mapping of the available resources and then improved coordination. Annan (2012) argues that early 2012, the PBSO was implementing a pilot project titled Aid Information Management for Peacebuilding to coordinate, monitor and report on aid to post conflict countries. These planning and information resources may provide valuable data collection sources for evaluation of education for peace building efforts.

In the case of Zimbabwe, there was nothing given or done in terms of fund for this process of peacebuilding. It must be mentioned here that a lot of funding after independence in 1980 was in the areas of health, education, infrastructural development. (Makumbe 2005)

Richmond (2007) and Ramsbothan et al (2011) concur that key peacebuilding objectives include:

- preventing countries from lapsing or relapsing into violent conflict;
- establishing structures and incentives for peaceful mitigation of conflicts
- incentivising elite commitment to peace processes, while laying the groundwork for those processes to be made more inclusive over time;
- establishing a framework for political, security and economic transition; jump-starting recovery; demonstrating peace dividends by meeting the urgent needs of the population.

Key state-building objectives include developing capacity and legitimacy of the state and promoting a constructive relationship between the state and society. This necessitates building inclusive political processes to facilitate a continuous exchange between state and society, while developing state capacity to perform its functions in ways that meet people’s expectations. Key state functions in the process of peace-building include:

(i) delivery of security and justice,
(ii) revenue and expenditure management,
(iii) basic service delivery and
(iv) economic management.

Failure to undertake the above mentioned tasks have had negative effect on the generality of most citizens in these affected areas that are deemed as anti-government such as the Matebeleland provinces.

It can thus be argued that peacebuilding aims to consolidate and institutionalise peace by undertaking a range of actions that go beyond merely preventing a lapse into violent conflict, and this is what Galtung (1985) termed ‘negative peace’. Peacebuilding thus aims to address the underlying root causes of conflict and to create the conditions for a just social order, what Galtung (1985) termed ‘positive peace’. This core focus on avoiding a lapse into violent conflict is also referred to as peace consolidation, and that is why it can be said that the core aim of peacebuilding is peace consolidation.

In the context of this study, the government did not adopt measures that are necessary to avoid consolidation of peace, instead, they consolidated power at the expense of reconciliation and peacebuilding among the black population and as a result, according to Masipula Sithole (2008) things took the wrong turn and the rest of the world kept quiet in order to make Zimbabwe a success story in Southern Africa. He argues further that economically, things went well the first five years of independence from 1980 up to 1985 but politically and militarily, it was a complete disaster.

In the pyramid of peacebuilding, Lederach (1997) does argue that there is no one way to peace-build. In the pyramid it attempts to explain that peace building process can either be done from bottom or from the top or even by middle sections of society. It expounds the challenges that arise when certain sections of the society are excluded from the process by certain section of the society that views itself as the ultimate authority and have a general say in peace building in the given locality or society. The framework argues that it is important to include all stakeholders if the process is to be successful in any given locality.

Unfortunately, for Zimbabwe, the new government according to John Makumbe had exclusiveness tendencies and “we know better mentality” such that they went on the offensive to destroy ZAPU and all those who were linked to that political party. Furthermore,
peacebuilding from the security sector and the military, things did not work as ZIPRA forces from ZAPU were not properly integrated into the new Zimbabwe National Army.

Peace-builders can use the pyramid as a way of describing the numbers within a population in simplified terms. The pinnacle, or top-level leadership, represents the fewest people, in some instances perhaps only a handful of key actors. The grassroots base of the pyramid encompasses the largest number of people, those who represent the population at large. On the left-hand side of the pyramid are the types of leaders and the sectors from which they come at each level. On the right-hand side are the conflict transformation activities that the leaders at each level may undertake. Each of these levels deserves further discussion before we look at the broader implications of the pyramidal model for our conceptual framework.

This study is based mainly on Lederach (1997) who deals with pyramid of peacebuilding in post conflict societies as well as other major authors on the issue who include Neufeldt and Culbertson (2007). The Lederach peace building structure is shown in the pyramid in the next page.
2.3 Nature of peacebuilding challenges

There are a number of challenges in the peace building process in the Matebeleland and Midlands provinces of Zimbabwe. These challenges can be categorised as political, ideological, military, socio-religious, economic and also failure to reform institutions as well as the failure of rule of law to be applied uniformly and the opaque systems that are not accountable and transparent. In this regard it is necessary to have a multi thronged approach in order to have a successful peace building process.
2.3.1 Political and military challenges

The rift between ZANU and ZAPU further widened as result of the dissident problems in the Matebeleland provinces. The dissident problem was squarely blamed on the PF ZAPU. The reasons being that the problem was mainly concentrated in the Western provinces which traditionally was a ZAPU area of influence and this is where the ZANU PF Government had never once any election since the attainment of independence (Coltart 2016).

According to Hill (2002), after independence in 1980, there were bigger issues such that Western countries including Zimbabwe wanted to make Zimbabwe a success story. These countries were going to assist Mugabe and his people to achieve that. As a result of this, Gukurahundi became a side issue. The British were able to look the other way on Fifth Brigade atrocities by further development funds even new plans to new Zimbabwe Government to replace those that had been blown up by White Rhodesians working for South Africans.

According to Scarnnechia (2013) this support from United Kingdom strengthened ZANU PF. The net effect of this was that ZAPU virtually became “friendless” while ZANU PF managed to get support of the West, Soviets and to a certain extent South Africa so long as ZANU PF and the Fifth Brigade continued to target ZAPU, ZIPRA and by extension the ANC’s ability to fight apartheid South Africa.

2.3.2 Social and Economic Challenges

The disastrous effects of Gukurahundi in Matebeleland North and South provinces, it created a severe crisis among the people of the two provinces especially in the rural areas. Several thousands of men and women died at the hands of Fifth Brigade. The conservative estimate by Catholic Commission for Justice and Public (1987) puts the total number of people at 20,000. This is collaborated by detailed investigations that were carried out in the areas affected. Makumbe (2005) argues that Gukurahundi led to serious closure of industries that could not operate well in the unstable environment where security and movements were restricted as a result of emergency that had been imposed on the area.

According to Makumbe (2005) the ZANU (PF) Government tried to ‘Shonalise’ the provinces by having all Shona people in all positions of authority from headmasters to police
force, in the military, intelligence and in most public service positions. The net result was massive migration of young men as well as women from these areas to South Africa and Botswana. This resulted in the depopulation of the areas as a direct result of this conflict. Several hundreds of children were born out of wedlock during the time of Gukurahundi and some of these children have not been able to obtain birth records and this has resulted in their failure to get national identity documents. This is further collaborated by Ncube (1989) who has further argued that ZANU PF Government squandered a golden opportunity of peacebuilding and reconciliation and that its policies would throw the country into both economic and political darkness in the near future.

2.4 Approaches to Peacebuilding

According to ACCORD (4/2013) there are several approaches in which the understanding of peacebuilding can be based or operationalized. The two different perspectives and approaches which are often guides for different peace-building approaches, are both ‘programmatic peace-building’ and ‘systemic peace-building.’ These approaches are described in the below.

2.4.1 Programmatic peacebuilding

Programmatic peacebuilding refers to specific activities aimed at addressing urgent or imminent risks to a peace process. The following bullets summarise some of the key aspects of programmatic peacebuilding. According to Mitchel (1981), as perspectives shifts, peacebuilding becomes more comprehensive to incorporate broader dimensions of society thus increasing its ability to aid more people in the affected societies. In this regard, Mutisi (2008) discusses the following ideas with regards to peacebuilding as:

Risks refers to an assessment that a certain situation or condition may contribute to the increased likelihood of lapse or relapses into violent conflict.

It focuses on conflict factors that may potentially impact negatively on the peace process, and that can be addressed through specific targeted programme responses.

This can also be thought of as preventative peacebuilding or instrumental peacebuilding in that it refers to specific programming that is meant to prevent a lapse or relapse into conflict; and
The time-frame for programmatic peacebuilding is necessarily short- to medium term, because it is focussed on countering immediate or imminent threats to the peace process. This does relate to the concern of the study in the sense that there were no measures that were possibly taken to establish peace in the sensitive areas so that the lapse into conflict could have been avoided at a less cost.

UNDP (2009) is of the strong view that some major donors now have funds specifically earmarked for peacebuilding, and those funds would most likely be used to fund specific programmes in this category. For instance, the activities supported by the UN Peacebuilding Fund typically also fall in this category and are aimed at addressing specific peace consolidation needs that have either remained unfunded, or under-funded, or which have newly emerged.

In an unpublished article Masipula Sithole (2002), argued that even if such funds were released, they would have been misappropriated by the new government as it had did with so many donor funds that found their way into the country immediately after independence.

2.4.2 Programmatic peacebuilding initiatives
Mutisi (2007) is of the strong view that examples of such peacebuilding programmes include conflict resolution training and capacity building, the development of institutional capabilities needed for conflict prevention (such as the Peace Commission in Southern Sudan or the Ituri Pacification Commission in the DRC), support for civil society or women’s groups to participate in peace-making initiatives, and support for national reconciliation initiatives, including aspects of transitional justice. Some donors also include support for specific programme activities that form part of, or support, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), rule of law and Security Sector Reform (SSR) in this peacebuilding category.

However, in Sierra Leone, Burundi and Liberia, it has been noted that some of the activities earmarked in this category may appear to be very similar to traditional development categories, such as youth employment, infrastructure development and basic social services. This is because the frustrations with the lack of progress in these areas have become so critical in some of these communities that they become grievances which can be a source of a
potential relapse into violent conflict, and urgent action is required to show that some of these needs are being met. This potential relapse links to the notion of structural violence and it is vital to address the structural root causes of violence and grievances to truly prevent future outbreaks of conflict. (Accord 2013)

In this regard, it has been argued by Dabengwa (1998) [Dabengwa is former intelligence supreme of PF ZAPU and he lead the military wing of ZAPU that is ZIPRA and was detained for close to seven years after independence despite the Harare High Court acquitting him on trumped-up charges that these illegal detentions partly contributed to making it extremely difficult to build peace after the wear in Matebeleland to build sustainable peace]. There were high chances of building peace in Zimbabwe if the Western governments had stuck to principles of good governance. Unfortunately, according to Dabengwa, Cold War politics played in the hands of ZANU PF Government. Independence euphoria caused the rest of the world to fail to see the evils of the new government until it was too late.

It has been argued by Mazrui (2003) that some donors do not allocate funds specifically for peacebuilding, but prefer to encourage a conflict sensitive approach to development when working in conflict affected countries. Conflict-sensitive development programmes have a developmental objective that is poverty reduction. In this regard, programmes that are done or carried out are sensitive to the conflict environment within which they operate, in that specific steps are taken in the design and management of the programme to avoid aggravating the situation. In some cases, the design of the programme can also be intended to support conflict prevention efforts proactively, and, in the latter case, such activities are almost indistinguishable from targeted peacebuilding.

Accord (2013) strongly maintains that an important prerequisite for a pragmatic peacebuilding to be effective is an understanding of the risks to the Peace process, and the conflict factors that characterise the conflict system. Forms of risk analysis are recommended to be undertaken as part of the process leading up to the design of appropriate targeted peacebuilding programmes. That analysis is meant to assist the peacebuilding agent, and key stakeholders to work towards a common understanding of what the conflict factors in a particular context are – from the earliest planning stages and continuously throughout the life-cycle of the peacebuilding system. Funding for, and capacity-building towards, effective participation in an appropriate analysis approach could also be regarded as a programmatic
peacebuilding activity, because it makes the peacebuilding activities context-specific and therefore more likely to succeed.

### 2.4.3 Systemic peacebuilding

Lederach (1997) argues that in contrast to pragmatic peacebuilding approaches, systemic peacebuilding emerges out of the total combined effort of the activities undertaken under the various peacebuilding dimensions, and thus exists in the form of a system-wide or holistic process. This overall effort may sometimes be anchored in a strategy or vision, for example, an integrated strategic framework such as the ‘Lift Liberia’ Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) or the Afghan Compact in Afghanistan. There may be specific processes and structures that facilitate the development, management and monitoring of such peacebuilding frameworks and these may be purposely funded. However, it has been noted that this monitoring process is not that easy as most African countries hide under the guise of sovereignty.

With passage of time in Southern Africa support for systemic peacebuilding has been taking place in a highly fragmented manner in that the various agents that participate in, and contributes to, the overall process work independently design; each independently, manage, monitor and evaluate and secure funding for their own programmes. These activities are not necessarily identified, or funded, as peacebuilding activities at the programme level, although some of the programmes discussed in the previous section on programmatic peacebuilding can be included here. Instead, they are considered and funded as peacekeeping, development, human rights, job creation, or rule of law activities. It is when these activities are considered together over time, in the context of their combined and cumulative peace consolidation effect, that their systemic peacebuilding identity emerges.

It has been noted by Hanlon (2008) that it was not easy for Zimbabwe to undertake this systematic peacebuilding because the Zimbabwean government has a serious tendency of regarding all monitoring as it regarded this as interference in its internal affairs. This view is also shared by Manning (2008) who is of the opinion that current leadership greatly eroded all the opportunities for peace building from the early years of independence and concentrated all efforts on establishing power for themselves at the expense of building democratic principles for the country.
The challenge to this scenario has been that there have been changing trends in peacebuilding as well as many other issues that need funding from the same traditional funders. The above argument has been advanced by Raftopoulos (2007). The above view has been also supported by Wanjiku (2012) who goes on to argues that there are many conflicts and social upheavals in Central and North Africa as well as in the Middle east such that the world preoccupation is to bring conflicts to an end than embark on peacebuilding issues.

A strategic or integrated framework, that is aimed at an overall strategic vision for the systemic peacebuilding process, such as a conflict-sensitive poverty reduction strategy (PRS), maps out the overall priorities and objectives of the systemic peacebuilding strategy for a particular country. Examples include the Results Based Transitional Framework (RFTF), interim Integrated Regional Support Programme (IRSP) and Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) in Liberia, the Peace Consolidation Strategy and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in Sierra Leone, and the Integrated Peacebuilding Frameworks in Burundi and the Central African Republic. Individual programmes become part of the systemic peacebuilding process when they contribute to, and are considered as part of the overall effort directed towards achieving the objectives set out in the strategic vision (Mann 2005).

Anderson (1996) maintains that in some cases, the individual agencies may be conscious of their role in the overall framework, but in many cases this link is drawn only at the systemic level, for instance in strategic evaluations or in annual PRS reports. This does not imply that the connections are artificial, but rather that those at the programme level are not always aware of the degree to which their individual activities contribute to an overall systemic peacebuilding framework. There is disagreement over the extent to which a development activity such as a programme aimed at poverty reduction or infrastructure development (for example, the construction of a road) can be regarded as having a peace consolidation effect, and thus be considered part of a peacebuilding system. The confusion lies in perspective and context. An individual donor or implementing agent may not think of, or categorise the funding of an activity (for example, the construction of a road), as peacebuilding, from a programme level or budget-line perspective.

However, from a systemic perspective – it has been argued that, in the context of an integrated peacebuilding framework – and sticking with the example, the construction of roads may be regarded as an important element of a larger systemic peacebuilding
framework. It may perhaps create work for ex-combatants, it may stimulate local economies and improve livelihoods by providing access to markets, it may stimulate local contractor capacity, it may open up outlying areas previously marginalised because of their inaccessibility, and assist in the extension of the authority of the state into those territories, and it may contribute to overall economic growth, all of which are important aspects of an environment conducive to a successful peace process and preventing a relapse into conflict.

Any particular system is framed by the observer, and it thus requires an overall systems perspective to recognise that a specific programme activity, such as the road building project in this example, has a positive feedback effect for peace consolidation, and is thus regarded as being part of the peacebuilding system. It is not necessary for the agent to be aware that it is part of a particular system, for it to contribute to the overall system effect.

2.4.4 Peacebuilding is primarily concerned with peace consolidation

The first characteristic is that peacebuilding is primarily concerned with securing or consolidating lasting peace. It is concerned with preventing a lapse, or relapse, into violent conflict. It has been argued by Hill (2007) that the reason Mozambique and Angola went back to protracted civil wars that were costly in both human lives and destruction of infrastructure was a result of failure of peace building exercise. The fundamentals of peacebuilding were not taken into consideration. In this regard, Manuel (2008) sees peacebuilding as a process that is aimed at consolidating peace by addressing those conflict factors that may, in the short to medium term, threaten a lapse – or relapse – into conflict as well as addressing root causes of conflicts, that may threaten the peace in the long term.

2.4.5 Peacebuilding is multi-dimensional

The second characteristic is that peacebuilding is a multi-dimensional or system-wide undertaking that spans several dimensions. There are different models or approaches, but most range from differentiating between three core dimensions to the more elaborate approaches listing six to eight different dimensions. The UN Secretary-General Report S/2001/394 No Exit without Strategy (2001:31), argues that peacebuilding should be understood as fostering the capacity to resolve future conflicts by:

- Consolidating security,
- Strengthening political institutions and
Promoting economic and social reconstruction.

Other UN policy documents, for instance the Secretary-General’s Note on the Integrated Approach (2006), prefer a more elaborate list that includes: political, development, humanitarian, human rights, and rule of law, social reconciliation and security dimensions. The AU’s Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development Framework (2006) comprise six similar constitutive elements, but adds gender as a self-standing dimension.

Humanitarian assistance should be highlighted as one dimension that is treated differently in the various models. A number of peacebuilding models – such as the UN’s Integrated Approach and NEPAD’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework for Africa (2004) include humanitarian dimensions. However, some in the humanitarian community argue that humanitarian assistance should not be seen as being part of peacebuilding, because it needs to be recognised as independent, neutral and impartial. In other words, whilst peacebuilding is inherently political, humanitarian assistance is at pains to remain above the politics of the day. Some models, including the UN’s integrated approach, nevertheless include humanitarian assistance within their peacebuilding framework, because they argue that the humanitarian dimension needs to be factored into the overall peacebuilding planning and coordination mechanisms. However, they explicitly recognise that the humanitarian dimension has a special status and that it needs to be treated as an independent, but parallel, peace-building dimension (Muhammed 2007 & Mbeki 2008).

As observed by Manuel (2008) war, civil war and other political violence often revisit countries after brief periods of ‘peace’ or armistice. Some countries are ravaged by multifarious violent conflict during two to four decades after civil war. Many cease-fires and peace agreements do not cure the underlying social pathology which led to the bloodshed in the first place. The journey which this explorative study maps out begins at the cease-fire line. It proceeds through the rough and risky terrain of post-war looting, military rule, interim government, and ‘transitional’ justice. “We will pass refugee camps and come across heinous war criminals. Our destination is the promise of a peaceful state in the distance, where stable and possibly good governance gives comfort to the traveller. Grave threats to basic human rights dominate the entire region. The grey zone between war and peace is a source of life-threatening problems, not only to its inhabitants, but also to people in distant countries, far away from the violence” (Hanlon 2008:167).
According to Annan (2005) around the turn of the twenty-first century, it became clearer than ever before that war, civil war and massive, violent political crimes in a state anywhere in the world pose risks to the well-being of other states, even on different continents. In the era of global communications, the news about political violence travels fast. Streams of refugees knock on the doors of other states. George (1991) is of the strong view that the effects of different forms of terrorism, violent and oppressive governments, failing or collapsing states, widespread, abject poverty and virulent, endemic diseases, as well as other sources of instability, can hardly ever be contained to the areas of origin. This has been happening in Southern Africa with the case of Zimbabwe, North Africa and Middle East. The impact has been global.

National stability and legal order, including human rights, suffer from lawlessness and instability of states elsewhere, as well as from the volatility of the world’s political system. The serious deficiencies which exist in the maintenance of human rights in many regions have a troublesome impact on stable states which are trying to uphold those rights. Anarchy, violence and the absence of the rule of law in several states undermine the maintenance of the global legal order (Hills 2004 & Irvin 2008).

The imperative of human solidarity prompts us to help avoid violence. It is not only in the enlightened interest, but also in the narrower self-interest of well-developed societies that try to respect all human rights, to foster the rule of law in other societies. There can be no solid international peace without legal order (Annan 2005).

Cronins et al (2003) is of the strong view that there is no effective legal world order when its foundations, the legal order of stable states, are holes or crumbling stones. Encouraging effective states, based on the rule of law, is a major task of foreign policy and civil society. Fostering the rule of law in foreign societies is however, a daunting task (Mutisi 2011). The efforts of the international community to help build up the rule of law in other states are not always successful. The assistance by the United Nations, the European Union, NATO and many other international bodies, as well as many donor countries and humanitarian or legal assistance organisations are often late, weak, short, divided or ill-designed (Banfa 2010). There is the case with Libya when the citizens were threatened by their government under Col Kaddafi. The African Union delayed responding until the Western Governments came to the assistance of the Libyans.
In 1994 the UN Security Council decided not to provide additional peacekeepers for Rwanda, after a multilateral peace operation in Somalia had become a fiasco. While the UN turned a blind eye to Rwanda, about 800,000 people were killed in a genocidal wave of politically mobilised group hatred. In 1995, when the UN’s peacekeeping effort in Bosnia collapsed, two enclaves, Srebrenica and Zepa, full of Bosnian refugees, were overrun. United Nations blue helmets from the Netherlands were unable to prevent this. The Serb attackers deported the women, elderly and children to Central Bosnia and brutally massacred about seven thousand five hundred men. (Collins 2006)

In the words of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, (2006) about half of the countries which have gone through civil war fall back into violence in only a few years. World Bank(2006) concluded that one third of countries in Africa and Latin America return to civil war within five years and another one third within ten years, meaning that only one in three can avoid a new war for ten years or longer. This shows that national and international efforts to maintain, re-establish, and develop peaceful structures are often not yet successful.

2.5 Elements of peacebuilding
According to Machakanja (2006), there is often no clear division between war and peace. There is rarely one exact date marking the transition from one to the other. Violence tends to linger on after a cease-fire. Reconstruction has to start in an environment of insecurity. As a result, the new (interim) government has to begin many of the tasks of peacebuilding and reconstruction at the same time, in a high risk environment. The main elements of peacebuilding are: establishing security, renewal of government institutions, (re)starting the rule of law, possibly sowing the seeds of democracy, and socio-economic rehabilitation and development (Banfa 2010).

In the beginning, emergency powers are needed for stabilisation. Ruined infrastructure needs to be repaired. Mines have to be cleared. Refugees need protection and assistance to return safely to their homes. The sense of security and faith in the future will increase if an international peace force disarms and demobilises former warring parties, disbands paramilitary forces, reintegrates combatants and builds law-abiding security forces, including professional police, embedded in a new legal order. Progress towards democracy needs to be
entrenched through national, regional and local elections. Prosecution, arrest and trial of war criminals is needed, while a new professional justice system has to be built up, for which officials have to be (re)trained and laws have to be enacted. These tasks are formidable, as they encounter much opposition from old vestiges of power.

Richmond (2002) is of the strong opinion that good government should be based on an internally recognised and legitimate legal order with clearly defined powers, accepted by the population. He notes that this is the basis for lasting internal peace. In countries outside the OECD-area (comprised of Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea and Mexico) donors are tempted to transplant European multi-party democracy (Collier et al 2003). They might instead help to create conditions for power sharing, pluralism and inclusive participation in political decision making (Ramsbotham et al 2011).

McCandless (2007) is of the strong view that security for individuals and respect for basic human rights are crucial. An independent, well-functioning, professional justice system and independence of the media are the best checks on corruption and abuse of power. Peacebuilding requires patience. Instant solutions and quick fixes, often advocated by donors who think that their electorates are averse to long-term involvement, do not bring lasting stability (Kumar, K. et al 2009).

Thus, Coltart (2008) says that peacebuilding takes more nerve and stamina than fighting wars. Ten weeks of military intervention often need to be followed by ten years of peacebuilding, to avoid a return to bloodshed. In many capitals, one can admire statues of generals who have won a war. Statesman and diplomats who avoided wars by caution and compromise are less frequently immortalized. Countries that provide troops for peacekeeping or enforcement actions are generally inclined to withdraw them as soon as possible to reduce casualties among their own troops and limit domestic criticism and high expenses, but international forces often remain crucial to stabilising the country.

However, Coltart (2007) goes further to argue that there was no progress in this regard in the issue of peacebuilding in Zimbabwe after the liberation struggle as well as after the civil conflict between the ZANU PF Government and the dissidents. The presence of peacekeepers is usually required for several years to allow peacebuilding to proceed and take root. These stabilising forces should be strong enough to deter resumption of hostilities. Unfortunately
Makumbe (1995) argues that the case of Zimbabwe was different because after elections in March 1980, all the international peacekeepers left the country and there was relative peace and the whole world ignored the signs of impending conflicts which degenerated into the civil conflict.

Muhammed (1999) is of the strong opinion that experience in Afghanistan and Iraq shows that frequent terrorist acts can seriously undermine peacebuilding. According to Makumbe (2004) organising, training and supporting a new police structure helps shifting domestic security tasks from military to civilian control. It is important to encourage visible, domestic ownership of the security sphere and weaken the criticism that foreign troops are an occupying force. One can categorise these manifold activities in eight elements:

- Ending violence
- Emergency assistance
- Disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and de-mining
- Economic reconstruction
- Transitional justice; reconciliation
- Legal Order
- New (democratic) government
- Refugee return. (Muhammed, 1999)

Retraining of the army also falls in the same category so that there is efficient and stable security that can effectively defend the country in times of crisis. Together with an efficient police force there can be stable and lasting peacebuilding activities.

2.6 Peacebuilding Model of Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall
A second model of peacebuilding is provided by Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall (2011) who urge a cosmopolitan conflict resolution approach to peacebuilding. They define peacebuilding “as the project of overcoming structural and cultural violence (conflict transformation), in conjunction with peace-making between conflict parties (conflict settlement) and peacekeeping (conflict containment).” This is further supported by Ramsbotham (2011:199). They suggest peacebuilding from below must be coordinated with cosmopolitan conflict resolution so as to limit the impact of global and external forces on local communities and the local conflict. The peacebuilding from below model was the
dominant theoretical model from the 1990s through the early 2000s, and is currently being replaced by more transformative models. They provide an interesting schema for peacebuilding from below which identifies grassroots, mid-level, and top leaders in four sectors: psycho-social, economic-social, military-security, and political constitutional.

This model builds on the work of Levy (2004) and Lederach (1997) and provides a useful framework for peacebuilding programme design and evaluation. Referring to previous language for peacebuilding, they provide an intervention, reconstruction and withdrawal (IRW) model that combines phases of intervention with specific sectors.

According Ramsbotham (2011:210-213) the three phases are nested in the sense that they should be implemented concurrently, with their main tasks below:

**Intervention**: simultaneous stopping violence and making self-sustaining peace through institution building. This involves peacekeeping and high level peace-making.

**Stabilization**: promoting political stability and government institutional development and legitimacy. This involves structural peacebuilding.

**Normalization**: supporting and sustaining the full range of social institutions necessary for a peaceful society. This involves social and cultural peacebuilding

Cross-cutting these three phases is a wide range of critical activities across five sectors:

- **Security** – disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, etc.
- **Law and order** – policing, justice, human rights, etc.
- **Government** – constitutions, elections, taxes, representative governing systems, etc.
- **Economy** – building the official economy, ending the war economy, building, creating Employment and service provision.
- **Social and civil society**, containing intergroup antagonisms, supporting minorities, refugees, and peace and justice efforts. This phase and sector matrix provides one cogent model for managing peacebuilding efforts, from programme design through monitoring and evaluation.
Moving beyond the peacebuilding from below model, Ramsbotham, et al, (2011) recognize that, while empowering local communities is valuable, there may still be power disparities and local forces that promote conflict and violence, which must be contained and transformed toward peaceful change mechanisms. They suggest using a cosmopolitan conflict resolution approach for peacebuilding that provides a framework for global governance founded upon cosmopolitan human rights while also supporting local. It should be noted that some debate exists regarding the ability of peacebuilding efforts to generate full normalization of post-conflict societies, given the potential for conflict escalation and problems with conceptualizing or affecting such complex social issues as community empowerment, gender equality and reconciliation.

The principal mechanism for building peace suggested by Ramsbotham, et al, (2011) is peace education. Theory of change reflects discursive and systems models for addressing complex conflict structures, and engages multiple actors, spaces, actions, and communication feedback mechanisms. Their theory of change may be best seen (although not explicitly stated) through the nature of their cosmopolitan conflict resolution and transformative cosmopolitanism models. Cosmopolitan conflict resolution refers to “constructive means of handling conflict at the local through global levels” and transformative cosmopolitanism to “a genuine and inclusive local-global effort to determine what contributes to human welfare in general and to human emancipation worldwide.” (Ramsbotham et al 2011:265).

One primary change model that can be presumed from the work of Ramsbotham et al (2011) is the social and communal nature of conflict. The above authors do argue that most current armed conflicts can best be explained by Edward Azar’s Protracted Social Conflict model which has four main components. These components are:

- communal nature of conflict with identity groups (racial, religious, ethnic, etc.) as a basis for analysis;
- social and human needs deprivation as a main driver of conflict;
- poor state governance and under development cause needs deprivation;
- external political, economic and military factors impact the communal-state conflict

This change model highlights the importance of social and cultural factors (especially group conflict dynamics and basic human needs), state functions, and globalization forces. Part of Ramsbotham and colleagues (2011) theory of change recognizes special organizational principles and explanatory theories in different state contexts. In those societies still governed
by pre-state structures (often fragile or failed states), charisma and traditionalist explanations of how things work are most applicable.

Accordingly, Richmond (2007) argues that in those states or societies governed by an international system of states, power and realism best explain human interaction and armed conflict. The above statement is further supported by Ramsbotham et al (2011:268-271) who strongly argue that in states or societies that operate more as an international society of states, social order exists through reciprocity, mutual interests, cultural pluralism, and non-intervention. In states that operate at an international community level, legitimacy and solidarity are the organizing principles, with both state and non-state actors finally having equal footing. Finally, the most idealist form is the world community, which is based on social justice and cosmopolitan governing structures. This change model depends on how power is used and whether international institutions seek full emancipation, progressive change and cosmopolitan values.

2.7 Peacebuilding Model of Lederach, Neufeldt and Culbertson

The reflective and integrative peacebuilding model of Lederach and colleagues (Lederach 1997; Lederach, Neufeldt and Culbertson 2007) is founded on a view of conflict as being deep-rooted, and involving broken social relationships and sociological dynamics of interpersonal and intergroup conflict. Much of what occurs in these armed conflicts rests on individual and group identities at the local level, where basic needs of security and identity are left unmet due to a breakdown of governing structures, lack of participatory democratic spaces, and inequitable resource distribution. This is the case of Zimbabwe’s Matebeleland where the inhabitants of the region have lost their rights and well-being such that they are regarded as aliens. The deep rooted issues in this conflict have not been taken care of since the attainment of Zimbabwean Independence in 1980 up to date. There are issues that need peacebuilding which have been piling up to now.

In this regard, Lederach (1997) is of the strong view that characteristics of such conflicts include marginalized populations, poverty, inequality, lack of development, group collective issues, acceptance of armed confrontation, availability of small arms, and direct conflict that is more communal than international. These communal conflicts involve an interaction between relations, power, and awareness of conflict.
This understanding of conflict as being more social, communal, and needs or rights-based has significant implications for Lederach’s peacebuilding model. Lederach conceptualizes peacebuilding as “a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates and sustains the full array of processes, approaches and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships. The term thus, involves a wide range of activities and functions that both precede and follow formal peace accords. Metaphorically, peace is seen not merely as a stage in time or a condition. It is a dynamic social construct.” (1997:21). His model encourages transformation of three interrelated arenas, structures, social relationships, and peace infrastructure, and relationship building through reconciliation activities concentrating on truth, justice, mercy and peace.

Lederach conceptualizes targeted peacebuilding activities for different actors, with senior leaders working in high level negotiations on issues such as ceasefire agreements; mid-level leaders participating in problem solving workshops, conflict resolution training, peace commissions, and insider, partial roles in mediation or conciliation efforts; and low-level actors involved in local peace commissions, grassroots training, prejudice reduction, and psychosocial trauma work.

Lederach’s theory of change reflects this framework and conceptualization of conflict as a social process. It requires focused actions at different levels depending on the nature of the conflict, from issues at the most concrete level, to relationships, subsystems, and finally systems level. He views training as a critical component of any peacebuilding intervention, entailing “a process of strategic capacity and relationship building.”

According to Lederach (1997:109) capacity building entails empowering individuals and groups to affect change, a “process of reinforcing the inherent capabilities and understandings of people related to the challenge of conflict in their context, and to a philosophy oriented toward the generation of new, proactive, empowered action for desired change in those settings.” Relationship building involves reducing stereotypes and building skills so as to enhance relationships with both in-group members and parties in conflict, highlighting the interdependence of group and community-level actors. Both capacity and relationship building should be strategic in the sense of considering the broader conflict setting and sustainable change mechanisms.
Dugan (1996) supports the above idea that to guide such change the process requires a detailed training matrix incorporating outcome and time factors and an infrastructure matrix that guides the areas of design and inquiry needed on issues of crisis management, people, institutions and visions, moving respectively from short to long term. In effect, he further posits that change is contingent on the vision, process and context needed for long-term, sustainable, peaceful relationships. Both Lederach and Ramsbotham et al (2011) build their nested models off the nested theory of conflict by Maire

Lederach’s later work (2007) with Neufeldt and Culbertson reinforces the importance of conflict transformation identifying four dimensions of change that occurs in conflict transformation. According to Lederach these changes are:

- Personal changes may include emotional, spiritual, attitude and behaviour changes.

- Relational changes exist between people in direct contact with others, and may include changes during conflictive escalation of communication, stereotypes, polarization, trust, cooperation, decision-making and conflict management mechanisms.

- Structural and systems changes address the nature of social relations and power issues at the level of families, organizations, communities and societies, and consider social conditions, and procedural and institutional trends.

- Cultural changes may include beliefs, norms, the meaning of things, traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, authority structures, and processes (Lederach, et al 2007:17-23).

Lederach, Neufeldt and Culbertson note that multiple theories of change can exist depending on which of the four previous dimensions are relevant in the Peacebuilding intervention. These theories of change are often implicit in the programme design and simply need full articulation of how participants are expected to respond to the proposed peacebuilding activities. As they note, “making the theory of change explicit can help the group identify further activities that may be needed as well as other actors or institutions that need to be involved in the programme” (Lederach, et al 2007:27-28). Helpful techniques for identifying change theories include diagramming or modelling the steps which need to occur to get to the end goal; examining stories from actual peacebuilding field practice to identify change
mechanisms; and involving reflective or inquisitive outsiders to help identify change mechanisms (Lederach, et al 2007:27-28).

2.8 Evaluation of peace-building models

The political strategy of a peacebuilding mandate is the concept of operations embodied in its design. Just as civil wars are usually about failures of legitimate state authority, sustainable civil peace relies on its successful reconstruction.(Gurr et al 2001) Peacebuilding is about what needs to happen in between. Civil wars arise when individuals, groups and factions discover that a policeman, judge, soldier or politician no longer speaks and acts for them. Rather than “the local cop on the beat,” the cop becomes “the Croatian, Serb or Muslim cop.” When the disaffected mobilize, acquire the resources needed to risk an armed contest, and judge that they can win, civil war usually follows (Muhammed 2013).

Although we can imagine purely cooperative solutions to domestic peace, the confusion, “noise,” violence, and changing identification that characterize the onslaught and conduct of civil war do not seem to be promising circumstances for rational cooperation among factions (Doyle et al 2000). Instead the establishment of civil peace seems to require addressing directly both the defensive and aggressive incentives that motivate faction leaders and sometimes their followers from pursuing conflict agenda (Galtung 1996).

De Figueiredo and Weingast (1999), strongly believe that defensive incentives arise in the domestic “security dilemma.” Under emerging conditions of anarchy (the collapse of central authority) each group/faction seeks to arm itself in order to be protected; but, as in inter-state anarchy, each defensive armament constitutes a threat to other factions.

In this regard, Posen (1993) says offensive incentives arise because factions and their leaders will want to impose their ideology or culture, to reap the spoils of state power, to seize the property of rivals, or to exploit public resources for private gain, or all of the above. Establishing peace will thus also require the elimination, management or control of “spoilers” or war entrepreneurs. Conquest by one faction in any given conflict can solve the problem and more importantly, political and social reconstruction is critical and can be vital for longer-term legitimacy and stability. Kaufmann (1996) therefore sums it up by saying peace
through agreement can employ the separation of populations and territorial partition to address war-prone incentives.

Herbst (1996), believes that civil wars can be turned into international wars as was the case of Eritrea-Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo or stable and relatively secure international or inter-communal balances of power, as in Cyprus or Somaliland-Somalia. “To each spoiler, his or her separate pile of spoils” Kayembe (2001:89). Dennis (2013) supports the above idea and goes further to maintain that in many civil war, the contests is over who or what ideology controls a single polity. But in many civil wars the contest is over who or what “ideology” controls a single polity.

Moreover, in some ethnic wars the costs of ethnic “cleansing” will seem too high. This has created problems that post conflict governments are not able to handle. Examples of this case include Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda. In this vein, Wanjiku (2014) has strongly argued that troubles created by the above is the issue of ethnic cleansing that have far reaching consequences and very difficult to handle. Combatants in these circumstances still have continuing disputes over material interests, who or what rules, and safety. They have each experienced varying degrees of devastating destruction and both leaders and followers are likely to harbour deep resentment for losses sustained, particularly to family and village members. They also are experiencing the costs of war and may have come to “hurting stalemate,” in which no faction sees that it can win and each is experiencing net costs of continuing strife (Miguel 2011).

On the other hand, Zartman (1985) is of the opinion that in these latter circumstances, sustainable peace needs state authority as a starting point to overcome security concerns. Hobbes’s Leviathan – state sovereignty or authority – fills that role, restoring “legitimate power.” The specific motivations that shape the behaviour of combatants are thus complex and varied. The classical, Thucydidean and Hobbesian trinity of motives [fear, honour, interest] are present in modern variations --security dilemmas, ethnic identity and/or ideological fervour, and loot-seeking and each of them is complicated by potential differences between leaders and followers; factions and patrons.

Thus, according to Zartman (1985), the decision to organize or participate in a rebellion and then attempt to achieve a viable peace is not a straight-forward matter and may differ greatly
across actors. This is further supported by Collier and Hoeffler (1999) who strongly argue that what each motivated actor shares, however, is a political environment in which success in achieving peace depends on the degree of harm sustained, the resources available for development, and the international assistance to overcome gaps. Low levels of economic development and other deficiencies in local capacities may motivate actors to violence, due to the low opportunity cost of war and the opportunities for private gains from violence).

Increased hostility can be due to the experience of protracted war which makes reconciliation more difficult. To achieve peace and reconciliation under these circumstances, Zartman (1995) argues that there is need some combination of:

- Re-concentrating central power (the powerful must be recognized as legitimate; or the legitimate, made powerful).
- Increasing state legitimacy through participation (elections, power-sharing) and
- Raising and allocating economic resources in support of peace. Given the devastation of civil war; all three generally require.
- External, international assistance or international authority in a transitional period.

It will argue that the levels of war-related hostility and the pre- and post-war levels of local capacities interact with present international capacities to deliver specific post-conflict outcomes.

### 2.9 A Peacebuilding Triangle

International peacebuilding strategies and concepts of operations should be “strategic” in the ordinary sense of that term, matching means to ends. Although a peacebuilding strategy must be designed to address a particular conflict, broad parameters that fit most conflicts can be identified. According to Zartman (1985) strategies should address the local sources of hostility; the local capacities for change; and the net specific degree of international commitment available to assist change. One can conceive of the three as the three dimensions of a triangle, whose area is the “political space”—or effective capacity—for building peace. This metaphor suggests that the dimensions substitute for each other—more of one substitutes for less of another, less extreme hostilities substitute for weak local capacity or minor international commitment.
International commitment or lack thereof interacts with local capacities and factional hostility to shape the triangular peacebuilding “space;” for few peacebuilding plans work unless regional neighbours and other significant international actors desist from supporting war and begin supporting peace (Muhammed 2013). The end of Cold War competition thus was an important precondition for the bloom of peacebuilding operations of the early 1990’s. Beyond that minimum, international peacebuilding, from monitoring to enforcement, also makes a difference (Miall et al 2003).

2.9.1 The Peacebuilding Triangle Model

Doyle and Sambanis (2000) identify three core dimensions of international peacebuilding; peacebuilding strategies should all address the domestic sources of hostility, the local capacities for change, and the extent to which international assistance is available to generate reform. The peacebuilding triangle is an embodiment of these three dimensions – level of hostility, local capacities, and international capacities – as a model of the effective capacity for building post-conflict peace. The dimensions interact with each other allowing the model to be both competitive – hostility level versus international and local capacities – and cooperative – international capacities and local capacities. The model assumes international capacities to be strictly positive following the assumption that international assistance will only improve, not thwart, the likelihood of peacebuilding success. Each of the three dimensions is measured as an individual index ranging from zero to one.

The logic of the model is straightforward. As a modern international concept, peacebuilding success heavily depend on ample international and/or regional involvement. Furthermore Sambanis and Doyle (2006) constructed the peacebuilding triangle model for the purpose of deciphering the influence of various types of UN peace operations such as mediation missions, observer missions, traditional peacekeeping missions, multidimensional peacekeeping missions, and peace enforcement missions) during the post-war era. The hostility level captures the impact of the depth of violence present during the civil war – the more pugnacious and numerous factions on the need for greater international assistance in order to build peace.

Accordingly, Ramsbothan et al (2012) do believe that lower levels of hostility may require less international assistance, resulting in a lower-intensity UN mission as the most appropriate option. The local capacities level captures the degree of socioeconomic
development present, or the need for state reconstruction. Greater international assistance coincides with a greater need for state reconstruction, or a higher-intensity UN mission. In sum, the aim of Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) peacebuilding triangle is to show how international assistance is central to peacebuilding in general and more likely to be successful when it caters to the context of each particular case.

Figure 6: The Peace building Triangle

Although for some cases, such as El Salvador and Croatia, Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) peacebuilding model does accurately predict the probability of peacebuilding success for other cases. The peacebuilding triangle is less accurate due to omitted variables. Sambanis and Doyle (2006) note that the peacebuilding triangle in Congo (1960-1965) could have conceivably been more accurate if the primary commodity exports variable captured the country’s high dependence on natural resource rents. On the one hand, the peacebuilding triangle in Cambodia (1975-1991) was unable to capture the Khmer Rouge’s principal source of revenue, the timber trade. On the other hand, and equally problematic, the Peacebuilding triangle in Cyprus (1974) overestimates the country’s resource dependency.

Looking more closely, though, Angola’s domestic terrain is highly problematic for building peace: dependency on natural resource rents, loot-able resource endowment, religious dominance, and no previous experience with political pluralism. Post-conflict Iraq (1985-
1996) also measures at a relatively high local capacities level; according to the current local capacities index, Iraq had greater domestic capacity for building peace than approximately 90% of all the cases (Aziz 2013). Adding dimensions to the local capacities index will induce greater variance in the index and enable a more fruitful exploration of the effect of the domestic realm with respect to building peace (Aziz 2013).

2.9.2 Peace building: The peace process

Conflict and conciliation dynamics puts the accent on obstacles to peace making in civil wars and insurgencies. Wallensteen (2002:149–156) argues that the end of hostilities finds the adversaries and the society more divided than before violent conflict in that:

Internal armed conflict has devastating effects on the polity, society, and the economy. Peace institutions and capabilities weaken, and violence institutions and capabilities strengthen.

According to the paradox of mobilization, leadership groups and the population change during the conflict in ways that make peace making problematic. Hardliners displace moderates, and splits between conciliators and rejectionists factionalize each adversary; bystanders are mobilized, polarized, and encapsulated in partisan subcultures; external interveners have been added to the internal adversaries.

The insurgents and the security forces perpetuate massacres and atrocities against one another and against civilians in violation of the laws of war, human rights, and humanitarian law. An emergency system of surveillance, fighting, detention, and prosecution of insurgents and terrorists suspends the justice system and leads to abuses.

Issues have accumulated. On top of the core issues, the armed conflict and the emergency institutions for counterinsurgency keep generating contentious conflicts over responsibility for killings, violence and security, refugees, relief operations, failed peace efforts, and the safety and welfare of civilians.

Some external intervention tends to increase the conflict because it is partisan rather than conciliatory. Well-intentioned humanitarian relief and peacekeeping operations are diverted by the combatants for increasing their war-making resources and enable
combatants to relinquish responsibility for non-combatants. International intervention with military force is improvised as the crisis deepens and is often too little, too late.

The stakes in a peace settlement are very high since adversaries will continue living in the same state and will need to cooperate for peace implementation, yet they continue pursuing war goals by other means.

According to the paradox of peace making, the adversaries’ relationship has become more hostile and less trusting; rigid and extreme views about one another have embedded in collective myths that have the force of truth; each considers itself the victim of the other’s aggression. Peace negotiations are preceded by informal probes and exploratory communications between the adversaries through intermediaries who may be external stakeholders, neutral states without a direct interest in the conflict, prominent public figures such as retired statesmen and Nobel prize winners, or mediators appointed by international organizations such as the European Union and the United Nations.

According to Darby and Mac Ginty (2004) peace negotiations are not institutionalized to the same extent as other modes of conflict management, for example, collective bargaining between management and trade unions under labour law. For collective bargaining for a labour contract, who the adversaries are is recognized by law, the date of contract expiration is known, there are rules for negotiation according to law and precedent, the mode of acceptance for a new contract is lawful – ratification by vote of the union members and coercive actions undertaken during negotiations, such as striking and picketing and countermoves by the employer, are also protected by labour law and violations.

In this regard, Oberschall (1973: 244–5) thus believes that labour negotiators can focus on the substantive issues because the procedures for negotiation are set down in the law. By contrast in peace negotiations, the who, when, how, and what (the agenda) are subject to disagreement; the mode of ratification of the settlement has to be determined; coercive moves by the adversaries continue and are not subject to sanction mechanisms; and the enforcement of the peace settlement is also to be negotiated.
2.10 Principles for peacebuilding

According to Zartman (1995) the central task of peacebuilding is to create positive peace, a social environment in which new disputes do not escalate into violence and war. Sustainable peace is characterized by self-sustainability, the absence of physical and structural violence and the elimination of discrimination. In this regard, Lederach (1997) says moving towards this sort of environment goes beyond problem solving or conflict management. Peacebuilding initiatives try to fix the core problems that underlie the conflict and change the patterns of interaction of the involved parties. They aim to move a given population from a condition of extreme vulnerability and dependency to one of self-sufficiency and well-being (Lederach 1997).

Comprehensive means having the ability to see the overall picture in order to effect change within it. The above idea is further supported by Herbst, (1996) who observes that lasting peace can be achieved by addressing the multiple sources of conflict at various levels of society. This means identifying the needs of those involved, developing a vision of what should be worked towards, creating actions that might lead to achieving this goal, and constructing a plan that functions as a guide. To do this, one has to step back from the immediate day-to-day events and situate the actions within a broader vision and purpose. It therefore follows that no interdependent person, activity or level of society is able to design and deliver ‘peace’ on its own (Herbst 1996).

Thus, according to Lederach (1997) peacebuilding involves a variety of actors and roles, interconnected people, systems and activities. All things are linked and mutually affect one another. He proposes three levels of leadership that is top leadership, middle level leadership and grassroots level. There is serious need to include all these levels in the process of peacebuilding. In this regard, people are at the heart of peacebuilding, therefore peacebuilding is very closely connected to the nature and quality of relationships. It builds and supports the interdependent relationships necessary to affect and sustain the desired changes. Sustainable Peacebuilding is a long term prospect. Conflicts often span generations and flare up periodically into violent actions. To achieve sustainable peace, one therefore needs to pay attention to where the activities and energies are leading. This means not just thinking about and working on immediate and effective responses to issues and crises, but
creating on-going capacities within the context to transform recurring cycles of conflict and crisis. This means identifying and strengthening resources in the context of the conflict.

Boutros Boutros Ghali (1995) suggests that being strategic implies putting specific scheduled actions in place, responding pro-actively to emerging social situations and meeting immediate and specific concerns and needs. At the same time a larger and longer term change process must be reinforced. The design of peacebuilding actions should therefore be related to immediate needs and desired ideas for future changes (including the what, where and how of activities). The above ideas are further supported by Berliner (2009) who argues that infrastructure is required to provide the necessary logistical mechanisms, social space and institutions that support the peacebuilding processes and effect the envisaged changes. Peacebuilding infrastructure can be compared to the foundations and pillars that hold up a house: while people and their relations are the foundations, the pillars symbolize the social spaces. Both need to transform from violence to increased respect and interdependence, increased involvement and the acceptance of individual responsibility for building peace.

2.11 Peacebuilding dimensions

Neufeldt and Culbertson (2007) are of the strong opinion that peacebuilding measures involve all levels of society, target all aspects of the state structure and require a wide variety of agents for their implementation. While external agents can facilitate and support peacebuilding, it must be driven by internal forces; it cannot be imposed from outside. Peacebuilding aims at creating an environment conducive to self-sustaining and durable peace, and to prevent conflict from re-emerging. Therefore parties must replace the spiral of violence and destruction with a spiral of peace and development. The creation of such an environment has the following three central dimensions. Each of these dimensions relies on different strategies and techniques.

Richmond (2007) goes further to argue that the peacebuilding has structural dimension which focuses on the social, economic, political and cultural conditions that foster violent conflicts. Therefore, these root causes are typically complex and can include unfair land distribution, environmental degradation or unequal political representation. If these social, economic, political and cultural foundations that should serve to satisfy the needs of the population are
not addressed, there can be no lasting peace. Therefore the parties must analyse the structural causes of the conflict and initiate social structural change.

Ramsbothan et al (2011) bring in the relational dimension which centres on reconciliation, forgiveness, trust building and future vision. Its focus lies in reducing the negative effects of conflicts which include violence and war through repairing and transforming damaged relationships. One of the essential requirements for this transformation is effective communication. Through dialogue on all levels, parties can increase their awareness of their own role in the conflict, develop a more accurate perception of their own and the other group’s identity and may eventually understand each other better. If supportive communication systems are in place, relations between the parties can improve, trust can be built and any peace agreements reached will more likely be sustainable. A crucial component of such bridge-building dialogue is future imaging, whereby parties create a vision of the commonly shared future they are trying to build (Hill 2007).

According to Ramsbothan et al (2011), parties often have more in common in terms of their visions of the future than they do about their shared and violent past. If they know where they would like to go, it will be easier to get there. In addition to looking towards the future, parties must deal with their painful past. Reconciliation means recognizing both a common future, and the past wrongdoing. Therefore, what has happened should be dealt with and possibly forgiven if the parties are to renew their relationship and build an interdependent future.

In addition to the relational dimension there is the personal dimension which does focus on desired changes at the individual level. According to Ramshobothan et al (2011) if individuals are not able to undergo a healing process, there may be social, political, and economic repercussions. The social fabric that has been destroyed by conflicts must be repaired and trauma must be dealt with. Building peace must pay attention to the psychological and emotional layers of the conflict. After an experience of violence, an individual is likely to feel vulnerable, helpless and out of control in an unpredictable context.

Furthermore, Simmons (1996) argues that if the psychological aspects of experienced violence and its consequence are ignored, victims are at risk of becoming perpetrators of future violence. Victim empowerment can help to break this cycle. Peacebuilding initiatives
should therefore, provide and support appropriate programmes for different levels and areas of the society (e.g.: one-to-one counselling, rebuilding community structures, performing rituals or ceremonies, constructing memorials to commemorate pain and suffering, building mental health infrastructure and establishing professional training).

2.12 Peace education
As observed by Ramsbothan et al (2011) peace-education finds its motivation in peace utopias and in the visions of people who have shown that hopes and dreams are not necessarily individualistic, but can be combined with political commitment. In this sense many individuals serve as important role models in peace education; for example the vision of Martin Luther King Jr. that he spelled out in his “I have a dream” speech 24, or Mahatma Gandhi’s concept of “satyagraha” (persisting, holding firm to the truth). The ideas and visions they described became meaningful because they took specific steps towards freedom from violence and justice for everybody. Peace education is one step, one part of the process towards more justice and peace in the world.

UNESCO is regarded as one of the most important organizations for peace education. The following quote on ‘Education for a Culture of Peace’ underlines UNESCO’s commitment to peace education “The development of a holistic approach, based on participatory methods and taking into account the various dimensions of education for a culture of peace (peace and non-violence, human rights, democracy, tolerance, international and intercultural understanding, cultural and linguistic diversity) is its main objective” (Reilley 2009:67).

An attempt at theory
As noted by Oberschall (2007), the practical challenges posed by peacebuilding begs the question if theoretical generalisation is possible as a way to gain an overview, notwithstanding the observation at the outset that all countries and wars are different. The purposes of a peacebuilding theory might be to:

- help diagnose the political pathology of countries;
- help determine feasible goals, optimal treatment, and suitable sequencing of actions;
- select countries in need for assistance programs;
- better allocate limited resources;
find the best ‘agents of change’ (improvement) in countries in need; and also 6. to develop crisis prevention strategies. Such theory may exist, but we have not yet identified it (Reilley (2009:242).

Oberschall (2007) is of the strong view that this new field of study might not yet be ready for such achievements, but the need is great and new studies may help to make progress in the next few years. In the present explorative study, the purpose is more modest: to find elements of a possible theory that might help to improve assistance to building the rule of law in post-conflict societies. There are different approaches and frameworks used in the peacebuilding literature, such as a liberal/universalistic strand which focuses on human rights, and more constructivist strands that focus on local culture. This idea is further supported by Reilley (2009) who strongly believes that this subject area of assistance for building the rule of law in foreign countries is relatively new as an academic and policy field. On the other hand, history offers endless cases of building and reforming states and their various legal systems, sometimes with outside assistance, or under strong external pressures.

2.13 APPROACHES TO PEACEBUILDING

Figure 7: Approaches to building peace
2.13.1 Level 1: Top-Level Approaches

On the right-hand side of the pyramid are various features of, and approaches to, peacebuilding. At the top level we find what we might call the "top-down" approach to peacebuilding. This approach has the following characteristics. First, the people who emerge as peacemakers, often seen as intermediaries or mediators, are eminent figures who themselves possess a public profile. They are often backed by a supporting government or international organization such as the United Nations, which lies outside the relationships embroiled in the internal conflict. More often than not, actors at this level operate as single personalities.

Lederach (1997) says that for the second, the goal is to achieve a negotiated settlement between the principal high-level leaders in the conflict/these peacemakers tend to operate as third parties who shuttle between the protagonists. What transpires is a process of high-level
negotiations in which top-level leaders are identified and brought to the bargaining table. Getting to the table and setting the agenda for negotiations become guiding metaphors of the peacemaker's work. By virtue of the players involved, both the intermediaries and the negotiations are typically subjected to close media scrutiny.

Azar (1985) is of the opinion that a critical aspect of this work is the need to create sufficient trust and flexibility among the protagonists to permit new options to emerge and compromise to take place. This poses a serious dilemma for a negotiation process conducted in a highly visible environment, in which the lead negotiators must maintain publicly articulated goals and demands in order not be seen as weak yet move toward each other at the table. Third, the peacebuilding approach at this level is often focused on achieving a cease-fire or a cessation of hostilities as a first step that will lead to subsequent steps involving broader political and substantive negotiations, which in turn will culminate in an agreement creating the mechanisms for a political transition from war to peace. A number of operative assumptions undergird peacebuilding activity at the top level. It is assumed, for example, that the key to achieving peace lies with identifying the representative leaders and getting them to agree. It is assumed according to Azar (1985:147) that the key to achieving peace lies with identifying the representative leaders and getting them to agree.

Azar (1985:147) this presumes that:
- Representative leaders can be identified;
- They will articulate and advocate, from the perspective of those they represent, the concerns giving rise to the conflict; and
- they possess the power, or at least the influence, to deliver the support of their respective communities for the implementation of any agreements reached. In other words, the model builds on the assumption of a hierarchical, as well as a monolithic, power structure within the setting (Hanlon 2002).

Ramsbothan et al (2011) argues that Lederach’s framework is based on a top-down, or what might more aptly be called a "trickle-down," approach to peace. In essence, it is believed that the accomplishments at the highest level will translate to, and move down through, the rest of the population. According to this model, the greatest potential and the primary responsibility for achieving peace resides with the representative leaders of the parties to the conflict. If
these leaders can agree, that sets the stage, the framework, and the environment for delivering
the rest of society in the implementation of the agreement that will end the war.

Finally, the top-level approach makes some concrete assumptions about the order and time
frame for peace. A certain pattern for a phased approach has emerged that can be detected
from the recent peace processes in Ethiopia, El Salvador, and Cambodia. (Muhammed 2013).
As pointed out by Manuel (2009) it first involves efforts aimed at achieving a cease-fire
agreement with military leaders. Next, a process of "national" transition is initiated involving
the political leadership in creating a framework that will lead to democratic elections. "Peace"
in the early stages hinges on achieving a cease-fire, and in the later stages on broadening and
including more sectors of the society. This assumes a step-by-step, issue-oriented, and short-
term achievement process engaged in by top-level leaders.

As noted by White (2011) perhaps the most critical assumption, however, is that by and large
the other levels of the population wait for the accord to be reached and only then are they
engaged in its implementation. In other words, it is assumed that the accord will have to be
relevant to and capable of practical implementation at the local level, even though in most
instances the accord was reached under enormous political pressure and involved
compromises on all sides. As shall be seen, this scenario contrasts sharply with the kind of
peace process envisaged under a more comprehensive framework, which assumes an
interdependence of levels that involve multiple tiers of leadership and participation within the
affected population and that integrate simultaneous but pace-differentiated activities.

2.13.2 Level 2: Middle-Range Approaches

The middle range offers what might be called a "middle-out" approach to peacebuilding. It is
based on the idea that the middle range contains a set of leaders with a determinant location
in the conflict who, if integrated properly, might provide the key to creating an infrastructure
for achieving and sustaining peace (Lederach 1997; 1998b). According to Paffenholz and
Spurk (2005:168), “a theory or literature of middle-range peacebuilding as such has not yet
been developed.” They observed that there are however, a number of parallel examples to
draw upon of middle-range approaches to peace. These fit into three categories: problem-
solving workshops, conflict resolution training, and the development of peace commissions
(Paffenholz and Spurk 2005). This area therefore needs serious attention so as to fully develop this approach as it brings on board all key stakeholders.

2.13.3 Problem-solving workshops

Further, Lederach (1997) is of the strong view that the most developed activity theoretically and the most thoroughly evaluated for effectiveness and impact (given that few non-traditional peace processes have received enough attention to be formally evaluated) have been problem solving workshops. Accordingly, these workshops, at times are referred to as "interactive problem-solving" or "third-party consultation," provide a venue for persons who unofficially represent the parties to a conflict to interact in a process of "collaborative analysis" of the problems that separate them.

Mitchell (1981) argues that the approach should involves informal, week or month long meetings of the representatives of parties in protracted, deep-rooted, and frequently violent conflict in an informal, often academic, setting that permits the re-analysis of their conflict as a shared problem and the generation of some alternative courses of action to continued coercion, together with new options for a generally acceptable and self-sustaining resolution.

As pointed by Mitchell (1981) this problem-solving approach has a number of important features that are characteristic of middle-range peacebuilding. First, participants are typically invited because of their knowledge of the conflict and their proximity to key decision makers, but top-level actors are not invited. He has referred to such participants as opinion leaders those who are in a position to influence opinion. The workshop is not an exercise aimed at emulating or replacing formal negotiations. It is an exercise aimed at broadening participation in the process, as well as the perceptions of the participants, and deepening their analysis of the problem and their innovation in seeking solutions.

Secondly, the workshop approach is designed to be informal and off the record, which creates an environment for adversaries to interact in ways that their chosen settings, and certainly which public events, would not permit. An environment is established that enables direct interaction with adversaries and encourages the development of relationships, as well as flexibility in looking at the parties' shared problems and possible solutions. The workshop provides a politically safe space for floating and testing ideas, which may or may not prove useful back in real-life settings. Finally, the third-party component in the workshop provides
multiple services. Among its key functions are the convening of the parties, facilitating the meeting, and providing expertise on the analysis of conflict and processes of conflict resolution. The third party team seeks to provide participants an opportunity for and an example of a more effective mode of interaction, and to permit them to look at the conflict through analytical rather than only coercive lenses (Pradesh 1998).

It is worth noting that recent peace processes that have captured public attention have featured, behind the scenes, significant and concerted problem-solving efforts that provided support to the negotiators and fed new ideas into the bargaining process. As noted by Muhammed (2012), this was the case, for example, with the PLO-Israeli accord signed in 1993, developments in Northern Ireland in the mid-1990s, and the accord in Guatemala signed in 1996.

According to Coetzee (2011), some illustrations of practical applications will highlight the role middle-range training has played in peace strategies. In the South African context, for example, the Centre for Conflict Resolution (formerly the Centre for Intergroup Studies) has undertaken an extensive training programme directed at providing a conceptual framework and skills for dealing with conflict in the post-apartheid "New South Africa." In some instances, the organization has trained leaders of political movements such as the African National Congress in others, it has targeted sectoral actors such as religious and civic leaders; and in a third approach, it has provided training that brought together former antagonists, such as liberation movement leaders and policemen.

Paula Gutlove et al (2008), strongly believe that the programme of training middle-level leaders across the former Yugoslavia was meant to enable most of these key people to assist in the process of bringing both groups of actors so that the peace process could go on smoothly and bring lasting peace in the war/conflict torn country. The threefold goal was to create for participants an opportunity to reflect on the experience of the conflict; to deal with the psychological dimensions inherent in their experience of the conflict; and to develop skills for dealing with conflict in alternative ways. A third example is the vast array of training approaches and events that have emerged in Northern Ireland. In these instances, the training has not only provided skills but also endeavoured to identify Irish approaches and experiments far dealing innovatively with the sharp sectarian divisions (Karbo 2007).
Yet another example is the efforts by the All Africa Conference of Churches, principally in collaboration with the Nairobi Peace Initiative, to combine the roles of convenor and trainer (Lederach1997). Middle-range leaders from church communities who found themselves on different sides of conflicts in countries such as Mozambique, Angola and to a lesser extent Zimbabwe were brought together to share their perceptions and experiences of the conflict, analyse their own roles in it, and develop approaches for encouraging and supporting reconciliation in their context.

What these approaches suggest is that although training is generally thought of as the dissemination of knowledge and imparting of skills, it becomes a strategic tool as it promotes the development of peacebuilding capacities within the middle-range leadership. This potential is further enhanced when training, serving a convening function, brings together people from the same level of society but on different sides of the conflict.

The Zimbabwean Catholic Conference (in the period 2007 to 2008) in association with civil society produced a document entitled “The Zimbabwe We Want” In this document they espoused the major concepts of an ideal country and what the generality of Zimbabweans wanted. However, it was not given any attention by ZANU PF Government. Instead of critically reviewing the ideas, the government saw it as conspiracy by churches and civil society to get power through the back door. According to CCJP (2009) the involvement of the church and the rest of civil society are critical because it brings many people on board and in that process it becomes consensus oriented as churches represent big constituency of believers. Thus, the document, The Zimbabwe We Want came as a result of intensive consultation with all the churches affiliate to Zimbabwe Council of Churches (Trevor Manhanga 2006).

2.13.4 Level 3: Grassroots Approaches

As pointed by Lederach (1998), grassroots approaches face different challenges from those confronting the top and middle-range levels. First, at this level are massive numbers of people. At best, strategies can be implemented to touch the leadership working at local and community levels, but more often than not these strategies represent points of contact with the masses rather than a comprehensive programme for reaching them. Second, many of the people at this level are in a survival mode in which meeting the basic human needs of food, shelter, and safety is a daily struggle. Although unresolved human conflict is a central cause
of their suffering, efforts directed at peace and conflict resolution can easily be seen as an unaffordable luxury. Nonetheless, important ideas and practical efforts do emerge at this level. It is therefore necessary to consider here an outline of a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding advanced by Galtung (1996) and several concrete examples of programmes targeted at the grassroots-level population (White 2011).

2.13.4.1 Bottom-up approach.

It has been argued by some scholars such as Muhammed (1995) that virtually all of the recent transitions toward peace such as those in El Salvador and Ethiopia, as well as the earlier one in the Philippines were driven largely by the pressure for change that was bubbling up from the grassroots. According to Dennis (2013) at times it seems that exhaustion, rather than innovative planned transformation, is chiefly responsible for ending conflicts. A concrete case of a bottom-up approach has been clearly delineated in the Somali context (Doyles et al 2000). First articulated by the Somali members of the Ergada, a forum of Somali intellectuals for peace created in 1990 the bottom-up perspective was later rearticulated in more detail by international and Somali resource groups convened by the Life and Peace Institute of Uppsala, Sweden, to advise the United Nations in its reconciliation work in Somalia between 1991 and 1993 (Ell Farrad 2012).

The approach was rooted in an assessment of three important features of the situation in Somalia. First, since the fall of President Siad Barre in 1991, the formal, political infrastructure of the country had for all practical purposes disintegrated. Second, in the post-Barre years Somalis had come to rely directly on clan and sub-clan structures for security and subsistence (Richmond 2007).

Muhammed (1995) strongly argues that Somalis have a rich history of traditional mechanisms for dealing with inter-clan disputes. Given this background, efforts to identify national leaders or convene peace conferences relying on common diplomatic devices, such as bringing together key militia leaders, would create a superficial structure unable to sustain itself. Instead, the most promising approach would be to develop a process that builds on the traditions of the Somali people. In brief, the bottom-up approach involved a process of first achieving discussions and agreements to end the fighting at local peace conferences, by bringing together contiguous and interdependent sub-clans, guided by the elders of each sub-clan. These conferences not only dealt with issues of immediate concern at local levels, but
also served to place responsibility for inter-clan fighting on the shoulders of local leaders and helped to identify the persons who were considered to be rightful representatives of those clans' concerns. Having achieved this initial agreement, it was then possible to repeat the same process at a higher level with a broader set of clans (Really 2009).

Characteristic of these processes were the reliance on elders; lengthy oral deliberations often lasting months sometimes years. The creation of a forum or assembly of elders known in some parts of the region as the Guurti and careful negotiation over access to resources and payments for deaths that would re-establish a balance among the clans. These are basic parameters of the process as it was implemented in Somaliland, the north western part of the country, which announced its secession in 1991 (Azziz 2013).

According to Miguel and Hanlon (2008), the process was initiated with numerous local peace conferences throughout the region and culminated in the Grand Borama Peace Conference, which brought together more than five hundred elders. The Grand Conference lasted for more than six months and succeeded in establishing a framework for peace, the basic structure of which helped to significantly diminish the level of fighting and violence in Somaliland as compared to other parts of Somalia, particularly Mogadishu (Pradesh, 1998).

2.13.4.2 From issues to systems
Hart (2006) used one set of lenses to focus on the actors and appropriate peacebuilding activities to be found at the different levels in a population affected by conflict, some scholars moved on to employ a second set of lenses to focus on the structural component of an analytical framework for conflict transformation. As pointed Martins (2010) there is need to take into consideration both the immediate, "micro-issues" in the conflict and the broader, more systemic concerns in order to address the peacebuilding issues. Dugan (2006) developed a "nested paradigm" as a mechanism for considering both the narrower and the broader aspects of conflict resolution and peacebuilding.
Dugan (2006) took the practical example of a violent conflict that had emerged in a local school between African American and white gangs of young boys. She speculated that a conflict resolution practitioner, such as a mediator, would see this as an issue in dispute, a case to be explored and resolved between the boys who had been fighting. The answer to the problem, then, would be to resolve the issue that sparked the fight. Taking it one step further, she suggested that in some instances, depending on the model of practice used, the mediator might see this as not only a particular issue to be resolved but also a relationship that needed to be addressed. In this case, the issue would be embedded within a relationship that needed to be reconciled. Here, the practitioner might move to incorporate, for example, prejudice.
reduction or bias-awareness work with the boys in order to increase their understanding of one another and promote reconciliation in a deeper sense.

Dugan goes further to say that the problem in this instance would be defined as a broken relationship that needed to be restored as part of the solution. Dugan, therefore, adds a third, intermediate level the sub-system. Here the focus will be on the immediate system within which the boys are located, in this case the school. At this level, a peacebuilding strategy could be designed that would address both the systemic concerns and the problematic issues and relationships. It might involve the development of a school wide programme that would address the social issue of racism in the context of the relationships in that subsystem. The school, for example, might introduce into its curriculum a required course on diversity and race relations or might host a weeklong training program on prejudice reduction for students and teachers.

Gurr and Khola (2001) have noted that although such approaches are informed by deeper systemic analysis, they also provide practical initiatives for addressing immediate issues, and are able to draw on valuable human resources, tap into and take maximum benefit from institutional, cultural, and informal networks that cut across the lines of conflict, and connect the levels of peace activity within the population. As further noted by Fisher (2004) these qualities give middle-range actors and subsystem and relationship foci the greatest potential to serve as sources of practical, immediate action and to sustain long-term transformation in the setting. The most savage offenses a government can perpetuate on its own people (and sometimes neighbouring people as well) are genocide and ethnic cleansing. The above was further supported by Lederach (1997) who maintains that all actors including middle range actors are critical for the success of peacebuilding efforts.

Tutu (2004) talking about this issue says that ethnic cleansing is the use of force or intimidation for removing people of a certain ethnic or religious group from an area or territory that is their homeland. It used to be called “mass deportations.” A host of criminal offenses take place during ethnic cleansing: murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, executions, rape and sexual assault, military and paramilitary attacks on civilians, robbery and extortion, destruction of cultural and religious buildings and monuments, destruction of homes, confinement of civilians in camps, purposeful starvation, and some others. Some of these crimes are war crimes; others are crimes against humanity; still others are criminal acts by individuals.
The purpose of these crimes is to get the target population to flee (kill and assault some, and the others will flee), to rob its property and make it destitute, to administer extra-legal punishment and revenge for alleged disloyalty or helping enemies, and to prevent return by having nothing to return for. In many cases, return is not possible. In others, only a fraction of the refugees and internally displaced persons return. Ethnic cleansing “works” as intended by the perpetrators.

The 1948 Genocide Convention (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide) article 2 defines ethnic cleansing as any of the following acts committed with intention to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, racial, or religious group, as such:

- Killing members of the group.
- Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group.
- Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in Peace intervention part.
- Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group.
- Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
- Genocide is killing a part or all of an ethnic group.

In this regard, Raphael Lemkin (1990), the Polish scholar who first proposed the label and crime of genocide, explained that genocide does not only mean the immediate total destruction of a people, as in mass extermination, but is also a coordinated plan of many different actions aimed at destroying the basic foundations of life of a people and thus annihilating the people itself. Genocide against a politically defined group was not included in the convention, nor forced assimilation of a people by another one, because the Soviet Union would not have agreed to the convention. The crime of genocide, as well as mass political persecution and forced assimilation, consists of violent actions that are themselves war crimes and crimes against humanity, as is true for ethnic cleansing. All of these crimes are aimed at an entire group or people. Killing of civilians in a single incident, e.g. when a group extracts revenge for the death of its members by killing members of the alleged perpetrators, is termed a massacre, or ethnic riot. On the scale of horrors and tragedies that a human group inflicts on another, genocide and ethnic cleansing occupy the top.
As pointed by Hamber (2001), both genocide and ethnic cleansing are planned and organized murderous violence against a people by the authorities and their agents, take time to prepare, and require the complicity of large numbers of militants and passive acceptance by ordinary citizens who “look the other way,” are intimidated or are confused. Collective violence tends to be perpetuated by authoritarian regimes that have a long record of oppression and human rights violations against minorities, between adversaries who have a history of hostile relations and of conflict, and during a major crisis such as insurgency, civil war, and secession.

Research by Fein (1979) and Mann (2005) have shown that in the preparatory period the target group is labelled and sharply distinguished from the perpetrator people by a name and hate symbols (yellow stars for Jews in Nazi Germany and Nazi-occupied Europe). It is dehumanized in official hate and threat propaganda, e.g. in cartoons, false atrocity stories and films, and the falsification of history, the target group is depicted as amoral, dangerous, and a threat to the perpetrators and their way of life. An elaborate justification is created for preparing the public for the collective violence and mass killings. Justification encompasses innocent civilians such as children, mothers, and old people because children will grow up to adulthood, women will give birth for the enemy group, and old folks may become troublesome witnesses, that is the entire group or people are tainted with the brush of guilt and should be struck pre-emptively before they strike the perpetrators (Cohen 1998). Armed fighters, including often special branches of the regular army and police, are trained, armed, and organized for the campaign of genocide or ethnic cleansing. A wall of concealment, falsehood, and denial is built to cover up criminal actions, such as the burial of bodies at remote execution sites in mass graves that are covered with dirt and levelled for escaping discovery (Callahan 2002).

Genocide and ethnic cleansing in the contemporary world are not rare events. Naimark (2001) has described many. His list includes: Armenian genocide in 1915; Greek and Turkish mutual ethnic cleansing in the 1920s; Nazi genocide of the Jews and some other groups in World War II; internal mass deportations in the Soviet Union against Chechens, Crimean Tatars, the Inguish, and the Volga Germans; mass atrocities between the various political and nationality groups in Yugoslavia in World War II; in the aftermath of that war the mass expulsion of German ethnics from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and other places;
ethnic cleansing in Cyprus during civil war and partition; and repeated ethnic cleansing and atrocities during the Yugoslav wars and civil wars of the 1990s.

According to Darby (2006), in the rest of the world, just focusing on the period after World War II, there is the expulsion of the French settlers from Algeria after the war of independence, forced expulsion and mass killings during the partition of India, ethnic cleansing and mass flight of Palestinians during the Israeli war of independence and a lesser wave during the 1967 war, mass killings of communists and their supporters in 1965 in Indonesia, repeated ethnic cleansing in Kurdistan, genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda, mass killings in Algeria during the war between the Islamists and the army, mass killings and deportations from East Timor by the Indonesian army, and mass killings and ethnic cleansing in the South Sudan and again currently in Darfur by the Sudanese government and its allies. (Du Toit 2000).

In this regard, Obserchall (2007), is of the view that the above is not a complete list by any means. Nor does he puts much stake on what precise word is attached to a particular episode of collective violence because they all are instances of mass suffering intentionally perpetuated by the authorities and their agents, and which external states singly and jointly have failed to stop. What typically happens when an internal crisis unfolds? Diplomatic observers, NGOs, and news reporters will be the first to call attention to some violent events that become a continuing international crisis story (Coltart 2016).

Winter (2009) is of the view that the NGOs, the United Nations, some stakeholder states, e.g. neighbours who are impacted by refugees, call for and sponsor fact-finding commissions, and publicly call on the adversaries to resolve their differences peacefully. Some external organizations and political leaders may offer their services for mediation and for talks. Debates take place in the United Nations Security Council about what is happening, who is responsible, and what should be done. The Security Council then passes resolutions calling for a ceasefire, for states and external bodies to stop assistance to the adversaries, for named aggressors to stop aggression, for talks between the adversaries, which, if not complied with, will result in sanctions (e.g. economic sanctions against an aggressor). The UN’s various humanitarian agencies and other such organizations which include; UNHCR, World Food, International Red Cross are called on for humanitarian relief to non-combatants and relief operations, and refugee camps are then organized. The UN may deploy lightly armed
peacekeepers with a mandate for protecting the relief operations and for Peace intervention 85 reporting ceasefire violations, and for protecting itself against attack.

As noted by Crocker (2008), since the UN has no permanent armed force, the Secretary General calls on member states to contribute soldiers, logistics, emergency assistance, and funds for the intervention, and may delegate some of these functions to other bodies, such as a regional organization (e.g. the African Union, the European Union, or NATO). Intervention is contingent on the consent of the state in which the conflict occurs. If the target government obstructs the peace operations or is incapable of ensuring the safety of UN and humanitarian personnel, the Security Council may strengthen the mandate, size, and armament of the peacekeeper, threaten sanctions and the use of force against those who defy its resolutions, and as a last resort authorize peace enforcement to stop assaults on protected civilians, refugees under its care, and international staff. The UN may also authorize a criminal tribunal for prosecuting those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity (Annan 2008).

2.13.5 The peace process
It has been observed that conflict and conciliation dynamics puts the accent on obstacles to peace making in civil wars and insurgencies. MacGinty (2000). The end of hostilities finds the adversaries and the society more divided than before violent conflict:

Internal armed conflict has devastating effects on the polity, society, and the economy. Peace institutions and capabilities weaken, and violence institutions and capabilities strengthen. According to the paradox of mobilization, leadership groups and the population change during the conflict in ways that make peace making problematic.

Hardliners displace moderates, and splits between conciliators and rejectionists factionalize each adversary; bystanders are mobilized, polarized, and encapsulated in partisan subcultures; external interveners have been added to the internal adversaries.
The insurgents and the security forces perpetuate massacres and atrocities against one another and against civilians in violation of the laws of war, human rights, and humanitarian law. An emergency system of surveillance, fighting, detention, and prosecution of insurgents and terrorists suspends the justice system and leads to abuses.
Issues have accumulated. On top of the core issues, the armed conflict and the emergency institutions for counterinsurgency keep generating contentious conflicts over responsibility for killings, violence and security, refugees, relief operations, failed peace efforts, and the safety and welfare of civilians. Some external intervention tends to increase the conflict because it is partisan rather than conciliatory (Dugan 2006).

Oberschall (2007: 244–5), strongly believes that the preparatory talks and intermediaries attempt to create an orderly and normative framework for peace talks and get the adversaries to commit to that framework ahead of the negotiations. Thus talk/fight eventually shifts to cessation of open hostilities and to peace negotiations.

In this regard, Darby and Mac Ginty (2000: 7–8) have identified five criteria defining a genuine peacebuilding process:

- The adversaries negotiate in good faith and do not stall with preconditions and non-negotiable demands.
- The key players are included in the process, which necessitates mutual “recognition” by the adversaries.
- The central issues in the conflict are addressed – both the core and the derivative issues.
- The players do not use force to achieve their goals, or use a ceasefire merely for rearming and repositioning their forces.
- The players are committed to a sustained process, not just exploratory talks.
- The external stakeholders and interveners assume some responsibility for implementing the settlement with resources, monitoring, enforcement guarantees, and reconstruction aid.

Muhammed (1999) is of the strong view that these are the ideal circumstances: the Oslo, Dayton, and Northern Ireland peace processes were short on several criteria yet went ahead. In the Oslo process through Camp David, the good faith of both adversaries was questionable because of their use of or reluctance to stop coercive moves that each knew obstructed the negotiations. In Northern Ireland, some major players were excluded or took themselves out of the negotiations, Sinn Fein until the final phase; the DUP refused to sign the peace accord.
Some of the most divisive issues such as decommissioning and police reform were outsourced from the negotiations to post-accord commissions. Before and at Dayton, the Bosnian Serbs had to be bombed by NATO into participation in peace talks and coerced by Milosevic for compromising on borders and for signing the DPA, which they did their utmost to undermine during implementation (Doyle et al 2006). In the Kosovo peace negotiations, the central issue of stateness was not decided. Because of these shortcomings of peace pacting, implementation of peace accords is beset by uncertainties (Reilley 2009).

2.14 Reconciliation
Harold Saunders and Randa Slim (1998) do articulate that by putting forward relationships as the focal point for sustained dialogue within protracted conflict settings, this approach, though simple in its orientation, has wide-ranging ramifications. Most proponents of reconciliation do agree that reconciliation describes a process rather than an end state or outcome, aiming at building relationships between individuals, groups and societies. Reconciliation has also been defined as a process “through which a society moves from a divided past to a shared future”; looking at the past in a way that allows people to see it in terms of “shared suffering and collective responsibility” may help to restore confidence (Bloomfield et al. 2003, 12-21).

As Gurr (2000) has noted the need for reconciliation is emphasised in particular for societies that have gone through a process of ethno-political conflict, as these are marked by a loss of trust, intergenerational transmission of trauma and grievances, negative interdependence (as the assertion of each group’s identity is seen as requiring the negation of the other group’s identity) and polarisation. Given that antagonists live in close proximity, not addressing these legacies means risking that they will form the causes of new spirals of violence (Fischer 2004).

Reconciliation is regarded as being necessary to prevent the desire for revenge. Reconciliation is not pursued by seeking innovative ways to disengage or minimize the conflicting groups’ affiliations, but instead is built on mechanisms that engage the sides of a conflict with each other as humans-in-relationship (Worthington 2001). According to Terril (2003), both quantum and chaos theory strongly indicates that people are ill advised to focus their attention on the parts of a system.
Instead, people must look at the system as a whole and to the relationships of its parts if they are to understand its dynamic and structure. Relationships, it is argued by Lederach (1999), are the centre piece, the beginning and the ending point for understanding the system. This, it is believed, is the essential contribution brought by reconciliation. It envisions protracted conflict as a system and focuses its attention on relationships within that system. Second, engagement of the conflicting groups assumes an encounter, not only of people but also of several different and highly interdependent streams of activity.

Lederach (1999) further argues that reconciliation must find ways to address the past without getting locked into a vicious cycle of mutual exclusiveness inherent in the past. People need opportunity and space to express to and with one another the trauma of loss and their grief at that loss, and the anger that accompanies the pain and the memory of injustices experienced. Acknowledgment is decisive in the reconciliation dynamic. It is one thing to know; it is yet a very different social phenomenon to acknowledge. Acknowledgment through hearing one another's stories validates experience and feelings and represents the first step toward restoration of the person and the relationship. Worthington (2001) supports the above thought and adds that it is necessary to give acknowledgement of what was committed in the past. This in Worthington's view promotes reconciliation.

Lederach (1997) is of the strong view that mercy alone is superficial. It covers up and moves up too quickly. At the same time, Tutu (2008), concurs with Mandela (1995) that reconciliation must envision the fixture in a way that enhances interdependence. In all contemporary internal conflicts, the futures of those who are fighting are ultimately and intimately linked and interdependent. Opportunity must therefore be given for people to look forward and envision their shared future. The perspective of native peoples, such as the Mohawk nation, is highly instructive in this respect. Reconciliation, in essence, represents a place, the point of encounter where concerns about both the past and the future can meet (Worthington 2001).

As pointed out by Lederach (1999) reconciliation represents a social space. Reconciliation is a locus, a place where people and things come together. As observed by Worthington (2001) truth is the longing for acknowledgment of wrong and the validation of painful loss and experiences, but it is coupled with Mercy, which articulates the need for acceptance, letting
go, and a new beginning. As observed by Muhammed (1999) justice represents the search for individual and group rights, for social restructuring, and for restitution and it is linked with Peace, which underscores the need for interdependence, well-being, and security.

Reconciliation as suggested by McCandless and Karbo (2007) involves the creation of the social space where both truth and forgiveness are validated and joined together, rather than being forced into an encounter in which one must win out over the other or envisioned as fragmented and separated parts. These elements lie at the heart of the challenge facing us in contemporary conflict. Although enormous pain and deep-rooted animosity accompany any war, the nature of contemporary settings of armed conflict where neighbour fears neighbour and sometimes family member fears family member, and where each sheds blood makes the emotive, perceptual, social-psychological, and spiritual dimensions core, not peripheral, concerns. The immediacy of hatred and prejudice, of racism and xenophobia, as primary factors and motivators of the conflict means that its transformation must be rooted in social-psychological and spiritual dimensions that traditionally have been seen as either irrelevant or outside the competency of international diplomacy. Reconciliation is seen as a process of encounter and as a social space, points us in that direction (Simmons1996).

As noted by Sambanis (2006), reconciliation-as-encounter suggests that space for the acknowledging of the past and envisioning of the future is the necessary ingredient for reframing the present. For this to happen, people must find ways to encounter themselves and their enemies, their hopes and their fears.

Lederach (1997) is of the strong view that mercy alone is superficial. It covers up. It moves on too quickly. Justice raised powerful images of making things right, creating equal opportunity, rectifying the wrong, and restitution. "Without justice," one person commented, "the brokenness continues and festers "(Anderson 1996 and Ramsbothan 2011). With Peace came images of harmony, unity and well-being. It is the feeling and prevalence of respect and security. But, it was observed by Muhammed (1999) that peace is not just for a few, and if it is preserved for the benefit of some and not others it represents a farce.

Gurr et al (2001) is of the strong view that reconciliation involves the creation of the social space where both truth and forgiveness are validated and joined together, rather than being forced into an encounter in which one must win out over the other or envisioned as
fragmented and separated parts. These elements lie at the heart of the challenge facing us in contemporary conflict. Although enormous pain and deep-rooted animosity accompany any war, the nature of contemporary settings of armed conflict where neighbour fears neighbour and sometimes family member fears family member, and where each sheds blood makes the emotive, perceptual, social-psychological, and spiritual dimensions core, not peripheral, concerns. The immediacy of hatred and prejudice, of racism and xenophobia, as primary factors and motivators of the conflict means that its transformation must be rooted in social-psychological and spiritual dimensions that traditionally have been seen as either irrelevant or outside the competency of international diplomacy. Reconciliation is seen as a process of encounter and as a social space, points us in that direction (Coetzee 2003).

Figure 9: The place called Reconciliation

Source: Lederach (1999): The Place Called Reconciliation.

Mandela (1995) strongly argues that reconciliation can be thus understood as both a focus and a locus. As a perspective, it is built on and oriented toward the relational aspects of a conflict. As a social phenomenon, reconciliation represents a space, a place or location of
encounter, where parties to a conflict meet. Reconciliation must be proactive in seeking to create an encounter where people can focus on their relationship and share their perceptions, feelings, and experiences with one another, with the goal of creating new perceptions and a new shared experience. As such, reconciliation is built on paradox, that which links seemingly contradictory but in fact interdependent ideas and forces (Gurr et al 2000).

Smith and Berg (2001) have suggested that paradoxes are a natural part of group life. To deal with them constructively it is necessary to identify the opposing energies that form the poles of the paradox, provide space for each, and embrace them as interdependent and necessary for the health of the group. In the case of contemporary conflict, the poles of energy, often seen as incompatibilities, are the fundamental human and relational needs inherent in the context of protracted, violent conflict. Reconciliation thus represents the space, or creative tension, that holds these needs and the energy that drives them together. In more specific terms, reconciliation can be seen as dealing with three specific paradoxes (Kirkpatric 2008).

In this regard, Tutu (2008) says that reconciliation promotes an encounter between the open expression of the painful past, on the one hand, and the search for the articulation of a long-term, interdependent future, on the other hand. Second, reconciliation provides a place for truth and mercy to meet, where concerns for exposing what has happened and for letting go in favour of renewed relationship are validated and embraced (DuToit 2000).

Third, reconciliation recognizes the need to give time and place to both justice and peace, where redressing the wrong is held together with the envisioning of a common, connected future (Mandela 1995). According to Coetzee (1998) a paradox can create a binding and crippling impasse when only one of the sources is embraced at the expense of the other; in other words, groups lock into one element in opposition to the other. The basic paradigm of reconciliation, therefore, embraces paradox. It suggests, for example, that a focus on relationship will provide new ways to address the impasse on issues; or that providing space for grieving the past permits a reorientation toward the future and, inversely, that envisioning a common future creates new lenses for dealing with the past (Worthington 2001).
2.14.1 Truth, justice, reconciliation
Hutchins (1989: 160) argues that the peace process and settlement frequently include some institutions for justice and truth, and more broadly reconciliation. First and foremost, victims want justice, as was the case for “las abuelitas” in Buenos Aires, Argentina who marched once a week around the Plaza de Mayo in front of the presidential palace carrying the photographs of vanished family members. External stakeholders insist on it, as was true for the Allies in World War II for both Germany and Japan (Tutu 2005; Hill 2007). Judge Richard Goldstone who played a leading role in both the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) stated that:

It is my belief that when nations ignore the victims’ call for justice, they are condemning their people to the terrible consequences of ongoing hatred and revenge. But for the TRC, there would have been widespread denials of most of the worst manifestations of apartheid and those denials could have been believed by the majority of white South Africans. That is no longer possible. Nor would the same result have been achieved through the normal criminal process (Neier 1998).

2.15 State failure and peace building
Rahin (2001) is of the opinion that after insurgency and war, peace building is contingent on unfavourable conditions that exist at that time and in all likelihood for some time to come. This is true because there is serious physical destruction, an economy in shambles, flourishing black markets and smuggling, refugees and internally displaced persons living in camps and temporary residences, unemployed young men with access to cheap weapons, high levels of both property and violent crime, dependence by many on humanitarian relief, and spoiler groups who continue violent attacks (Azziz 2013). Within these typical parameters there is a great deal of variation on state failure and on effective authority. At one extreme there is total state failure, as in Somalia; at the other extreme there exists a functioning state and administration, as in Northern Ireland (Pergamum 2000).

Karbo, (2006) says between the extremes there can be state failure at the centre but an effective administration in particular provinces and municipalities. A typical instance is when the central state administration is weaker than ethno-political patron client machines that
effectively run the government administration in their domains, as in Bosnia after Dayton (Darby 2006). Another instance is when the state administration is eclipsed by ethnic and religious groups with militias that become rivals and substitutes of the state (Muhammed 2003). They provide some security and justice in areas they control, run their own schools and other social services, and collect compulsory “taxes” from the population to finance their activities, which approximates some areas of DRC as well as post-war Afghanistan (Ramsbothan et al 2011).

As observed by Azziz (2013), effective local authority can be exercised by a multitude of small groups, leaders, parties, warlords, clan leaders and/or insurgents rooted each in a district, province, or town, but who fight one another and block effective authority beyond localities. At times one group ends up controlling the capital and many control the periphery, as in Somalia, DRC and Afghanistan, without an effective central government it is extremely not possible to carry out peacebuilding process as that becomes a major challenge (Simmons 2003). Another possibility is that a strong man and party end up controlling the central government and most of the state’s territory and population, which was the situation in Somalia with Muhammed Farrah Aideed after the fall of Muhammed Siad Bare (Karamoja 2009).

2.16 Conclusion
This chapter primarily looked at various issues concerning peacebuilding and critiqued theories and models as well as on the topic of peacebuilding and discussed related issues. It further proposed the idea models that could be used in the process of peace building in various post conflict areas anywhere in the world as conflicts have similar trends and effects despite geographical boundaries, ethnic or religious or political dimensions of the conflict.
CHAPTER THREE

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Introduction
The study is centred on the peacebuilding theory by John Paul Lederach which has a pyramid of building with various actors in the three level of pyramid. The theory was also complimented by a general perception and belief that has been sustained by various scholars such as Saunders (1999) and Galtung (1999). There is a very strong argument that the approaches by Lederach are very much applicable to various situations around the world. It is assumed that if all the actors work with mutual understanding in the peacebuilding initiatives then there is a very strong possibility of building an effective peacebuilding process that sets strong foundations for stability in the given countries and the rest of the world. In this regard, this study also sought to establish the challenges of peacebuilding in Matebeleland Provinces using the John Paul Lederach’s Theory of Peacebuilding.

3.2 Theoretical framework
This theoretical framework hinges Mainly on peacebuilding by Lederach and this section will deal with those issues that assist in building and its relevance.

3.2.1 Peacebuilding theory
The importance of peace-building is to create a structure of peace that is usually based on justice, equity, and cooperation thereby creating positive peace which thus address the underlying causes of violent conflict so that they become less likely in the future. In this regard, Roland (1997) argues that peace-building is recognized as dynamic process and have something to contribute in every phase of a conflict, and always moving/changing in response to the situation and the stage of the peace-making efforts.

Lederach (1998) suggests that transformation of conflicts involve the recognition that conflicts can progress in either constructive or destructive ways and in this vein, Miall et al (2003), do argue that with its focus on transforming unjust as well as un-peaceful social relationships and addressing the root causes of conflicts, transformation is especially salient for asymmetrical conflicts. The concept is thus in line with the peace studies tradition in
which “it is direct, structural, and cultural violence, not conflict that is seen as the antithesis of peace” (Banfa 2003).

According to Muhammed (1999) in addition to being to being “descriptive” with regard to the dynamics and dialectical nature of conflicts, transformation is also “prescriptive” in that it allows for a greater and more complex understanding of the multiple steps and interventions involved in a peace-building process. At a minimum, peace-building should seek to ensure that activities do not cause further traumatization or psychological harm to people already suffering the effects of conflict (Rae 1999). Another issue for practitioners is the hazard of classifying people as traumatized, without recognizing that individuals, groups, and communities respond to severe events in different ways and within political and social contexts (Reilly 2009).

The assumption underlying this work is that the international community must take a more organized and systematic approach to peace-building; one that does not focus on the creation of democratic institutions alone or on re-establishing the pre-war status quo. In this regard, Reychler et al (2007) argue that peacebuilding strives to provide an overall conceptual and analytical approach, which identifies the numerous key steps and actions required during peacebuilding in order to build a stable and durable peace.

This comprehensive approach bridges the works of various scholars and practitioners by offering an integrative peace-building model aimed at bringing together the pieces of this fragmented research. The result is an overarching classification and discussion of peace-building activities. These activities are classified into four main categories: security and demilitarization; political transition; development; and, reconciliation and social rehabilitation (Hill 2007). Within these categories, the author covers dozens of issues ranging from disarmament, protecting human rights, and institutional reform to power sharing, elections, economic rehabilitation, and truth and reconciliation commission (Tutu 2006). The breadth of topics covered is impressive. While the space does not allow detailed discussion of each activity, the main concepts and characteristics are identified and even scholarly debates over the use of certain tools are included.

It is necessary to understand that peacebuilding raises a number of important issues that may seem common on first glance, but that often fail to come to the fore during peace-building
planning. Tutu (2006) argues for the need to design peace-building strategies according to the complex realities of the conflict situation at hand, rather than applying a “one-size fits all” approach to all conflicts. In addition, any strategy must identify the activities that are first priority and second priority; these activities should be coordinated and integrated to ensure they support rather than detract from one another; activities should take place at the national, local, and community levels; and, the strategy should contain short-, medium-, and long-term time frames for achieving set goals. (Karbo and McCandless 2007)

Karbo and McCandless (2007) argue that this kind of extensive planning needs to occur early in the intervention to ensure an effective and coordinated strategy aimed at peacebuilding, rather than a short-term focus on ending violence and holding elections. In many cases, the focus on holding elections as a measure of success fails to address the underlying causes of a conflict and leaves states vulnerable to relapse, yet this continues to be a common approach to ending conflict.

Reychler (2007) argues peacebuilding does fall short of offering a roadmap for peacebuilding or an analytical framework explaining which policies work best and under what circumstances. The book provides more than sufficient details that explain the successes and failures of specific approaches in certain contexts in post conflict situations. The next step is to analyze this multitude of data to derive a best-practices model of peacebuilding that indicates which policies are most effective, why, and when and how they should be implemented. There is arguably no silver-bullet to peacebuilding. Context will always be important, and the author is accurate in stating this upfront and advocating an integrated, coordinated, and multi-sectoral approach to peacebuilding. In this regard peacebuilding process provides a strong foundation and framework for future research aimed at improving our understanding of the who, what, when, where, and why of successful peace-building in order to build an understanding of not only how these elements fit together but also how to implement policies that build on this understanding (Gurr et al 2003).
3.2.2 Lederach’s Peacebuilding Theory

Lederach (1997) strongly argues that peacebuilding theory must include all actors in the conflict and political process such that the inclusion of many members will assist. In this regard, Lederach argues that all members of the community or country from those in high positions to the lowest positions have a direct say in the process of peacebuilding. Thus grassroots, middle range and top leadership are all critical in the success of the peacebuilding. It may be concluded that this theory advocates inclusiveness of all the stakeholders.

Peacebuilding must be undertaken simultaneously at every level of society. Lederach (1997:58) strongly argued that a successful peacebuilding strategy in all honesty must reach all sectors of society and not only focused on high-level political actors. He thus goes on to argue that:

*If we are to move beyond settlement and toward reconciliation or toward what I refer to as sustainable peace processes, we must not limit our lenses to only the highest level of political actors and the peace negotiations they forge. I have graphically depicted this as a pyramid that describes three related but different processes. The first process is a top-down negotiation conducted by a few representative and usually highly visible leaders. The second is bottom-up approaches that involve the forcing of understanding and peace at local levels according to the unique characteristics of those local settings. The third is middle-out approaches that can support both of the other two in unique ways and that often provide linkages vertically in the society and horizontally across the lines of conflict.*

In this regard, Lederach supported by Galtung (1996) are of the strong view that conflict is dynamic and inter-related and so is peacebuilding. As a result, peace processes cannot be achieved in isolation in one part of society without simultaneous activities at other levels if the process is going to be truly transformative or indeed sustainable, given the pressures and temptation to revert to violence that are often placed on the system.

The second component of a comprehensive peacebuilding approach is one that enables all key stakeholders to link both actions which can meet short term needs and processes which can help us to build a broader vision.
Reychler (2007) has observed that peace processes must be able to be sustainable in the long run and it is critical to develop a strategic framework to achieve the work. In this regard, such a framework must provide a space for envisioning a desired future and pushes stakeholders to reflect critically about the nature of change processes required to move from immediate crisis to longer-term hope. It is only within a framework that thinks ahead that people are able to shift from being crisis driven to being crisis responsive. Crisis responsive means that actors in peacebuilding are able to recognize within any given opportunity for maximizing their potential that both responds to the immediate need and at the same time increases the overall movement toward the desired change.

Thus, according to Reychler’s opinion, these elements of the comprehensive peace building assist those engaged in peacebuilding to think about ensuring that immediate needs driven by crisis or by key moments are linked to a broader overall vision of the peace process. These events, awful as they can be, do present peace-builders with an opportunity to consider how relations and capacities can be developed and increased.

The third critical aspect of Lederach’s theory, according to peacebuilding proponents is that it goes further to transform relationships among the people involved in the conflict. Accordingly, Rudney (2008:125) is of the opinion that “reconciliation and the strengthening of civil society must think beyond workshop, trainings and develop much further. Peacebuilding suggests forging structures and processes that redefine violent relationships into constructive and cooperative patterns.”

Lederach encourages peace-builders not to consider particular issues outside of structures and relationships of which they occur. This approach will help not only to deal with the immediate context but also challenge us to begin to address some of the key causes or roots of the conflict, future-proofing us from the potential emergence of new crisis events.

Karbo (2010) argues that track two diplomacy is important in that it gives voice to all private citizens, local initiatives, and people-to-people activities have in building peace, as well as in maintaining conflict. The remainder of this chapter will be concerned with the role, impact, potential, and limitations of local and grassroots people to people initiatives as an approach
for peace in contemporary conflicts, as well as the controversy surrounding these initiatives. In the McCandless (2007) view, the controversy speaks more than anything to the need for structural interventions alongside psycho-cultural interventions.

Kelman (2006) argues that for a positive peace in an area that has had a long history of war, there needs to be amongst the communities’ mutual acceptance, cooperative interaction, a feeling of security, space for human dignity, the institutionalization of a mechanism for problem solving, and finally, broad reconciliation. In this regard, Marshall and Gurr (1998) do suggest that for the peace-building process to be sustainable for more than a short interlude, relief, recovery, reconciliation, and social and economic development must be integrated into the actual settlement. Failure to do this, it will result in the failure of the process of peacebuilding.

Zartman (2007) powerfully argues that “Unfortunately there is no order of priority amongst them to prescribe … All of this must be done at once and at the same time, and the steps kept apace of each other as the process moves along …rather than as a series of discrete steps taken one step at a time.” The implication of above statement by Zartman is that there is consensus in the peace-building field, which a peace process is more likely to succeed and be sustainable if it is comprehensive and accompanied by multitrack diplomacy and public involvement. It has been argued that in the case of both Northern Ireland and South Africa that the informal diplomacy, public involvement, and grassroots dialogue were critical elements in their relatively successful peace processes (Obserchall2007).

These professional approaches and actors are conceptualized by Lederach as part of “the middle range” and he argues that it is the group/level with the “greatest potential for establishing an infrastructure that can sustain the peace-building process over the long term.” Similarly, Kelman (1997) cited in Francis (2008) reasoned that actors in middle range are more connected to both the top-level leadership and the grassroots, they have more flexibility for action and movement since they are rarely in the limelight, and they often have pre-existing relationships across the conflict lines due to professional associations.

For Partman (2005) what is critically most important is the vertical capacity of the middle range actors to link with those in either top or grassroots levels in peace building. Further to
this, Lizee (1996:132) notes that in addition to having the capacity to “bridge the divide between conflicting parties,” second track diplomacy also has the ability to bridge “critical divides that complicate and often retard the process of conflict transformation … [including] the divisions between government and civil society, between elite and grassroots levels within communities, and between different cultural worldviews and assumptions about how to manage conflict and change.”

Lederach (2007) develops conceptual frameworks for conflict and peacebuilding. He argues further that that modern peacebuilding must focus on reconciliation, and on rebuilding relationships. A focus on reconciliation recognizes that conflicts are essentially types of relationships. It also allows us to address the psychological components of conflict.

Paris (1997) in support of Lederach’s approaches of peacebuilding describes the actors and issues in conflicts in terms of levels of leadership and nested foci. Leadership occurs at three different levels: top level, the middle-range, and grassroots. Top level actors consist of political, military or sometimes religious leaders. The middle range consists of people whose positions of leadership are not directly dependent on the power hierarchy of the top level, such as respected heads of business, education or agriculture. The grassroots leadership operates in direct connection to the masses of people and includes refugee camp officials, NGO workers, and health workers. Different peacebuilding activities are possible and appropriate at different levels of leadership (Miall 2003).

Lederach’s peace-building pyramid analyses three levels of interventions with players who can help to build peace and support reconciliation. The pyramid analytical framework provides a holistic overview of affected societies and their populations representing various stakeholders, including leaders of governments, armed groups (rebel groups) and grassroots leaders, all of whom play differing roles in conflict.

Lederach’s framework is a very practical tool, although viewed by some as a simplistic division of a complex web of relationships within a conflict context. The division provides areas and levels of interventions with suggested practical activities that can be used to begin the long process of peace-building.

In this regard, Karbo (2007) cited in Francis (2008) is of the view that peacebuilding is both processual and dynamic hence the need to have an all-encompassing process involving all
stakeholders so that a lasting solution is found and it becomes a win-win situation as exemplified by South African case of Rainbow Nation.

Furthermore, Dugan (1997) believes that peacebuilding is transformative in nature as it relates to rebuilding of relationships. In this regard, Lederach (1998:35) posits: Peacebuilding involves the transformation of relationships. In the sense that peacebuilding includes processes of change with a more expansive view of context and time.

Hence pyramid of peacebuilding, is not limited to the concrete peace makers such as signing of agreements or the cessation of hostilities. It is an ongoing multifaceted and a holistic concept that should be tied to society’s social, cultural political, spiritual, economic and developmental fabrics.

Lederach and Assefa, for example, examine relationship-building in different spheres and on different levels. For Lederach (1998) reconciliation is seen as the place where justice, peace, truth and mercy meet. He perceives reconciliation to be both a locus and a focus. As a perspective, reconciliation is built on and oriented toward the relational aspects of a conflict. As a social phenomenon, reconciliation represents a space, a place or location of encounter, where parties to a conflict meet. Reconciliation must be proactive in seeking to create an encounter where people can focus on their Relationship and share their perceptions, feelings and experiences with one another, with the goal of creating new perceptions and a new shared experience. The basis for this approach, according to Lederach, is anchored first on relationships, which form both the basis for the conflict as well as the solution. This sounds simple, but the consequences are profound since reconciliation is not fostered by minimizing affiliations between contending groups but rather by

Lederach describes peace building resources as including not only financial and material support, but also socio-cultural resources. People in the conflict setting should be seen as resources rather than recipients. Peace building should also draw on existing cultural resources. Lederach argues that the systems which assign responsibility and accountability for financial and material support are as important as the material support itself. These systems can themselves contribute pro-actively to the peace process.
Lederach (1997) describes methods for coordinating the various levels, actors, and resources in peace building. Generally, coordination should focus on "creating strategic points of contact and coordination rather than rigid, centralized control" (Lederach 1997:198). One helpful tool is the peace inventory, a comprehensive listing of the various peacebuilding activities and actors in a particular conflict. Coordination can also be improved by creating clearer channels of communication between top- and middle-level actors, and between first and second track diplomatic initiatives. Peace-donor conferences provide an opportunity for interested and involved agencies to identify needs, match needs to resources, and coordinate their activities. Proposed conflict interventions should be reviewed by strategic resource groups, composed of experts from a variety of disciplines. Finally, external peacemakers should try to link their activities with internal peacemakers (Galtung 1996).

Heart (2006) seems to support the credence of Lederach’s approach to peacebuilding as shown by all-inclusive approach he adopts in the above diagram. According to Hart, there is simply too much that has to be included in the process of peacebuilding so much that the process cannot be successful if these things are not done. This include inclusivity, issues to do with justice, conflict transformation, trauma and healing, reforms and security issues which need to be addressed as well as humanitarian assistance.

Effective leadership is a crucial aspect of conflict transformation and reconciliation. Top, middle and grassroots levels of leadership are congruent with top, middle and grassroots approaches for interventions. Lederach (1997:181) sums up the issues as follows:

- **Top-level leadership (high status, power, authority) = Top-down approach:** goal is negotiated settlement and cease-fire.
- **Middle-level leadership (civil society) = Middle level approach:** located to build peace infrastructure, problem-solving workshops, trainings and peace commissions.
- **Grassroots-level leadership (the masses) = Bottom-up approach:** pressure from the masses, more indigenous and traditional interventions in communities.
- **Middle level leaders are ideally situated as they are connected to people at the top and grassroots but not necessarily constrained by either.** Leaders at this level are more suited to execute the co-ordination and implementation of holistic peace-building plans and programmes. The middle level approach to interventions is therefore also considered ideal for peace-building and reconciliation.
Transforming conflicts and addressing the root causes must be concerned with the long-term nature and progression of conflicts (Galtung 1996). Conflicts are not static but expressive, dynamic, dialectical and progress through stages from un-peaceful to peaceful (Darby 2007). Contemporary conflicts tend to be locked in a cycle of confrontation, negotiations and ceasefires, which are not enough to sustain reconciliation (Mandela 1999). Conflict transformation must consist of multiple interventions, roles, and functions depending on the stage of conflict being addressed (Manuel 2007). The book lists and explains a number of these roles and functions. Peace-building as process is therefore based on conflict as progression (Hamber 2001).

Hart (2006) argues that integrated framework for building peace as outlined above needs to reconceptualise time frames for planning and action, and link ‘structure’ with ‘process.’ There needs to be a long-term view of conflict progression, which recognises the distinction between the time-frame needed for responding to humanitarian disasters and that needed for building peace (Anderson 1996). He goes further to maintain that any immediate intervention must be connected to movement toward the longer term goal of sustainable peace.

In order to transform conflicts short-term efforts at resolving conflicts (cease-fires) must be informed by long-term vision and implications of sustained peace (Tutu 2006). The aim is not to find quick-fixes that manage conflict temporarily, but to heal and rebuild relationships in the long term. Peace-building must therefore be based on ‘decade-thinking approaches’ that link the immediate crisis experience with a better future in which such crises can be prevented (Cohen 2001).

3.2.3 The Broadness of Peacebuilding Process

Figure 10: Peace building Wheel

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In an integrated peace-building infrastructure:

- Social change is designed in time-units of decades and crisis management is linked with future visions.
- Crisis issues are connected to systemic roots so that conflict resolution approaches are anchored within relationships and subsystems.
- The integrative potential of middle-range leaders is recognised.

Charters (1996) is of the view that financial support is essential for effective peacebuilding, but people, organisations and cultural mechanisms must also be recognized as resources. It is important to empower the people and practices within the conflict context. In addition, mechanisms to improve coordination, communication and collaboration between people, organisations and interventions, internally and externally, must be a part of the peace-building plan.
3.3 Conceptual framework

This researcher has come up with this conceptual framework which draws key thoughts of peacebuilding as inclusiveness process that brings in all stakeholders. This researcher strongly believes that for successful peacebuilding to take place in Zimbabwe and more so in Matebeleland North and South Provinces, there is need to bring all stakeholders such as communities, civil society, non-governmental organisations, traditional leaders, churches, political and military leaders.

The churches represent several thousand members of the communities or societies hence the need to bring them on board. It is a critical part of the society which is also interested in issues of peace and peacebuilding.

Civil society is equally critical as it has capacity to assist and complement government efforts with resources and planning and accessing the various areas of the country. They also bring in wealth of experience since they may have worked in other countries that have experienced similar challenges.

Furthermore, any successful peacebuilding process cannot exclude the political and military leaders as these have a problem if not included ‘to return to the bush’ to pursue a military approach to resolve problems. In addition, there high possibility that non-inclusion, of this category of leaders can result in serious challenges with regards to success of the process. Alternatively they simply sabotage peacebuilding efforts.

In addition, this researcher is of the strong view that in addition to the categories of stakeholders that have been discussed above there is also serious need to have the regional organisation such as SADC as well as United Nations and its affiliate organisations. These have power to ensure that all activities are in tandem with expectations of the world with regards to peace. They have the means especially United Nations to use carrot and stick to ensure that various parties stick to agreed ways of bringing peace. In view of that they support peacebuilding process with expertise, resources both human and financial. The net effect of this is the success of the peacebuilding processes.
The models and approaches to peace building are many and they have similarities and some differences. However the bottom line is that almost all the models have inclusiveness of all the actors,

This chapter basically analysed the theories/models that are used in the process of peacebuilding as well as other related aspect of the process which include nation healing and reconciliation. It critically analysed the strengths and weaknesses of the models of peacebuilding. It further looked at the relevance of these models and their practical usefulness. However, Lederach’s 1997 model which is the major model for peacebuilding used by this researcher because it has several advantages over the other approaches as these too dwell or borrow some aspects from Lederach. This chapter proposes that Lederach’s approaches are critically useful in solving the issues of peacebuilding.
CHAPTER IV

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces the philosophical underpinning, discusses the research design that has been adopted for this study as well as its justification. Furthermore, this methodology chapter will dwell on sampling techniques and sample size adopted for the study. It also discusses the research instruments used to collect data by the researcher and their justification. In addition, the researcher will discuss the data analysis techniques that have been adopted, relate issues of validity reliability as well as reliability.

4.2 Research design
This researcher adopted the use of qualitative design because of numerous reasons and advantages and these will be discussed. Johnson (1995:39) suggests that technology educators "engage in research that probes for deeper understanding rather than examining surface features." He notes that qualitative methodologies are powerful tools for enhancing people’s understanding of deep emotional issues, understanding of teaching and learning.

Patton (1990) is of the strong view that phenomenological inquiry, or qualitative research, uses a naturalistic approach that seeks to understand phenomena in context-specific settings. Logical positivism, or quantitative research has its own uses and can also be used in conjunction with the above named approach. Each represents a fundamentally different inquiry paradigm, and researcher actions are based on the underlying assumptions of each paradigm. This researcher intends to seek better understanding of the issues being researched in this particular social environment.

This researcher is of the strong opinion that there is discovery and exploration in natural settings. Thus, the purpose of qualitative research is to better understands the human condition, another distinguishing attribute is discovery and exploration in natural environments. In this regard, the laboratory environment for quantitative methods of human study, such as exercise science, is often more sterile and foreign and does not easily apply in this context. Hence, investigating critical issues in the environment where they occurred. Hence this qualitative approach is important because it takes place in the environment in
which people actually live and function. Qualitative researchers wish to understand the experiences of their participants in their natural settings, without manipulating or controlling the environment. For example, to fully understand the natural context, many qualitative researchers travel to schools to observe physical education classes; interview teachers, coaches, and students; and collect data (Patton 1990, Eisner 1991).

Qualitative research design is important for this research as it uses an interpretive process that relies on inductive analysis. In other words, this researcher will attempt to construct general findings from all pieces of specific information that is collected from the respondents and then attempt to categorises them or group the ideas in themes so that meaningful generalisations can be arrived at. This process contrasts with deductive reasoning, in which general principles and information lead researchers to a specific conclusion.

This researcher used this design because it is very deliberate, systematic at the same time flexible. Thus, in order to ensure authenticity in qualitative research, it is important that researchers use specific tactics to design and plan the study, by identifying as well as selecting appropriate participants, and methodically collect and analyse data. However, qualitative research is also inherently flexible. It is often difficult for researchers to predict whom they will interview, which documents they will examine, or where they will conduct observations.

As a result, another goal of qualitative research is to gain serious or further insight into the issues at stake. Thus, this researcher will strive more for a depth of understanding than a breadth of information. Research is the systematic process of collecting and analysing information to answer specific questions. In this regard, qualitative research is thus a very legitimate form of inquiry that allows researchers and scholars to gain insight and understanding about the human condition.

Its key attributes include a humanistic orientation, a focus on discovery and exploration, and the use of inductive analysis. Qualitative researchers draw meaning from textual data rather than from numbers, and work with small groups of participants. Other attributes of qualitative research include rich descriptions, the emergence of data patterns, and the development of conceptual models. Although qualitative research has gained acceptance in many disciplines, it also has many critics.
Babbie (2007) strongly believes that a researcher can adopt a qualitative approach because it focuses on people and is extremely humanistic. This researcher is interested in how people perceive their experiences and lives in Matebeleland North and South provinces as result of Gukurahundi. Furthermore, the researcher wants to know what they believe about the causes of such issues, and how their interactions with others influence these attitudes and values. Thus, this social construction of reality as a result of the serious impact, or the meaning people assign to their life situations based on their interactions with others. In this regard, it is critical to understand that human perception of experience can rarely be measured and analysed with numbers. Hence the qualitative aspect which will be able to fully describe the emotions of the people affected.

Furthermore, this researcher adopted this design because Babbie (2007) is of the strong view that qualitative approach largely uses textual data. This follows that the meaning of human experiences and meanings of life cannot be represented by numbers alone; there is need to interpret situations with personal descriptions and accounts. Thus, the researcher will conduct interviews and use the transcripts as data. Observations or documents may also be used as data. In each case, the information is collected and analysed by a very sensitive instrument the researcher. Therefore this design will enable the researcher to understand complex situations and identify processes, perspectives, and perceptions that technical instruments which are quantitative in nature might miss.

There are several considerations when deciding to adopt a qualitative research methodology. Strauss and Corbin (1990) claim that qualitative methods can be used to better understand any phenomenon about which little is yet known. They can also be used to gain new perspectives on things about which much is already known, or to gain more in-depth information that may be difficult to convey quantitatively. Thus, qualitative methods are appropriate in situations where one needs to first identify the variables that might later be tested quantitatively, or where the researcher has determined that quantitative measures cannot adequately describe or interpret a situation. Research problems tend to be framed as open-ended questions that will support discovery of new information.

This writer also adopted qualitative approach because qualitative research reports, are usually rich with detail and insights into participants’ experiences of the world under consideration,
this is supported by Strauss (1990:87) who says that qualitative approach "may be epistemologically in harmony with the reader's experience" and thus more meaningful.

It is important to emphasize the emergent nature of qualitative research design. Because the researcher seeks to observe and interpret meanings in context, it is neither possible nor appropriate to finalize research strategies before data collection has begun (Patton, 1990). Qualitative research proposals should, however, specify primary questions to be explored and plans for data collection strategies.

4.3 Sampling techniques
The nature of this topic demands that the researcher uses a number of techniques to sample the respondents in order to get the best out of the situation.

The researcher used several techniques with various respondents and these sampling techniques include snowball sampling. This technique involves interviewing well placed respondents in the Zimbabwe National Army, The Central Intelligence Organisation, Zimbabwe Republic Police, as well as those in the Zimbabwe Prison Services. As result of connectedness, it may follow that more respondents will be accessed than previously thought

4.3.1 Purposive sampling
Purposive sampling represents a group of different non-probability sampling techniques. It is also known as judgmental, selective or subjective sampling; purposive sampling relies on the judgement of the researcher when it comes to selecting the units that are to be studied. Under normal circumstances, the sample being investigated is not as large as that used in probability sampling.

According to Patton (2002) the main goal of purposive sampling is thus to focus on special or peculiar characteristics of a population that are of interest, which will best enable one to answer researchers questions. The sample being studied in the context of this research is not therefore representative of the population as what was experienced in other parts of Zimbabwe is completely different. Rather, it is a choice, the purpose of which varies depending on the type of purposing sampling technique that is used. For example, in homogeneous sampling, units are selected based on their having similar characteristics because such characteristics are of particular interested to the researcher. By contrast, critical case sampling is frequently used in exploratory, qualitative research in order to assess whether the phenomenon of interest even exists (amongst other reasons). This researcher will
attempt to investigate the issues of Gukurahundi, and how they have resulted in the challenges in the peacebuilding process in the whole Region of Matabeleland and ultimately for the whole country.

Thus, information on the events of the dark period of 1980s until 1990s needs careful handling as well as most suited approach of sampling and better researcher instruments so that all the information is properly gathered.

In view of this issue and the sensitivity nature of the issue under investigation, the researcher also used expert sampling.

4.3.2 Expert sampling
Expert sampling is a type of purposive sampling technique that is used when one’s research needs to glean knowledge from individuals who have particular or information concerning a given issue or expertise. Yin (2003) strongly believes that this expertise or knowledge ability may be required during the exploratory phase of qualitative research, highlighting potential new areas of interest or opening doors to other participants. Alternately, the particular expertise that is being investigated may form the basis of one’s research, requiring a focus only on individuals with such specific expertise. Therefore, expert sampling is a cornerstone of a research design known as expert elicitation.

Purposive sampling techniques do provide researchers with the justification to make generalisations from the sample that is being studied, whether such generalisations are theoretical, analytic and/or logical in nature.

Qualitative research designs can involve multiple phases, with each phase building on the previous one. In such instances, different types of sampling technique may be required at each phase. Purposive sampling is useful in these instances because it provides a wide range of non-probability sampling techniques for the researcher to draw on.(Gall et al 2003)

Disadvantages of purposive sampling
Purposive samples, irrespective of the type of purposive sampling used, can usually be highly subject to researcher bias. However, this judgemental component of purpose sampling is only a major disadvantage when such judgements are ill-conceived or poorly considered; that is,
where judgements have not been based on clear criteria, whether a theoretical framework, expert elicitation, or some other accepted criteria.

4.3.3 Critical case sampling
Critical case sampling is a type of purposive sampling technique that is particularly useful in exploratory qualitative research, research with limited resources, as well as research where a single case (or small number of cases) can be decisive in explaining the phenomenon of interest. It is this decisive aspect of critical case sampling that is arguably the most important. To know if a case is decisive, one has to think about the following statements:

- If it happens there, it will happen anywhere?
- If it does not happen there, it will not?
- Can it happen anywhere?

4.4 Data Collection Tools
This researcher adopted the use of several research or data collection instruments which enabled him to get the best and most accurate information from numerous sources in the area of Matabeleland North as well as beyond the area. The reason for this is that the entire data collection instrument will complement one another thereby providing the best information or plenty of data for analysis purposes as well as for making the generalisations.

4.4.1 Interviews
Lofland and Lofland, (1984) provided an interview guide or "schedule" as a list of questions or general topics that the interviewer wants to explore during the interview with the interviewees. It is usually prepared to ensure that most important, same information is obtained from each person, there are no predetermined responses, and in semi-structured interviews the interviewer is free to probe and explore within these predetermined inquiry areas.

Interview enabled the researcher to understand more about the issues because he could probe issues further as well as seeking clarification from the interviews concerning issues that were being interviewed.
Furthermore the interview process was effective in that it enabled the researcher to obtain more information from the interviewee as the researcher could see and read non-verbal language from the respondent.

In addition, interviews by their nature are more interactive and assisted the researcher to get insight into several issues that well define the processes of the research.

Interviews bring raw data from the respondents such that a lot of valuable information can be processed from such data. This enabled the researcher to make more meanings from the data which may not be possible with other data collection instruments.

This researcher carried out interviews with various key informants especially those in the security sector namely the members who may have participated in the disturbances in the Matabeleland North in one capacity or the other. In particular those members who were serving in senior capacity such as officers commanding districts, members in charge. These included the key people in the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) Zimbabwe Prison Services (ZPS). In addition members of the disbanded of the Fifth Brigade will be interviewed.

Furthermore, there were more members who are in different locations of Zimbabwe and were ready to provide information on request. It is in this regard that the researcher adopted the above sampling techniques in order to get the best in terms key informants.

For most of these interviews, it was one on one, save for two key informants who have relocated to United Kingdom, and expressed willingness to speak to this researcher through skype. The other two White former members of Intelligence who worked with CIO as well as both Fifth Brigade and Zimbabwe National Army accepted to speak with the researcher from their difference places of residence in South Africa’s Hillbrow and Pretoria Suburbs.

The other key informants were the traditional leaders, school heads, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, Roman Catholic Church officials, hospital doctors (these have records of the deaths, injuries, records of illegitimate children born as a result of rape, abuse) as well as resettlement officials in these affected provinces.
4.4.2 Focus Group discussion
The use of focus groups as a qualitative method for rapid assessment is discussed. A focus-group session is an in-depth discussion in which a small number of people from the target population discuss topics that are of importance for a particular study or project (Babbie 2007). Focus groups are a form of group interview that capitalises on communication between research participants in order to generate data. Although group interviews are often used simply as a quick and convenient way to collect data from several people simultaneously, focus groups explicitly use group interaction as part of the method.

This means that instead of the researcher asking each person to respond to a question in turn, people are encouraged to talk to one another: asking questions, exchanging anecdotes and commenting on each other's experiences and points of view. The method is particularly useful for exploring people's knowledge and experiences and can be used to examine not only what people think but how they think and why they think that way.

Kruguer (1988) strongly believes that generally the participants are chosen purposively, and it is recommended that they should be homogeneous with respect to characteristics which might otherwise impede the free flow of discussion. Focus groups can be used for idea generation, in conjunction with a quantitative method, or as a primary data-collection method. However, if focus groups are used as a primary data-collection method, their results must be treated with caution.

This researcher feels that the main advantage of using focus-group discussions during rapid assessment is that they provide in-depth information without requiring full-scale anthropological investigations. The informal group setting ideally do make people feel much at ease thereby, encouraging these respondents to freely express their views.

It is also important to use focus group discussion because there is the ability of group participants to interact with each other in the process. This in turn generates important data for the researcher. Furthermore, when respondents participate they are stimulated to discuss critical issues and in the process, the group dynamics can generate new thinking about a topic which will result in a much more in-depth discussion.

The researcher with the help of a research assistant carried out focus group discussions with [Sabhukus- local traditional officials in charge of people in the given locality; each of these
have between 10 to 20 households in their jurisdiction] and are under a headman who is in turn answerable to a paramount chief in the given area. The local traditional officials assisted in the selection of affected people in their area such that the real people who matter were spoken to and expressed themselves in the best way possible.

It was also the intention of the researcher to meet most of the victims of this Gukurahundi in this province and in the Tsholotsho District in particular. This ensured that all critical people were able to discuss the issues in free atmosphere without fear of intimidation or victimisation or repercussion after participation in such focus group discussion.

In focus groups, the goal of the researcher was to let people speak with one another, suggesting dimensions and assurances of the original problem that any one individual might not have thought of sometimes a totally different understanding of a problem emerges from the group discussion.

Thus focus group discussion complement interviews it that face-to-face interviews should be understood as social interaction, focus group discussions should be viewed in terms of group dynamics as the interactions between group members largely replaces the usual interaction between interviewer and interviewee. Thus greater emphasis is given to respondents' viewpoints. As with informal interviewing, focus groups may sometimes be undertaken without preconceived questions, focus questions, or guidelines.

Yin (2003) argues that there are a number of limitations to focus-group discussions. The samples are small and purposively selected, and therefore do not allow generalization to larger populations. In addition, as with other qualitative methods, the chances of introducing bias and subjectivity into the interpretation of the data are high. There are a number of methodological issues which still need to be addressed in order to further develop the method. Little is known about how many discussion sessions are needed to be reasonably sure that most aspects related to the subject of inquiry have been explored.

Finally, this researcher also utilized observation because it is another classic form of data collection in field research. It has been argued by Patton (1990) that observational data are used for the purposes of description of settings, activities and people and it gives the meaning from the context. It is the belief of this researcher that that observation can lead to deeper understanding than interviews alone as it provides knowledge of the context in which the
events occurred and it thus assisted or enabled the researcher to see things which the people themselves were not aware or could not see or things they are unwilling to discuss.

Observation further enabled the researcher to see and view the mass graves that are in these areas of research. The researcher then obtained narratives and take photographs of the sites where victims of the civil conflict were buried.

4.4.3 Questionnaires
The researcher also used questionnaires in order to reach a wide geographical area. This instrument had the advantage of reaching many respondents including those in diaspora. A lot of people left Zimbabwe as a result of the conflict and the majority of these are in South Africa, Australia and Botswana. This instrument, enabled the researcher to obtain data from these respondents who were scattered outside Zimbabwe at a lesser cost.

Questionnaires were are relatively easy and cost effective hence the researcher adopted them for use in this research.

Questionnaires allowed individuals to respond to issues raised without pressure from the interviewer. They have a sense of confidentiality as they fill in questions unlike in the interview set up.

In addition the questionnaire enabled respondents to be free to express their views in the comfort of their own place without undue influence. The researcher served the respondents with the questionnaires and then collected them. While those from outside Zimbabwe had their questionnaires emailed to them.

4.5 Methods of Data Analysis
Yin (2003:163) define qualitative data analysis as "working with data, organizing it, breaking it into manageable units, synthesizing it, searching for patterns, discovering what is important and what is to be learned, and deciding what you will tell others." In this vein, Patton (1990) believes that qualitative researchers tend to use inductive analysis of data, meaning that the critical themes emerge out of the data. Therefore, qualitative analysis requires some creativity because the challenge is to place the raw data into logical, meaningful categories; to examine them in a holistic fashion; and to find a way to communicate this interpretation to others.
The researcher categorised collected data into themes for easy codification and subsequent discussion and analysis. In this way, clear themes did emerge and all responses about similar issues were thus discussed in that way. Analysis began with identification of the themes emerging from the raw data, a process sometimes referred to as "open coding". During open coding, this researcher identified and attempted naming the conceptual categories into which the phenomena observed was be categorised. The goal is to create descriptive, multi-dimensional categories which form a preliminary framework for analysis. Words, phrases or events that appear to be similar can be grouped into the same category. This was further assisted by Nvivo process of handling qualitative data.

**Figure 11: The data Analysis Process**

![Figure 1. The Data Analysis Process](image)

**Qualitative Data Analysis**

**Notice Things**

**Think About Things**

**Collect Things**

**Source:** John V. Seidel (1998)

According Seidel (1998) there are three stages of data analysis in the qualitative design. This will be discussed differently in the following paragraphs.
Data analysis and collection are interactive. Data must be organized that is to say classified and reduced. Data are organized by coding. Descriptions of behaviour, statements, feelings, thoughts, etc. are identified and coded. Wiersma (1995:217) identifies three types of codes:

**Setting or context codes**: These codes describe the setting or context descriptors of the phenomenon under study. Given that copious field notes are taken, codes for specific or regularly occurring characteristics contribute to efficient and effective field note production.

**Perception codes**: These codes are used to accurately record subjects’ reported perception, understanding, etc. about relevant people, circumstances, or things.

**Process codes**: It is a given in qualitative research that naturally occurring systems change. These codes are used to note event or process evolution and factors which cause or contribute to said evolution.

The analysis of qualitative research involves aimed to uncover and understand the big picture by using the data to describe the phenomenon and what this means. Both qualitative and quantitative analysis involves labelling and coding all of the data in order that similarities and differences can be recognised. Responses from even an unstructured qualitative interview can be entered into a computer in order for it to be coded, counted and analysed. In qualitative data analysis, this researcher, however, has no system for pre-coding, therefore a method of identifying and labelling or coding data needs to be developed that is bespoke for each research which is called content analysis.

According to Taylor and Bogdan (1998), throughout data analysis, researchers attempt to gain a deeper understanding of what they have studied and to continually refine their interpretations. This researcher draws on his first-hand experience with settings, informants or documents to interpret the collected data. The object of analysing qualitative data is to determine the categories, relationships and assumptions that inform the respondents’ view of the world in general and of the topic in particular circumstances.

Content analysis is '...a procedure for the categorisation of verbal or behavioural data, for purposes of classification, summarisation and tabulation' (Gall, 2003:47).
The content can be analysed on two levels. Basic level or the manifest level where a descriptive account of the data that is this is what was said, but no comments or theories as to why or how. Higher level or latent level of analysis: a more interpretive analysis that is concerned with the response as well as what may have been inferred or implied. Content analysis involves coding and classifying data, also referred to as categorising and indexing and the aim of context analysis is to make sense of the data collected and to highlight the important messages, features or findings.

This researcher analysed the data using all the possible methods that have been mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. The researcher will also present information using descriptive analysis.

**4.6 Validity and Reliability**

Reliability and validity have been central concepts in debates over the credibility of qualitative research. Joppe (2000) cited in Golafshani (2003: 598) defines reliability as “...the extent to which results are consistent over time and an accurate representation of the total population under study is referred to as reliability and if the results of a study can be reproduced under a similar methodology, then the research instrument is considered to be reliable.

The research instruments were tested on a pilot group in Tsholotsho in Matebeleland North and in Gwanda Matebeleland South Provinces respectively. This was done in order to adjust the instruments so that when they are being used on a larger scale they would measure exactly what they are supposed to measure and in this way, the results can easily be generalised to other situations.

The researcher strongly feels that the instruments were both valid and reliable as they were used in both Matebeleland North and South Provinces without challenges and they produced the same results. Thus, adjustment of instruments during pilot study assisted the researcher to perfect the instruments thereby improving validity and reliability.
4.7 Ethical Considerations

The researcher endeavoured to conform to the highest ethical standards as guided by the following ethical considerations, most of which are extracted from Saunders et al (2000):

The researcher undertook to maintain the highest levels of objectivity right from literature review, through to data collection as well as analysis and reporting findings to ensure reliability and validity of findings.

Care was taken to ensure utmost confidentiality, anonymity and privacy to participant individuals who participated either as interviewees, respondents to questionnaires and those who took part in focus group discussions. Names of participants have remained confidential unless the participants allowed the researcher to use them as indicated in the acknowledgement section.

All sources were fully cited and referenced and acknowledged.

All information about the nature of the research was disclosed to all research participants.

Data collected and the findings thereof were used for academic purposes only.

The researcher undertook not to induce participants to participate or extend the scope of their participation beyond the level they had freely agreed.
CHAPTER FIVE

DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

5.1 Introduction
This chapter seeks to present and analyses data collected from the respondents. It will group responses into themes for easy discussion and interpretation. The data was collected through interviews, questionnaires and focus group discussions with various respondents throughout the two provinces. The analysis will be mainly qualitatively as it deals with emotions and feelings of the affected people as in some cases feelings and emotions are very difficult to quantify.

5.2 Demographic Details of the respondents
In the focus group discussions that were carried out in these two provinces, there were more female respondents as compared to males. There were more As compared with those who answered or who filled in questionnaire. The percentages for different focus group discussions were between sixty eight and eighty five percent female respectively. The focus group responses were very high in Matebeleland North. It recorded the highest rate of eighty five percent while in Matebeleland South it was sixty eight percent.
The high response rate in these groups could be explained by the fact that women felt much safer in groups as opposed to answering questions as individuals. This was apparently true for all the women in the rural Matebeleland North and South.

With regards to questionnaires, the rate of response for women was fifty three percent while that of men was forty six percent. The majority of these respondents were individuals who had witnessed the issues under discussion and forty eight percent were those who served the government in various capacities that include those who had retired and had served in various capacities ranging from teaching, Health services former officers in the police, Support Unit and the conventional Zimbabwe National Army, members of Central Intelligence Organisation. With regards to health personnel and civilians, they were drawn from the districts of the two provinces.
With regards to interviews that the researcher conducted, fifteen percent were women while the remaining eighty five percent were men. The most probably explanation is that these were the men who bore the blunt of the attacks and were working in the hot areas as activists, human rights defenders and in many other capacities. The majority of these respondents are seasoned and hardened individuals who put their lives at stake for the sake of liberty for the fellow countrymen and women.
Figure 14: Gender participation in Interviews

![Gender participation in Interviews](image)

Figure 15: Age Distribution of Respondents

![Age Distribution of Respondents](image)
Seventy five percent of the respondents were above sixty years old, while the youngest respondents were about twenty percent. The youngest respondents were between thirty and thirty nine years of age. Twenty percent were those in the forty to fifty nine years. The reason for these age groups is that the respondents who went through the disasters of Gukurahundi and saw all the hell are fairly old and the young ones are those who were born before and around that time and bear the burden of having lost parents, guardians, opportunity and dignity. In addition sampling techniques that were adopted by the researcher were such that the respondents would be knowledgeable on matters of concern to this research.

5.3 Background issues

Peacebuilding has to be understood in the proper context. The issues that the researcher is going to address are not in isolation. The Lancaster House Agreement brought an end to the war in Zimbabwe. It was expedient for the British to bring an end to the war in Rhodesia.

The war was long and protracted. The agreement also brought related problems in that the government intended to make it a success story to the rest of the world and the British gave it benefit of doubt and overlooked at the gross human right abuses that were carried in those days.

There was no attempt to address the 1970s issues and atrocities that were committed by both the ZANLA, ZPRA and Rhodesian forces till end of 1979. This brought a culture of impunity to all the forces who were involved in the liberation war. (David Coltart 2016)

The above different armed groups as well as UANC, ZIPA, Remnants of Umkonto WeSizwe, Selous Scouts created a lot of trouble for the new independent nation. In 1980 all the atrocities and killings were not dealt with hence issues fested and manifested in the civil conflict that erupted shortly after Entumbabe I and II.

Furthermore, 1987 Unity Accord between PF ZAPU and ZANU PF according to Pius Ncube can best be classified as “agreement between the defeated and the winner” It was in these context that the document did not address the critical issues such as how to deal with the perpetrators of violence especially from the government side. It was a document of winner who dictated the pace of events. In simple terms it was a winner takes all. It further swept all
the Gukurahundi killings under the carpet and no acknowledgement of what happened. It has thus been further described as “an agreement written on sand.”[see appendix with the details of the Unity of Agreement] (Interview with Pius Ncube 21 October 2015 Dete- Hwange)

Lack of accountability could also be explained in terms of generational problems in that by the time of committing of these atrocities that are going to be raised following pages, issues of world accountability and genocide were not strong and contentious as they are now. However, this does not exonerate the perpetrators of violence regardless of their ideology or skin colour.

There had been no major precedent in world history of such issues in international affairs with regards to dealing with issues of genocide. The International Criminal Court (ICC) only came into existence in 1988 and it does not handle cases in retrospect

5.4 Characteristics of Matebeleland North and South (Population make up)
Matebeleland North Province has eight districts. It is a province that consists of Ndebele, Tonga and Nambiya, Lozi speaking people. But the Ndebele is the most dominant. As far as Gukurahundi affected mostly people in Nkayi, Jotsholo, Lupane and in some of these areas people uncomfortable to talk to Shona speaking people. The Shona language reminds them of the terrible Gukurahundi of the 80s. Thus the people are still frightened and resent having Shona speaking police in their areas. People feel thus domination by the Shona. In areas like Binga, the Tonga didn’t suffer that much due to political violence before 2000 but there are suspicions that Zanu PF is not good because they have been voting for MDC since the year 2000. In Jambezi areas where most Nambiya speaking people live, there weren’t many disturbances to talk about

Matebeleland South Province has thirteen districts. Its capital city is Gwanda. The population of the province as of December 2012 is 683 893 and the area of the province is 54 172 square kilometres.

In Midlands Gukurahundi was rife in Zhombe, Silobela areas. Voting patterns from 2000 indicate that people voted for the MDC before split in 2005. Silobela, Lower/Gweru areas had serious attacks during Gukurahundi. However, what is noticeable is that in most of these
areas people vote for Zanu PF due to fear or duress. In Binga, the Tonga vote for MDC since 2000. In Lupane areas, the MDC dominated from 2000 but due to the split of 2005, some went to support MDC-N for example Hon Mguni. In the Hwange areas, MDC dominated since 2000. In Nkayi, ZANU PF has regained ground most likely due to the fast track resettlement since people got plots in areas around Nyamandlovu and Nkayi. When Zapu was swallowed by ZANU PF, people were forced to support it since the leaders were now working in ZANU PF.

Matebeleland Provinces are cosmopolitan because there are at least ten ethnic groups. According to the respondents, the dominant language that is widely spoken in the provinces is Ndebele. It must be noted that there as many as nine ethnic groups in the provinces and these include: Ndebele speaking with Venda, Sotho, Tonga up to Zambezi Valley, Nambiya up North Dete, Nyanja in Hwange mining area, Bulawayo is metropolitan, Nkayi, Lozi people, Zulu chief Mtabeni there is a mixture of Ndebele and Lozi, Shurugwi mixture of Ndebele and Shona, in Mberengwa mixture as well Shona and Ndebele.

5.5 Factors that affected Peacebuilding
Sixty Nine percent of respondents in Matebeleland North and sixty five percent in Matebeleland South strongly argued that ZANU PF Government lacked sincerity on the implementation of reconciliation policy. The reasons given were that ZANU PF had hidden agenda of trying to destroy the opposition PF ZAPU and establish its one party state program in Zimbabwe.

The policy of national reconciliation was only on paper and there was nothing that was done officially to show that various categories of the Black people were reconciling. According to the respondents, the relations among various Black groups were exacerbated by the attitude of government. Such groups include Pf ZAPU, UANC of Bishop Muzorewa, ZANU Mwenje of Reveland Ndabaningi Sithole and remnants of Rhodesian Army. It does appear according to the respondents that Whites were well respected and treated than the rest of Black groupings.

The reasons for this maybe have been to appease the Whites and the International Community so that assistance continues to flow in in many different areas as was the case in the first decade after Independence in 1980. Government made blunders after independence. It
did not handle Entumbane I and II well. For reasons that are not clear, armed combatants from both ZIPRA and ZANLA were occupying assembly points that were just adjacent and were armed. They carried their arms and respondents argue that the government should not have let this happen knowing fully well that there were going to be trouble between these groups who were always at loggerheads and that violence could erupt any time. Comrades were allowed to move with their weapons and this was a serious mistake on the part on government. All the respondents were of the strong view that this could have been done deliberately to create a situation where the government would react to the violence and blame it on the ZIPRA combatants.

Seventy five percent of respondents were of the strong view that if the government was not to blame, why it did fail to release the findings of Chihambakwe and Dumbutshena Commissions. The respondents are of the view that the government could not make findings public for reasons that included allegations that the ZANU PF government was heavily implicated in the violence that broke out. They further argue that up to this day, the findings of these commissions have never seen the light of the day.

The outbreak of Gukurahundi and how it was handled by the government exacerbated matters. This created deep seated problems for the whole country. According to CCJP (1997) twenty thousand people died as a result of the civil conflict. Respondents are of the strong view that this negatively impacted on the peacebuilding process. 78% of the respondents consider this Gukurahundi as the straw that broke the camel’s back. Technically, speaking it threw spanners in the whole peacebuilding work.

Eighty two percent of the respondents argued that there was no way peace could be built with what happened to Matebeleland North and South as a result of 5th Brigade activities that devastated the region and left a trail of destruction and long term negative impact for the region in many ways ranging from developmentally, socially, economically, politically and culturally.

More critically, sixty percent of the respondents argued that the confiscation of farms and properties belonging to PF ZAPU after the discovery of arms caches on PF ZAPU properties and the refusal to return these properties has been a blow to PF ZAPU empowerment of its ex-combatants such that it created a lot of animosity between government and PF ZAPU and its combatants as well as its supporters.
These respondents do further argue that, if government was serious about peacebuilding, the government was supposed to return those properties and farms after the signing of Unity Accord in December 1987. In addition, the respondents are of the view that government wants to ensure that the former PF ZAPU has no economic muscle after losing its properties and anything that could bring them revenue.

Over eighty percent of respondents from both provinces were of the view that confiscation of properties and PF ZAPU documentation was a deliberate act by government to ensure that it weakens and destroy PF ZAPU. Most historical records and political history of the opposition was collected and never returned. The respondents in Matebeleland North and South concurred that 5th Brigade operated closely with the Central Intelligence Organisation. Seventy percent of the respondents both those who were interviewed and focus group discussion agreed that Gukurahundi operatives moved from village to village with lists of names supplied by CIO (which were confiscated by Government from PF ZAPU properties and documents)

The respondents go further to argue that these Gukurahundi officers would then look for branch, district, provincial officers in all PF ZAPU and kill these individuals such that the impact was that all the structures of PF ZAPU and its support base was completely destroyed. The respondents are of the view that from 1980, the government deliberately started distorting the history of liberation of Zimbabwe and portrayed that PF ZAPU did not fight for the liberation of this country. Former commanders interviewed by this researcher, strongly argued that PF ZAPU was a national party that operated throughout the country. It is this regard that PF ZAPU had commanders from all over the country. In the words of one respondent, ZANU PF Government “privatised national history and completely distorted the role played by PF ZAPU in the liberation of Zimbabwe.” [Interview with Pius Ncube 21 October, Dete Hwange]

Over eighty percent of respondents from interviews and focus group discussion agreed that the arrests and detention of PF ZAPU leadership such as Dumiso Dabengwa, Lookout Masuku and several others was a major blow to the peacebuilding process. The respondents explained that the rank and file of the PF ZAPU membership found it extremely difficult to understand what the government was doing let alone the supposed unity of the people when all the leadership of PF ZAPU was detained, while others forced into exile. It was unfortunate
to single out PF ZAPU for all the dissidents’ problems. Twenty eight percent of the respondents were strongly in agreement that most of the dissidents were from PF ZAPU. Their argument was that if they were not from PF ZAPU they would not have operated from this region because they would have linguistic barriers and furthermore, people would not easily assist them no-matter how much the se dissidents forced people to give them food.

Forty seven percent was of the view that PF ZAPU contributed most of the members of dissidents. The others may have come from the disgruntled ZIPA ZANLA, Selous Scouts, or simply from remnants from the Rhodesian Army. The other respondents argued that it was difficult to say from which group the dissidents were from because there were over six different groups after the war including Super ZAPU which was a creation of South Africa.

The other twenty percent argued that PF ZAPU ex-combatant may have joined dissidents because they felt that they got a raw deal during integration into the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA).

From the above responses it can be concluded that the composition of dissidents was from all these groups though mainly from PF ZAPU. All the disgruntled soldiers from any of the six groups would have joined in the disturbances.

The other crucial factor that affected peacebuilding was that there was lack of cultural understanding and differences among the Shona and the Ndebeles culturally. The Shona who made the bulk of 5th Brigade members treated the Ndebele speaking people as ZAPU supporters and more so as dissidents. Thus, according to the respondents, people did not see need to support the government after seeing that the government has negative attitudes towards one section of the population.

5.6 Handling of reconciliation in the provinces

Eighty three percent of the respondents in Matebeleland North agreed that there was no reconciliation that was seriously attempted in affected areas such as their province. They cited the disaster that befell Tsholotsho (Jotsholo) because there are issues raised by the respondents such as some children of Gukurahundi victims do not having birth certificates. The major reason why this is the case is that all the people who were killed between 1982 and 1989 were not issued with death certificates and the net result is that their children and other relatives are unable to get national identity documents. This means that they cannot get
passports and are not officially known therefore, cannot vote or make meaning contribution. Furthermore they cannot enrol in primary schools for basic education. “The fact that government has not done anything about this matter with regards to issuance of these records, it shows that it is indeed arrogant and unrepentant towards its approach to dealing with Ndebele people and former PF ZAPU supporters.” In the mind of over seventy five percent of respondents’ means that people are not reconciled is that they resent Shona speaking officers and the government in general. [Thsolotsho Focus Group Discussion 23 October 2015]

According to these respondents, they have grievances against ZANU PF and they tend to punish the ruling party by voting for the opposition. Binga in Matebeleland North has been voting for the opposition since 2000. The respondents argue that they felt neglected by the government since 1980 nothing tangible has been done to uplift their lives. They are worse off than they were in 1980. People in these districts have not seen what development is and if anything, they are worse off than during colonial times. Sixty eight percent of the respondents strongly argued that they “expected the government to carry out policies in the two provinces that would benefit the people in the form of distributive justice. Examples would include building of clinics better school infrastructure, good road network, and radio and television network.” [Interview with Dr Ray Motsi, Theological College, Bulawayo 28 October 2015]

The above views have been echoed by over sixty nine percent of all the respondents who responded to questionnaire and interviews as well as focus group discussion.

The besides the GNU attempts to reconcile people, there hasn’t been any serious government efforts to reconcile people. Why does the government refuse to allow commemorations of Gukurahundi? Some people are still angry that they were never given the chance to mourn or bury their beloved ones. Church efforts like Catholic Church are/were always viewed with suspicion because of the Catholic Commission on Justice and Peace’s Report on Gukurahundi.

I am a Zimbabwean, I don’t want to go anywhere else, I belong to this country, I am committed to farming and building up my country. We’ve always said we can work with government, we want to work with government, and it is our government, let’s get together and make it work, it’s our future. I regard myself as…indigenous, I believe I can make a contribution to this country; the only people who can develop this country properly are all the indigenous people to this country. (CCJP 1995)
Over three quarters of the respondents from both provinces are of the strong view that government did nothing about reconciliation. Their argument was that instead of government reconciling the people in the country, the very government started unleashing extreme violence on the people in the region. As if that is not enough, The ZANU PF Government trained a new brigade- the 5th brigade to deal with the menace of the dissidents. This dumbfounded the people in Matebeleland North and South as it was believed that the very government had the national army and support unit that had sufficient capability to deal with such menace.

This researcher is of the view that the president of ZANU PF as head of state and government is a power monger and looked for ways of being an absolute monarch hence his preoccupation with one party state concept. The respondents concluded that after being the supreme leader in the country, he did not do anything to reconcile with different stakeholders in the political process.

When arm cashes were discovered in Matebeleland, in PF ZAPU properties, the then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe according to the respondents, did not make efforts to bring the people together. Instead, Robert Mugabe expelled Pf ZAPU ministers from Cabinet and this caused ill feelings among PF ZAPU rank and file. The feeling among the respondents is that, he as prime Minister should have known better that some of the weapons belonged to ANC of South Africa’s military wing- Umkonto WeSizwe.

Thirty seven percent of the respondents strongly argued that some of the weapons belonged to ZIPRA and were supposed to be used for self-defence in case Rhodesian Front soldiers take matters into their own hands. These respondents argue that imagine what would have happened had the Entumbane incidents taken place when ZIPRA ex-combatants had no weapons? These respondents go on to explain that the worst case scenario would have happened. The ZIPRA ex-combatants would have been slaughtered.

Twenty eight percent of the respondents were of the view that reconciliation took place at individual level where in a few case, Gukurahundi soldiers feeling the ‘heat’ of ngozi that is avenging spirits came to pay families of the people they slaughtered in order to get things
right. They go further to say this is difficult to quantify as they poke of the cases they witnessed both in Matebeleland North and South Provinces

The respondents especially those in Matebeleland North were of the view that government needed to carry out labour intensive process of reconciliation. This process must include all stakeholders such as non-state actors, churches traditional leaders in the communities and Government must take a serious lead in these matters. The female respondents were strongly opposed to the involvement of government in the process arguing that the government was the one that was responsible for this mercy which they created. As a result, they felt that government “were dirty because of its involvement”

Fifty three percent of respondents from the ZIPRA Demobilisation Directorate (that a total of two hundred and forty members) strongly complained that government was not for reconciliation at all. They reasoned that, the demobilisation and subsequent raw deal for ZIPRA ex-combatants suited ZANU PF Governments intentions and scheme very well.

The above respondents further argued that reconciliation was never handled in the provinces by the central government from Harare. It was just an announcement through the radio and there was no policy framework or legal act that should have done justice to such critical process. Forty seven percent of the respondents further argued that there was no explanation as to how this this process was to be carried out and there was no department that was responsible or in charge of handling these issues. The argument goes further to say that the ZANU PF government perpetrated violence and injustice to the people in the Matebeleland Provinces which negates that the policy of reconciliation that was at play.

This researcher believes that as a result of chaotic handling of the reconciliation process, there were no targets that one would measure the success of the process or lack of it. In addition, there was no program to bring all the people together such blacks and blacks and whites. In the view of the respondents ,the process of reconciliation was meant to bring together different groups of black people together as well as Black and Whites together in order to build a ‘rainbow nation’
Fifty eight percent of respondents with military background are of the strong view that the president of ZANU PF who is Head of State and Government is a power monger and looked for ways of being an absolute monarch hence his preoccupation with One party state concept since 1980 as well as crushing and detaining all the opposition parties and individuals opposed to him. These respondents cite Captain Nleya who died mysteriously and was found dead in the Hwange Game reserve, Sydney Malunga, Edgar Tekere, Ndabaningi Sithole, Margret Dongo, Morgen Tsvangirai, Dumiso Dabengwa, Lookout Masuku, Tonderai Ndira, and many others. The respondents concluded that after being the supreme leader in the country, he did not do anything to reconcile with different stakeholders in the political process. These stakeholders include various ethnic groups such as the Manyika from the East of the country Karangas from Masvingo, Ndebeles mainly in Matebeleland and Midlands Provinces as well as those in Mashonaland East, West and Central Provinces. Furthermore, and racial tensions have been taken advantages by the ZANU PF Government whose leader Robert Mugabe (2005) said “let’s strike fear into the hearts of the White men” and “the only White man you can trust is a dead White man” (Nemavhandu, M.{2008:12}Mugabe Crimes Exposed)

In addition, the churches, trade unions and the rest of the civil society have been divided so as to be easily manipulated. Thus, the respondents conclude that the extent of power hungriness in ruling party is unparalled in this Southern African Region.

When arm cashes were discovered in Matebeleland, in PF ZAPU properties, the then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe according to 61% of the respondents, did not make efforts to bring the people together. They argued that instead, Robert Mugabe expelled Pf ZAPU ministers from Cabinet and this caused ill-feelings among PF ZAPU rank and file. The some of the expelled ministers included Joshua Nkomo Minister of Home Affairs, Joseph Msika Minister of Industry and Commerce, Kembo Mohadi Deputy Minister of Energy, John Landa Nkomo minister of Local Government; Cephas Msipa resigned in sympathy of sacked colleagues.

The feeling among the respondents is that, Mugabe as Prime Minister should have known better that some of the weapons belonged to ANC of South Africa’s military wing- Umkonto WeSizwe.
Thirty seven percent of the respondents strongly argued that some of the weapons belonged to ZIPRA and were supposed to be used for self-defence in case Rhodesian Front soldiers take matters into their own hands. These respondents argue that what would have happened had the Entumbane incidents taken place when ZIPRA ex-combatants had no weapons? These respondents go on to explain that the worst case scenario would have happened. The ZIPRA ex-combatants would have been slaughtered. The fact is that ZIPRA combatants they were able to defend themselves because they had their arms. Furthermore, it is also argued that if all ex-combatants in the assembly points had no weapons, Ian Smith soldiers would have done exactly what ZANU PF did to ZIPRA.

Twenty eight percent of the respondents were of the view that reconciliation took place at individual level where in a few case, Gukurahundi soldiers feeling the ‘heat of ngozi’ avenging spirits came to pay families of the people they slaughtered in order to get things right. They go further to say this is difficult to quantify as they spoke of the cases they witnessed both in Matebeleland North and South Provinces.

The ninety three percent of respondents especially those in Matebeleland North were of the view that government needed to carry out labour intensive process of reconciliation. This process must include all stakeholders such as non-state actors, churches traditional leaders in the communities and Government must take a serious lead in these matters. The female respondents were strongly opposed to the involvement of government in the process arguing that the government was the one that was responsible for this mess which they created. As a result, they felt that government’s hands as well as ruling party’s hands “were dirty because of its involvement”.

The fifty three percent of respondents in the ZIPRA Demobilisation Directorate strongly complained that government was not for reconciliation at all. They reasoned that, that way it conducted the process of payments of war compensation was gravely biased in favour of former ZANLA combatants and it suited ZANU PF Governments intentions and scheme well.

They further argued that reconciliation was never handled in the provinces by the central government from Harare. It was just an announcement through the radio and there was no
policy framework or legal act that should have done justice to such critical process. Forty seven percent of the respondents further argued that there was no explanation as to how this process was to be carried out and there was no department that was responsible or in charge of handling these issues. The argument goes further to say that the ZANU PF government perpetrated violence and injustice on the people of the Matebeleland Provinces which negated that the policy of reconciliation that was at play.

This researcher believes that as a result of chaotic handling of the reconciliation process, there were no targets that one would measure the success of the process or lack of it.

In addition, there was no programme to bring all the people together such as blacks and whites. In the view of sixty seven percent of respondents, the process of reconciliation was meant to bring together different groups of Black people together as well as Black and Whites together in order to build a ‘rainbow nation.’

A senior Parliamentarian who served with ZANU PF and MDC Honourable Eddie Cross (He is White) strongly argued that another point that indicate that reconciliation was not properly handled was the fact that the new government in 1980 safeguarded the interest of ZANU PF and brought the whites back into cabinet at the expense of the Ndebele and other minority parties. The Whites in the Cabinet held very critical posts such as Ministry of Agriculture – Dennis Norman, Public Service Chris Anderson. Even when some disgruntled White officers run away with military planes to Apartheid South Africa, the Whites in the Cabinet were not expelled. The callousness with which the government treated the black people in Matebeleland and Midlands according to most respondents showed that government failed to create a rainbow nation where all Zimbabwean citizens were treated fairly. These respondents then strongly conclude that Whites were better treated by Mugabe Government up to year 2000 when ZANU PF Government embarked on land invasions that saw the chasing of White farmers by war veterans and ZANU PF supporters and by other rogue elements that took advantage of lawlessness. [Interview Honourable Eddie Cross, 21 November, MDC Offices Bulawayo]

The allocation of ministerial posts in the first 1980 Cabinet shows that ZAPU received a raw deal. They were given junior posts. Only four ministries went to PF ZAPU out of a 23 member Cabinet. Joshua Nkomo became Minister of Home Affairs. The former Rhodesian Front was given three critical posts in the new cabinet and these were Commerce and
Industry, Agriculture and Public Service. Mugabe supporters were given sixteen full ministries. Joyce Mujuru was given a full ministry though she was less knowledgeable on any of these matters of running a government department and she did not even have Ordinary Level Certificate. Some senior embers from PF ZAPU despite being very knowledgeable such as Cephas Msipa, a veteran educationist never got the best in 1980 first Cabinet. Records in the liberation history shows that Msipa has wide experience in the field of education, as a result of that experience; he would have been a better minister and better prepared for the task at hand. According to Dr Cephas Msipa, he was told by Mugabe, “you should be a Minister of Education but please accept the alternative post that I am assigning you in the interest of unity and peace” others. They had to pave way for ZANU PF functionaries. In an interview with this researcher, Dr Msipa agreed to take the other portfolio because” when we were fighting the oppressive system, personally, I was not fighting for a government position but it was in pursuit of freedom and justice.”

With regards to above matters, all respondents were greatly convinced that the reconciliation was poorly done and this brought anger and despondency. Pf ZAPU felt alienated from power after having started the liberation war. Thirty percent of those interviewed thought that ZANU PF took this position knowing fully well that PF ZAPU had lost the 1980 elections. Since they had lost the elections, there was no way they could complain and it is also strongly believed that even if PF ZAPU had refused, ZANU PF was more than ready to go it alone arguing that they won 57 seats out of 80 contested seats for the Black people under Lancaster House Agreement.

ZAPU cadres feel that their party received a raw deal from ZANU PF Government. They maintain that the government knew about the weapons in the PF ZAPU farms and could have asked for the surrender of these weapons into government hands. The argument by seventy percent of respondents was that the government wanted to embarrass and kick PF ZAPU out of government and then unleash its 5th Brigade into Matebeleland to crush PF ZAPU once and for all. These respondents maintain that this objective was fully achieved by ZANU PF. Former Commander in the ZAPU; Moses Mzila Ndlovu strongly argues that both ZAPU and ZANU did not surrender all weaponry to the state as required by law as there was lot of mistrust amongst the three protagonists. The only advantage that ZANU had was that it was the government of the day but it had “lots of weapons caches in many places and up to this day there are weapons all over in the hands of ZANU PF that is why
they always stress that if we lose elections, we will go back to the bush.” [Interview with Moses Mzila Ndlovu 18 November 2015, Bulawayo]

Eighty three percent of Catholic Bishops and other respondents in these two provinces are of the strong view that reconciliation was all rhetoric. According to the Catholic respondents, there is no-where reconciliation can take place if the perpetrators cannot acknowledge the past atrocities and take corrective actions in order to address the past then that is not reconciliation at all. The big question was how can people forgive and forget the past when daily they see graves of their relatives. The government has been very economic with apologies to the affected people of these provinces. According to the respondents, the nearest the government came to make an apology is when the President said, “it was a moment of madness” Mugabe according to ZAPU stalwarts [who include Cephas Msipa, Dumiso Dabengwa, Sandi Moyo, Simon Kaya Moyo] mentioned the above statement “moment of madness” at the burial of a senior ZAPU cadre at Lady Smith Cemetery in Bulawayo in 1993. According to ZAPU leader Dumiso Dabengwa, numerous bad things happened to Region of Matebeleland just as terrible things happened to Kosovo people in the 1990s through ethnic cleansing. Further he argued that it will take new thinking and completely new government several years to rectify the damage caused by the policies of this ZANU PF Government. [Interview with Dabengwa, Bulawayo 11 December 2015]

Seventy percent of one hundred and eighty respondents from human rights defenders mainly from the Catholic, Methodists, Anglican churches and villagers maintained that there must be a process which must be objective and truth telling and the process must be victim oriented. The respondents go further to argue that both perpetrators and victims must come together and then justice must take place. They argue that there are four critical ingredients for the success of the process namely truth telling, forgiveness, mercy and justice. It is the strong belief of the human rights defenders that none of this took place. In this regard, the victims must tell their stories as to what happened.

Furthermore, the process must look at how to achieve justice and build lasting peace. When all is said and done, justice must prevail. The above view is also shared by Lederach (1997) who feels that the victims play a significant role in the process of reconciliation and they set the pace and way forward with the perpetrators.
5.7 Major factors that contributed to failure of reconciliation

There are several factors that contributed to failure of reconciliation process in Zimbabwe. One of the major reasons was ZANU PF’s failure to apologise for the atrocities of Gukurahundi and the sufferings which people in Matebeleland went through when other Zimbabweans were enjoying independence.

There is no-way reconciliation can take place in the atmosphere of mistrust where there is never an apology from those who oversaw the atrocities. ZANU PF or any senior government officials never apologized for the atrocities or acknowledged the same. Mugabe only managed to say it “was a period of madness”. Ninety percent of the respondents concurred that people in Matebeleland Provinces need something like what happened in South Africa or Rwanda where they spoke about their experiences, grievances and what they wanted done so that they could forgive and forget. Traditional leaders, churches and civil society could help in reconciling communities with the government.

The utterances by ZANU PF leadership especially the Head of Government Robert Mugabe and some of his staunchest supporters such as Enos Nkala and Emmerson Mnangagwa did not help matters at all if anything, they exacerbated matters. The Prime Minister Mugabe made public statement such as:

The dissident party and its dissident father [Joshua Nkomo], are both dissidents and they are not only for rejection but for utter destruction……..

[Robert Mugabe in a BBC interview April 12, 1983]

According to ninety percent of respondents, such inflammatory statements created further problems and as such there was no-way reconciliation would succeed in the country let alone in Matebeleland provinces. It was the Gukurahundi that accomplished the task for Robert Mugabe. In addition, there are scattered graves all over these two provinces. As pointed out by eighty one percent of respondents some of the mass graves are still visible up to this day though cattle and weather has made these less visible save for the villagers who know about their location. There is a lot of evidence in these areas: Tsholotsho, Lupane, Gwayi, Mapisa, Kezi, and Plumtree.

There are other statements such as the “only good Whiteman is a dead one” This is not expected in a democratic state in the twenty first century. [Nemavhandu, 2008:72]
PF ZAPU has never forgiven government of ZANU PF for destroying its history so that future generations will never understand the role that PF ZAPU did from the 1960s up to 1980. This then means that what the government of the day feeds the nation and is in the curriculum of education will negatively impact on the people and future of this country. Seventy percent made the above feelings known because they argue further that “each of us in PF ZAPU as ex-combatants contributed $50.00 each and that money was used to mobile resources and many properties were bought to benefit ZIPRA combatants and all this investment was confiscated by the government in the early 1982s and have not been returned to us the rightful owners” [Interview with Dabengwa, 11 December 2015]

It is the views of sixty eight percent of respondents that there was strong dissatisfaction by ZIPRA combatants with the integration process into the national army and appeared to be excluded from the process. Whether they were not physically fit to be selected and attested into the national army is another issue. There was a lot of mistrust among ZANLA and ZIPRA ex-combatants. The fifty seven percent of respondents, who went through the process of reintegration into the national army, argued that they felt the British Military Advisal Team tended to sympathise with ZANU PF forces. This could probably be explained in terms of cold war politics since ZIPRA was Soviet Union trained and therefore Communist against ZANU PF which was Chinese oriented.

PF ZAPU had a good policy of empowerment among its forces and they were well disciplined. Upon independence in 1980, ZAPU ex-combatants made significant contributions and raised a lot of money that ran into millions of dollars. They used this money to buy several farms not only in Matebeleland but in Midlands, Mashonaland and Domboshava. In addition to farms; they also bought hotels and other buildings especially in Bulawayo some of these farms include Snake Park near Harare, Lido, Castle Arms and Magnet House. They had a technical college which was used to train ex combatants into various skills such as farming, carpentry, needlework, motor mechanics, fitter and turners and many other trades.

According to ninety percent of respondents, problems worsened after ZANU PF Government confiscated these farms, buildings and farms and deprived ZAPU ex-combatants opportunities to earn a decent wage and lead uninterrupted lives. Thus according to these ex-combatants from the PF ZAPU camp, “we are leading very destitute lives when they had invested in these productive ventures.”
From this, seventy percent of all respondents from all the two provinces have argued strongly that there was no-way reconciliation could take place under these circumstances. It was simply impossible. The respondents further argue that the government has not busy willing to listen and discuss this issue in the interests of peace and reconciliation. One former Governor and Cabinet Minister Cephas Msipa explained that the majority of ministers from ZANU PF camp were not willing to have the matter discussed at cabinet level for reasons that are not very clear. He argues further that during his tenure as cabinet, he tried to have the matter brought up for discussion but was accused to be “a tribalist who wanted to open old wounds.”

The then powerful ministers such as Enos Nkala (Defence), Enerst Kadungure, Kenbo Mohadi, and Sydney Sekeramayi blocked all the discussion. This could be attributed to politics of patronage where the occupation of any government ministry or post is at the mercy of Robert Mugabe. All those who differ from his perceived views are labelled saboteurs of the revolution and suffer “political Siberia”

In addition, ZANU PF used all tricks in the book to destroy PF ZAPU. For example, Obert Mpofu, Phelekezela Mphoko and many others were recruited from ZAPU by Enos Nkala and he further used money and government positions for people to defect from ZAPU to ZANU PF.

All PF ZAPU structures were destroyed and this made it extremely difficult for the people to reconcile with ZANU PF Government. The sixty eight percent of respondents argued that how could people in these provinces work with government that sent in a crack unit in the form of 5th Brigade that was trained to kill The 5th Brigade wanted to wipe out all the Ndebeles hence the use of all the violence that was directed at civilians and not the dissidents. The argument goes further that there are no published numbers of dissidents killed from late 1982 to the time of Unity Accord of 1987. Furthermore, people were perplexed as to why the government sent in a crack unit that operated outside the normal army channels, the unit had different uniforms, different communication systems and different vehicles which they used for their operations.

5.8 Methods adopted by Fifth Brigade
The 5th Brigade was commonly referred to as the Gukurahundi which in the local Shona parlance means “the rains which washes away the chaff before the spring rains.” By
implication, it would mean that the brigade would clear or wash all the unwanted elements in Matebeleland and in this context the Ndebele people and ZAPU.

The 5th Brigade adopted various cruel and inhuman methods of victimising and torturing civilians. According to eighty one percent of the respondents in this study, Gukurahundi used some of the methods described below.

The Gukurahundi would gather people in one place then blindfolded them and then told them to run and while they tried to run, the red Beret soldiers would then shoot them from the back. The implication would be that they were running from the army or soldiers therefore deserved to be shot.

In some cases, people were beaten with huge sticks until buttocks, back and clothes were torn into shreds from beating. It was just inhuman and degrading and this could not have happened in the 21st century with all the enlightenment and civilisation. [Interview with Raphael Khoza, Bulawayo, 6 December 2015]

The Gukurahundi soldiers would bayonet pregnant women and would say “we want to remove the dissident from inside.” They would then slit open the pregnant women and that would be the end of life for both the mother and unborn baby. Respondents cried when they narrated these ordeals. They summed it as “simply barbarism at its worst, meant only for Dark Age people.” [Interview with Raphael Khoza Bulawayo 6 December 2015]

In Matebeleland South at Gwanda, there was a lady known as Chipo. She belonged to Zimbabwe Intelligence Corp or CIO. She would parade her womanhood out for the men as a torture weapon and then she would sit at a high position with no pants, and open her legs then she would ask men to come and make love to her. According to the testimonies of two survivor of this horror at Gwanda,” She would say Iwe huya, huya undiise, ndaakunzwa kuda.which means you! Come and fuck me.” The outcome was the same whether one agreed or refused. In fact by agreeing, one would be committing worst offence. For the majority of men at Gwanda this was the worst part than beatings which they endured

The above was corroborated by several eyewitnesses who were interviewed by this researcher. They further maintained that people were forced to come to the Centre in Gwanda and spent the whole day in the sun being indoctrinated, while others were interrogated and tortured. At the same time, others would be beaten. Furthermore, all the people who were gathered were forced to singsongs that denigrated PF ZAPU and its leadership. In the words
of one Chief Ndiweni, "sifundilekuhlabelela ingoma ezitsha ezeZANU PF emhlanganweni ngesikhathi esincane ngoba kuyimpiло lokufa” This Ndebele translated into English, means “we learnt to sing new ZANU PF songs in these meetings in a matter of short time because it was a matter of life and death.” The respondents were of the strong view that they will never recover from the psychological traumas they went through in that dark moment in the history of the country.

Seventy nine percent of respondents testified that another common method used by the 5th Brigade was that individuals would be forced to dig their graves and then asked or forced to jump into the grave then lie on their stomachs. This would be followed by others who would be ordered to start throwing soil until the grave was filled with soil after that then people would dance on top of the fresh grave until it became flattened as if there was nothing. Those showing emotions would be severely thrashed.

The people in Filabuzi were spared from most of these sufferings. The respondents strongly argued that the 5th Brigade was never deployed in Filabuzi District now known as Uzingwane District. The reason for their non-deployment was that it was the home area of the Defence Minister Enos Nkala. However, the district is now the largest than it was in the period of Gukurahundi.

According seventy percent of respondents as well as government officers, there was severe curfew that was imposed in all the provinces. This had negative impact on the whole population in the areas save for those in the army, CIO and police.

**Curfew Time**

Seventy percent of respondents strongly argued that curfew was imposed from six in the evening to six in the morning. However, the respondents strongly noted that it virtually lasted the whole day or in some cases the whole week or month. The people were scare to death for those that braved travelling they met with hell on the roadblocks that were scattered and even the transport operators were scared to have buses to operate in the areas as the 5th Brigade could burn the buses and attribute it to the dissidents. One former 5th Brigade operative testified “isu taitonga. Taaita madiro, hapana mupurisa aitisunga, taive nefreedom kubva kuhoffice yaPrime Minister Mugabe” This roughly translated means” we were a law unto ourselves, no police officer could arrest us, we had freedom and blessings from Prime
Minister Mugabe’s office to deal with Ndebeles.” (Requested anonymity, 17 August 2015, Mapisa, Matebeleland South)

There was no way of verifying such cases as there was no media in these areas. During the curfew period:

- There was no transport from city to affected rural areas save for the military police and CIO vehicles.
- All shops were closed and as a result there were no supplies to assist the people in these areas. Shops were virtually empty in some cases not even salt was available.
- No buses from town to various rural villages making it difficult for the wounded, sick, and those moving from one point to another
- No movement of people between 6pm to 6 am. Anyone seen moving would be shot at and was deemed a dissident.
- Not even scotch carts would be allowed into the areas.
- No food was allowed and it would be believed that it was meant for the dissidents.

[David Foya Interview with Raphael Khoza, Bulawayo 6 December 2015]

According to Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace programme Officer Raphael Khoza interviewed by this researcher, from early February 1984, 5th Brigade was redeployed in Matebeleland South and the methods of operations were changed. Whereas in the Matebeleland North, Gukurahundi beat and killed people and left them, in the Matebeleland South they tried to destroy all evidence. They were replaced by para-group (parachute group) and Grey Scouts (those who move on horses) on the grounds that these were well trained and physically fit soldiers and were also less, cruel and criminal and were more human as compared to the Gukurahundi whom they replaced.

A former commander with Fifthy Brigade Mehluli Mpofu in focus group discussion with this researcher had this to say “we were trained to kill, torture, beat, rape and reorient these Ndebele people with ZANU PF philosophy and they were supposed to hate and not support PF ZAPU for good. This was made possible because as a brigade we were largely made up of ex-ZANLA and predominant Shona and would fight the Ndebeles and ZAPU better than the National Army which was well trained as disciplined and made up of three major components of ZIPRA, ZANLA and former Rhodesian Army personnel.” [Mpofu, Magwegwe Suburb, Bulawayo 17 December 2015 Comments made in Focus Group Discussion]
The above sentiments were echoed by all seventy percent of the respondents. They added that the whole issue was to destroy ZAPU supporters and structures. Those that were hunted were cell district and provincial chairpersons so as to eradicate the party or destroy it completely and render it leaderless. ZAPU was no more and it was systematically destroyed. It is in this regard that when Unity Accord came, the party was serious weakened and signed the document which did not spell their future. It spelt doom for the party and future of the regions.

More than sixty five percent of the respondents strongly argued that if the intention of ZANU PF Government was to hunt dissidents, why then destroy civilian homes, kill unarmed defenceless civilians instead of hunting the criminals wherever they were? Why close the shops that served the rural people? All these questions begged answers that were not forth coming from those in the government.

In other ways, people would have leg irons and their hands tied at their back and beatings would take place. Pregnant women were no exception in all these treatments. The 5th Brigade would accuse the women as giving love to the dissidents. Eighty percent of respondents argued further that homes or villagers were completely destroyed. The Red Berets or Gukurahundi accused the rural people of supporting the dissidents hence they destroyed homes and all livelihoods of these people. Their argument was that once the cover of dissidents was destroyed, they would destroy the dissidents.

Some of the approaches used included:

- Crude barbaric methods of killing people
- Whole families were killed
- Burying people alive
- Bayoneting pregnant women in order to ‘kill the dissident before birth’
- Based on the people speaking Ndebele not on combatants
- Whole villages killed

The above views of respondents were also corroborated by documents such as, Choosing the Path to Peace and Development by Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (1999), When the State Turns on its Citizens by Lloyd Sachikonye (2011), Mission Accomplished by Dr J.F. Davis (2013)
Then 5th brigade had to start from somewhere geographically. According to this research, the reason why they started with Matebeleland North could have been that, it is an area that is predominantly Ndebele especially Tsholotsho, Lupane and Nkayi areas. Furthermore, these were the areas that formed the core of PF ZAPU support base. Thus hitting them hard there would effectively send the ‘correct signals’ to the rest of the Matebeleland North and South to ‘watch out.’ A retired lieutenant with Fifthy Brigade, Fainos Malufu Dhlamini concurred with the above idea and added that “from our training base in Mberengwa it made military sense to start from the north then move southwards to Matebeleland South and Gwanda area. This explains why Matebeleland North and part of Midlands adjacent to Matebeleland North were affected at the same time. These areas of Midlands include Zhombe, Silobela and part of rural Gokwe.”[Dhlamini, 16December 2015, Interview with David Foya]

The 5th brigade took people to Stops Camp situated in Rose Camp in Bulawayo) and those taken there would disappear into thin air and no trace would be available. Records and people were all destroyed.[Coltart, D. 2016]

According survivors of interrogation, Colonel Mandlainkosi Mulindeli and Flight Lieutenant Paul Dumisani, there was ‘KK’, a black man who used to work with Special Branch (part of Central Intelligence Organisation) and was extremely ruthless when dealing with any suspect. He was based at Stops Camp in Bulawayo. He used inhuman methods such as inserting sticks to suspects’ anus and tying both testicles with rubber bend then hit the testicles with a ruler until victims fainted and some died as a result of this and Colonel Mulindeli concluded by saying “it was a miracle that we survived the horrors of the torture at Stopps Camp and in my case I no longer have erection no matter what I try. Hence, I will not forgive ZANU PF ” [Mulindeli and Dumisani 3 November 2015, Interview with Foya]

5.9 Impact of Fifth Brigade Operations

The 5TH BRIGADE must be located in the context of liberation war of 1970s and the violence it brought. In addition, there was a lot of impunity by those who had done atrocities during the liberation and thereafter. The above was explained by Moses Mzila Ndlovu former senior artillery commander in the PF ZAPU. Therefore, it promoted the continuity of these barbaric acts. It also explains why liberation movements have used violence to achieve their ends.[Marry Ndlovu, 5 November 2015, Interview with Foya]
In 1981, Robert Mugabe went to North Korea and confided to the dictator Kim II Sung that he felt insecure since the British were the ones who were training his ZNA and that where the British had handed power, there was a military coup and perhaps the same could happen to him in Zimbabwe. Kim II Sung then assisted with the training of 5th Brigade that would be directly answerable to the Prime Minister. These soldiers were extremely loyal, supportive of the Prime Minister, accountable to him alone. [Judith Todd, 2007]

Perrence Shiri was quoted by government owned Chronicle as saying “5th Brigade was elevated above all other brigades. Composition of 5th Brigade included mainly Shonas, those willing to serve the new government without inclination to PF ZAPU.” For example, Perence Shiri had no rank in the army but overnight was promoted to lead it and has been promoted ever since then. In this regard, more than sixty percent of the respondents argued that from the look of things in the ZANU PF, violence pays because all those who committed atrocities since liberation have been handsomely rewarded.[The Chronicles, 28February 1986 cited in Coltart 2016]

**Humiliation of People**

Testimonies of seventy percent of respondents did indicate that women were inhumanly treated, there were told to undress in public and touched on their private parts either by hands or by nose of the guns. Individuals were tortured in public. The above respondents argued that this was meant to reduce the menhood or womenhood of the population and also to make these people feel that they are nothing and culturally reduced. Furthermore, unlucky pregnant women at Gwanda interrogation Centre had their tummies ripped open by bynotes by soldiers and were accused to be spouses of dissidents. The above views were expressed by all respondents. It appears that the respondents were of the same views on the matters. There was convergence of ideas and thought

Sixty four percent of ZIPRA ex-combatants argued that 5th Brigade operations traumatised the entire region regardless of ethnic group. The Gukurahundi affected everyone who witnessed the inhuman cruelty of the ZANU PF government. The respondents go further to say that the Zimbabwean liberation war was not traumatising as was the Gukurahundi. Gukurahundi would force fathers to be intimate with their daughters in the presence of the village and there are reports of fathers who were killed for failure to have erection so that they sleep with their daughters.
Gukurahundi war was very disorienting to the people in the region and beyond. This was the case because there were people who had relatives in Matebeleland North, South and Midlands Provinces. It paralysed all the systems in the rural areas even in some cases in towns.

Seventy percent of respondents maintain that close to fifty percent of the adults in the region are traumatised especially those in the rural areas. The evidence of death and destruction is there for all to see. These respondents showed this researcher mass grave in the playgrounds of one school. For example, there is a mass grave at Silwane Primary school grounds in Matebeleland North where three teachers are buried up to this period when this research was conducted October 2015 - January 2016.

According to the retired Member In-Charge of Kezi Police Station (1981-1988) Chief Inspector Pilani Marxwell Ndlovu interviewed by this researcher, there is the mass grave in the police camp at Kezi Police Station.[Ndlovu, P 28 November 2015 Interview with Foya]

There is mass grave decorated as ‘rockery’ in order to conceal evidence because there is nobody who will temper with it. In addition to the above case, Father William Hebron who is now a retired Catholic Bishop who was in charge of Bulawayo Dioceses, at St Paul Mission Hospital, there is a mass grave in the school grounds where between twenty five to twenty eight people are buried there. (See pictures in the appendices section.)

All respondents were in agreement that the Gukurahundi had serious impact on the people in the provinces. The people have been largely disempowered. The affected people as a result of Gukurahundi do not have birth certificates nor death certificates thereby complicating already difficult issues. This means that several thousands of people who were born after Gukurahundi have no identification documents and this has deprived them of access to primary and secondary school education because without the identification, no one can go to school and ultimately cannot get employment. Even after unity Accord, nothing was done by the government to work on this issue. Hence, over sixty percent of respondents view government’s attitudes of trying to continue Gukurahundi in another way to ensure that the Ndebeles are dealt with once and for all. Once the ethnic group has had its leadership destroyed and its home party destroyed in terms of structure and leadership there is nowhere they would become a challenge to the ruling establishment.
Sixty one percent of all the respondents from Matebeleland Provinces were of the strong view that there are several hundreds of people who using surnames not theirs for the sake of having documents and they used other relatives’ documents in order to get identity documents. This is what has enabled some children to go to school and acquire documentation such as national identity documentation and passports that enables them to get employment and also enabled them to move from Zimbabwe to other countries that include South Africa, Botswana and the rest of the world. The danger of getting documents in this manner is that this becomes vicious cycle so that for eternity, the families will be using surnames that are not theirs.

A group of headmasters interviewed by this researcher, in focus group discussion explained that they knew very well of over twenty seven percent of the students using other surnames other than their family names. “As school heads in the affected areas, we have known that the surnames being used by families were not theirs. There is nothing that we can do about. The fault lies squarely with the government for not having affirmative action to allow these people to have documentation. Maybe, it serves the government well since people without document cannot travel or do anything worthwhile” In this regard, people cannot ask for any employment because they will be told that they have no educational qualifications and documentation.

The Gukurahundi created massive exodus of young and adult males from especially rural areas as well as from towns and cities because nobody was safe from Gukurahundi. They followed people into their homes as they were using lists confiscated from ZAPU offices. According to fifty nine percent of respondents, in most villages in Matebeleland North and South, there are very few young people. Majority of the young people have either left for urban areas and neighbouring countries notably Botswana and South Africa. These people do come during Christmas and Easter holidays. There are older women herding cattle because there is nobody to tend for the domestic animals. These views are confirmed by population census of Matebeleland North and South. For example, There are more women in Tsholotsho by 10 847, In Nkayi there are 7 047 more women than men and Lupane 5 209 more women than men.(ZimAsset 2012)
Depopulation of professionals

There was exodus of professionals from the affected areas and receiving areas of towns. All those professionals ran away from rural areas but most were pursued into towns and in some cases the state’s agents would move to neighbouring countries such as South Africa and Botswana where they kidnapped these people and some were brought into the country. According to Mary Ndlovu, ZAPU Director of Education and former Lecturer at Hillside Teachers College in Bulawayo, “rural Matebeleland has lost trained teachers and nurses and the schools and clinics are now manned by teachers awaiting training and first aiders in most clinics. The pass rate in all Matebeleland is extremely disgusting to say the least.” [Ndlovu, M 5November 2015, interview with Foya]

The Gukurahundi left a vacuum that will take generations to fill assuming that things get sorted. Vacuum in the sense that it is very difficult to fill in all the vacancies left by those who left this part of the country. Seventy three percent of the respondents are of the strong view that this has been a deliberate way to impoverish these provinces by any means possible. They argue further that government is not serious about peace-building and reconciliation. In this regard, ZAPU Leaders interviewed by this researcher argue that ZANU PF Government should have attempted to solve these issues of professionals. For instance the local teachers’ colleges such as Hillside and United Teachers Colleges should have embarked on a deliberate aggressive programme to train more science and mathematics teachers in order to fill the gaps.

In the same vein, former Senior Nurse Tutor at United Bulawayo Hospital (1980-1985) and at Mpilo Hospital (1985-1997) Mrs Catherine Ndlovu argued that “the government had all the resources to train more nurses from the region and deploy them to these district to boost nurse complement in rural hospitals and clinics. However, the political will was simply not there”[Catherine Ndlovu, 14 November 2015 ,Interview with Foya]

Most schools are manned by untrained teachers (that is teachers awaiting training), these schools are poorly resourced, and infrastructure resembles precolonial structures. The same applies to rural clinics in the areas, there are very few qualified nurses and the clinics have to drugs, poorly funded. Sixty three percent of respondents feel that in some cases patients visit traditional healers and the mapositori (Faith Healers)
These fifty six percent of respondents went further and said that only were police force and Central Intelligence Operatives remained in the rural areas in these rural areas. Those in the national army were not safe from Gukurahundi. They were arrested and tortured especially if they were members of former members of ZIPRA or were of Ndebele speaking. For the Gukurahundi officers were a law unto themselves. Those in the villages strongly believed that Gukurahundi soldiers were above any other members of the uniformed forces.

**Number of people killed & displaced**

According to the State Security Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa,( quoted by Government Herald Newspaper 13 July 1987) the total number of dissidents at their peak was four hundred. But the whole brigade was dispatched to Matebeleland in order to deal with the menace of these four hundred dissidents. According to forty seven percent of one hundred and twenty one Independent observers interviewed by this researcher as well as fifty eight percent of thirty nine NGOs that operated in these provinces strongly suggested that the total number of people killed by the Gukurahundi was higher than the figures given by Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace of twenty thousand people dead. Some of these NGOs include ZimRights, Plan International, Save the Children UK, World Food Programme, Christian Care, Red Crescent, Goal, International Red Cross, World Vision, Catholic Relief Services and many others. This figure does come from few selected districts where in-depth study was carried hence the arguments by the respondents that the figure could be far higher than that. Besides those who died at the hands of 5th Brigade, thousands more escaped to South Africa, Botswana and others into diaspora.

Then there are those who were thrown into mine shafts such as at Antelope Mine and others were burnt with chemicals. This was corroborated by former intelligence operative who requested to remain unnamed for security reasons. This operative explained that all those who were really perceived to be serious threat and of influence were burnt in that way. “we did many terrible things that when I look down the memory lane, I regret being part of the system that did those sadistic things to other human beings. There is no way I can be forgiven by people. It is regrettable. Now, as an old man I have no peace with myself, my extended family community and my God”
According to the former Minister of Reconciliation and National Healing, Moses Mzila Ndlovu anything between two to three and half thousand people died at Entumbane in Bulawayo during shootings that took place. These numbers are not being added to the 20 000 as given by the CCJP. (Interview 18 November 2015)

The dissidents killed a few whites. The number according to former PF ZAPU government ministers the number of White farmers killed by dissidents comes close to thirty. The above former minister Callister Ndlovu argued in an interview with Foya that “some whites were killed by 5th Brigade to give impression that the dissidents were evil and anti-White. The government controlled newspaper.” The Chronicle 17 July 1985 did comment that “the dissidents were evil because they were killing the Whites in Matebeleland and negatively affecting beef production in the provinces and instil fear in the White Community.” Surprisingly, the same paper did not say anything when thousands of Blacks were being massacred. It was heavily censored by the government and also self-censorship on the part of the editor and his entire staff.

This in the view of this researcher would build a coalition against the dissidents by the international community. The Whites would in turn support the government in its efforts to eliminate dissidents and their supporters. The White community became frightened and others moved from their farms in Matebeleland provinces to other provinces thereby affecting people’s livelihoods.

Development of negative attitudes

The 5th Brigade brought a lot of lawlessness and suffering in Matebeleland North, South and Midlands Provinces. The brigade was a law unto itself and from its operations; it does appear everyone feared the group right from the police and the rest of the army. Fifty four percent of the respondents maintained that individuals with criminal mind and inclination took advantage of lawlessness in committing crimes purporting to be dissidents. The above was explained by the respondents who argued that the Gukurahundi hardened people in the region and worsened their hatred of the Shona people as they are viewed being the same as the perpetrators.
5.10 Shaping of People’s Perceptions

Sixty eight percent of the respondents were of the strong view that the people of Matebeleland North, South, and parts of Midlands have been neglected by the government since the 1980s up to date which is 2015. To a large extent they feel that government has been extremely careless in the treatment of people in these regions. Seventy percent of the respondents feel that they are simply neglected in many ways.

The people in these provinces according to the above percentage of respondents are convinced that they have been marginalised by the government since the time of independence. This marginalisation has come in many forms and these forms include: lack of development in areas such as education, health delivery systems, road infrastructural development, telecommunication and social services for the people in the region.

It shaped the negative perceptions that the intention was to murder and wipe out Ndebeles as those who were Shona speaking survived the ordeals that others went through even Shona teachers and nurses were spared in the torture and killings that took places in these places . In the view of eighty percent of respondents, Gukurahundi had targets to achieve and this does suggest that it was an ethnic cleansing and was well planned and carefully executed.

Sixty three percent of respondents have strongly argued that there has not been any forum to discuss these Gukurahundi matters. Those who have attempted to attend commemorations of Gukurahundi in 2012 in Lupane Centre Matebeleland North were arrested. These include Honourable Member of parliament who was also Minister of reconciliation and National Healing Moses Mzila Ndlovu. Fifty five percent of respondents strongly argued that if such could happen to a Cabinet Minister, what more of civilians ordinary villagers? Furthermore, exhibition of photographs showing Gukurahundi events in pictures at Bulawayo National Gallery were stopped and exhibitors arrested by the police. No charges were laid according to The Chronicles 21 August 2012. This researcher interviewed (29 November 2015) the former member in Charge of Northern Police Station in Bulawayo on the matter. Inspector Mhlanga had this to say “We received radio communication from PHGQ in Harare to arrest the Minister of Reconciliation and National Healing Honourable M. M. Ndlovu. The instruction was to hold him there and no charge were preferred against him. Even if things are not right as a police officer, I am forced to take the government position least I am fired from my job.”
More than fifty eight percent of the respondents in this research strongly felt that Gukurahundi impact has been extremely negative. It brought ill feelings between the Shona and the Ndebeles especially rural Matebeleland. The reasons according to seventy percent of respondents are that those who committed these heinous crimes spoke the Shona Language and were mostly from the other provinces of Zimbabwe other than Matebeleland.

Three former Cabinet Ministers, Dr Cephas Msipa, Mr Dydimus Mutasa and Mr Rugare Gumbo in interviews with this researcher (November 2015) concurred with sixty percent of the village respondents that there is a sense of not belonging to this country. Furthermore, this is being compounded by statements from politicians such former Minister of Transport Obert Mpofu who said, “Bulawayo must become part of Zimbabwe, and the people here should vote for ZANU PF and failure to vote for the revolutionary.” (From the Chronicle 21 November 2015) The statement by implication means that it is not part of Zimbabwe. That is why people in these provinces do not get a fair deal. In this regard, people feel alienated from the country and governmental activities that take place in these provinces.

According to sixty six percent of the respondents, Ndebele people view themselves as Second class citizens. Asked why they felt that was the case, they argued that government deliberately placed the Shona people in all government positions of authority for instance in the ZRP, ZNA, headmastership positions especially important schools even in non-Shona speaking areas. For example there are Shona speaking Headmasters in Nkayi, Tsholotsho schools such as Sizane Primary, Sizinda Primary schools, Kezi Primary School, Tshayile primary school, Nyamandlovu Secondary. There are very few Ndebeles in high levels of government positions through the regions. According to Education officers stationed in Gwanda and Bulawayo who spoke of condition of anonymity, there are over seventy nine headmasters in rural Matebeleland whose origins and provinces are traceable to outside Matebeleland provinces.

In addition even government institutions are manned by people from beyond the region yet there are people from Matebeleland Provinces who are equally knowledgeable in these matters. However they are not given opportunities to do apply themselves diligently. This applies to nurses’ and teachers training institutions too. For instance, during 1984 to 1989, there were more Shona speaking nurses trained at Bulawayo United Hospitals and Mpilo Central Hospital. According to Sister Catherine Ndlovu (Senior Nursing tutor) in an Interview with Foya only two hundred and fifty three Ndebele nurses were trained against
one thousand and forty one Shona Shonas. Former PF ZAPU Artillery Commander and Cabinet Minister Moses Mzila Ndlovu commented that “all positions of authority in the army, police, education, health services, are manned by Shona and this caused an uproar with the late Governor of Matebeleland North, Welshman Mabhena who raised the issue with the President Mugabe and he was labelled an ‘an unrepentant tribalist’ by the president himself.” [M. M. Ndlovu 18 November 2015, Interview with Foya]

With regards to teachers training colleges in Bulawayo that is Hillside Teachers College and United College of Education, according to principals Mr F. Chirandu and Mr Kennedy Chakanetsa, of Hillside and United College of Education respectively “most of the staff are non-Ndebele and not from Matebeleland but we have never really questioned this trend. People apply for posts and attend interviews and successful candidates are offered the job. Admittedly, most of our students are non Ndebeles for the simple reason that among those who qualify and apply are not from this region because there are very few schools in Matebeleland that produce good results at Ordinary level let alone at Advanced level. Thus the region, is handicapped”

In the Zimbabwe Republic Police , it is worse in terms of deployment, forty eight percent of respondents testified that at Nkayi, Tsholotsho, Binga, Hwange, Kezi, Victoria Falls, Maphisa, stations just to name a few major police stations are headed by Shonas and over sixty percent of all the officers are Shona. In the view of these respondents, it is grossly unfair to have this state of affairs in this country because on paper, the citizens are equal but on the ground the situation is different.

There is a strong argument from more than fifty percent of respondents that the situation in the provinces is that of gloom and despondence as individuals find themselves hopeless by the politics and man- made disasters that will take generations to resolve assuming that there is enough political will to sort this mess out. People are facing bleak future and this has been exacerbated by the economic circumstances that have been merciless. As a result, people are living one day at a time because there is nothing to look forward to. To compound matters, more than fifty percent of the respondents testified that people in Matebeleland are hopeless and there is nothing for them in the national affairs. A retired former Army Colonel Nkosi Dube in a focus group discussion had this to say “there is no local leadership to take charge of local affairs. Those elected end up serving own interests and tore the Harare line and behaviour so that they continue eating from the gravy train.” From the testimonies of
respondents it can safely be concluded that it will take a long time for the missed opportunities in the provinces under discussion to reach the level of other provinces.

Gukurahundi made Matebeleland rural areas more emotional and resistant to the current government’s moves even if the intentions are noble, everything is accepted with scepticism. The people from Matebeleland have become less interested to work in Mashonaland Provinces save for professionals who view issues differently. These are views of the sixty percent of the respondents.

One of the greatest issues brought by the Gukurahundi into Matebeleland is fear. The brigade was so ferocious and killed and did all unimaginable things that will for ever create a state of fear amongst the population. According to a group of sixteen ex-combatants from ZIPRA who spoke in focus group discussion:

*Gukurahundi brought excessive fear among the Ndebele population as a result of what had happened to people at Nkayi, Tsholotsho, Lupane, Kezi and many other areas. That served as lessons for the other areas where the Ndebeles were prominent such as those in Matebeleland South.*

*(Interview 18 December 2015)*

Further seventy percent of the respondents in focus group discussion were of the view that people in Matebeleland developed strong hatred of ZANU PF and the Shona people. It brought to the fore the violent nature of ZANU PF and its government as well as everything which it represent. Thus, the people have perceptions of violence and justifiably so. Thus, people join ZANU PF to avoid being victimised and killed. It is purely for survival purposes and to avoid being persecuted.

### 5.11 Unity Accord of 1987 and reconciliation

The unity Accord between ZAPU and ZANU PF signed on 22 December 1987 between Robert Mugabe (ZANU PF) and Joshua Nkomo (PF ZAPU) was described by Dumiso Dabengwa Leader of ZAPU in an interview with this researcher as “*a document of the vanquished with no future for the defeated.*” The victor humiliated the loser who is ZAPU
and all the Ndebeles. The Shonas who were part of ZAPU switched sides when they realised that ZAPU had lost the 1980 elections. These who moved from ZAPU knew very well that there would be politics of patronage. They had seen this during the tenure of Bishop Muzorewa of Zimbabwe Rhodesia. Muzorewa’s supporters were rewarded with high salaries especially those in education and health services. (Source: The Great Betrayal by Ian Douglas Smith, 2005)

According to eighty seven percent of respondents, there is nothing in the Unity Accord for the Ndebele or PF ZAPU. Three former cabinet ministers who were in the ZAPU have argued that the Unity Accord has 11 articles and the issue of reconciliation is completely absent. It was only incorporation of PF ZAPU into ZANU PF.

The Unity Accord talked about establishing a one party state in Zimbabwe under the guidance of Marxist-Leninist principles. PF ZAPU was strongly against this ideology of one party state. It is from this background that the respondents strongly suspect that it was forced unto PF ZAPU by ZANU PF because the former had been weakened by the Gukurahundi and all its leadership had been eliminated and others had gone into hiding outside the country and more so the venue of the signing - The State House. It is not even suitable for such important and neutral events. (See appendix for Unity Accord details)

Seventy one percent of respondents concurred that the only positive thing about the Unity Accord is the ending of the civil conflict and the stopping of killings and the return of relative peace and the allowing in of the goods including food and basic necessities into the to rural areas and the end of the curfew.

The above respondents are of the strong view that Unity Accord did not assist matters at all. It left Matebeleland fractured. In an interview with Writer Charles Mungoshi (September 2015), “everyone in Matebeleland provinces has some kinds of wounds.” He goes further to explain “that virtually everyone suffered in some way or the other and everyone suffered differently depending on geographical location.”

Judith Todd and Mary Ndlovu in interviews with this researcher argued that peace was dictated to ZAPU at ZANU PF’s terms hence the retaining of the name of the ‘new’ party no change in terms of leadership of ‘old’ ZANU PF as well as the structure of ZANU PF. It just incorporated a few former PF ZAPU cadres. [Todd, 4 November 2015, Interview with Foya; M. Ndlovu, 5 November 2015, Interview with Foya]
The name of the party remained ZANU PF which has been associated with killings and destruction of lives and people’s livelihood. People had lost properties, loved ones and all future posterity. In most cases, the whole lineage was wiped out spelling doom and disaster for the future of the families in Matebeleland. Furthermore, the symbol of the ‘new party’ was a ZANU PF cockerel a sign that the ruling party was the cock in the country and that it was the one that had killed the ‘Bull’ that is ZAPU. Mugabe even named one building in the city centre of Harare as Karigamombe a clear reference to ZAPU.

Seventy five percent of the respondents view ZANU PF very suspiciously and as not interested in reconciliation. These respondents go further to say the idea is that ZANU PF is neither interested in reconciliation nor peacebuilding because they stand to lose their stronghold and use of violence to achieve their interests.

According to ten Catholic bishops that were interviewed Unity Accord of 1987 should have dealt with the past dark period and try to open up dialogue and apologise for atrocities of the past. Steps were supposed to have been taken at local level to deal with these issues. Focus group discussion contributions were that there was need for concessions especially in developmental terms to be given to the region. Unfortunately, The Unity Accord did not address these issues.

Close to seventy nine percent of the respondents were of the view that Unity Accord had many structural weaknesses that include the fact that there has been privatisation of history of the liberation struggle in which PF ZAPU is denigrated and is seen as having played second fiddle to ZANU PF. PF ZAPU was a national party operating in the whole of Zimbabwe and even among the rank and file, there were people from all ethnic groups, Ndebele, Kalanga, Manyika, Zezeru and others. Hence they had Mangena, George Nyandoro, Willie Musarurwa, Joseph Msika, George Silundika, and Lookout Masuku just to name some. The whole process of peacebuilding and reconciliation failed as it was based on wrong premises and did not address the issues that brought the conflict in the first place.

Eighty percent of all those interviewed in this research maintain that the unity accord was a marriage of convenience between Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe. ZAPU only came to the negotiation table on ZANU PF terms and to save people from Matebeleland from extinction. ZAPU came to accept dictated terms by the big brother, ZANU. ZAPU even
allowed itself to be swallowed and lost its identity for ever. There has never been a state sponsored/initiated peace building programme in the two provinces. No-one especially from ZANU PF wanted to take blame or to acknowledge that some wrongs were done.

According to Habakkuk Trust Chief Executive Director Dumisani Nkomo, reconciliation was poorly handled and from the word go, government was not sincere at all with the process. It just wanted to build its buttered image as a result of Gukurahundi. He commented thus: “Hence, signing Unity Accord and showing the world that he, the Prime Minister Robert Mugabe was willing to work with those who fought him in this civil conflict and that give the world the impression that he was a peace loving person.” [Nkomo, D, 3 November 2015, Interview with Foya]

In the same vein, Judith Todd a ZAPU stalwart and historian argued that Unity Accord was affected by the historical issues. She argues that the split of 1963 was disastrous for future of nationalists’ politics in Zimbabwe. It brought seeds of discord between the parties such that there would be no reconciliation at all. Robert Mugabe was not genuine with all the pronouncements he made on reconciliation policy. [Todd, J. Through Darkness, Life in Zimbabwe, 2007]

Lack of sincerity on the part of Robert Mugabe is seen historically by his manipulation of one group at a time. Firstly, he crushed opposition within his own ZANU PF. For example Rugare Gumbo, Augustine Chihuri, and Edgar Tekere, suffered in many ways as a result of opposing the authoritarian policies. After dealing with his internal enemies, he went for ZAPU and destroyed its leadership by arrests, detention and destroyed its support base by killing all the population perceived to be supporting ZAPU. [Sharri Eppil, 2 November 2015, Interview with Foya]

Whites were spared for the time being until farm evictions which began in the year 2000. That was followed by 2002 Citizenship Act which deprived citizenship from people whose parents were from SADC and other countries which include Britain, New Zealand and Australia. The major reasons for these actions were purely selfish reasons because these people did not support Robert Mugabe. Instead they supported the nascent Movement for Democratic Change which had been formed in September 1999. The above views of respondents were supported by Eddie Cross, an economist and Honourable Member of Parliament for Bulawayo South Constituency. Honourable Cross concludes by saying “in Zimbabwe, differing with the principles of the President Mugabe is treasonous, one can die,
get imprisoned, politically neutralised like what happened to numerous politicians that include Joshua Nkomo and Edson Zvobgo.” [Hon Eddie Cross, 20 November 2015, Interview with Foya]

According to seventy percent of respondents, Mugabe embarked on fast track land reform where supporters of his party were encouraged to move into the White owned farms as punishment for the White farmers’ support for the MDC. The accusation was that the mining and farming were mainly made up of aliens. In order to disenfranchise them, government came up with a Citizen Amendment Act which deprived all people of foreign descent from being citizens and therefore would not have voting rights until they renounced their foreign citizenship even if one was born and bred in Zimbabwe. These foreigners were even called ‘totemless’ by Mugabe.

In May 2005, just before parliamentary elections ZANU PF Government instituted in Operation Murambatsvina and this operation displaced over eight hundred thousand people and destroyed the livelihoods of vulnerable and the poor. The Operation Murambatsvina was carried out by Ministry of Local Government from May 2005. According to sixty percent of the respondents, to all intents and purposes, the operation was meant to drive all the supporters of opposition party who were very strong all urban centres and the ruling party had totally lost all support and city councils were under opposition councillors. According to Paul Themba Nyathi, former legislator for Gwanda South, “operation clear up filth was meant to drive out opposition supporters whom the government regarded as filthy and totemless” [Paul Themba Nyathi, 5 November 2015Interview with Foya]

The above respondents, say this was a reference to all the urbanites across the cities and towns in Zimbabwe caused a lot of suffering for the urbanites in Zimbabwe. The ripple effect reached all corners of the country. United Nations argue that eight hundred thousand people were directly affected by this move and they lost their livelihoods and housing and were forced to move into rural areas. (Tibaijuka Report July, 2005)

The more than sixty percent of respondents concurred that this was meant to dilute all urban constituencies and dilute strong opposition support base. Eighty percent of respondents maintained that Unity Accord introduced a culture of intolerance and distorted unity as conformity which is not the case. Above all, Robert Mugabe defines everything in the party
and in the country therefore, he is the Centre of Power. One respondent, Paul Themba Nyathi of ZAPU Directorate and former Member of Parliament was of the view that, “Mugabe should have taken the opportunity through Unity Accord to unite and rebuild the country. Instead, he created a very hostile environment for democracy to thrive by seeking to build one party sate which left no room for divergent views.” [Paul Themba Nyathi, 5 November 2015Interview with Foya]

Former National War Veterans Chairperson commented that after the Unity Accord 1987, ZANU PF invested heavily in violence and sharpened all instruments and institutions that perpetuate violence and all national institutions were adulterated to the extent that they serve the interests of ZANU PF party rather than the state. Thus, ZANU PF according to more than fifty three percent of the respondents have made it a point that there is a very thin dividing line if any between the state and the party.

According to Mary Ndlovu the widow of a national hero, Edward Ndlovu, the Unity Accord and “the merger was more political than anything”(Interview with Mary Ndlovu 5th of November 2015, Bulawayo)

This researcher is of the view that the Unity Accord of 1987 demonstrated Joshua Nkomo’s desire for peace and the love for his people. This view can be explained by the fact that the terms of peace accord were in favour of the ruling party ZANU PF and there was nothing for the PF ZAPU let alone for the region.

**The positive**

The Unity Accord showed that people in conflict as was the case in Zimbabwe, can find solutions to their conflicts or problems. For some members in ZAPU it brought benefits of being appointed into positions in politics and government. Fifty percent of respondents do strongly argue that once appointed, that these officials from this region stop serving interests of their respective regions but served the interests of appointing authority in Harare.

Forty seven of the respondents felt that causes of violence were never addressed at all. This has serious implications for the future generations because the conflicts may remain at latent stages.
**Negative**

Eighty percent of ZIPRA ex-combatants interviewed [one hundred and thirty] said that there was a training centre known as Paradise Camp in Mazowe Valley where some ZNA soldiers were taken there for training early 1982. The ZNA soldiers were indoctrinated into ZANU PF ideology and to make slogans in favour of ruling party and chant slogans against the other leaders notably Joshua Nkomo, Bishop Abel Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole. At this training centre, the training was not being done by the BMMAT. At the gate there was an anthill shaped structure inscribed in white paint “Pasi naJoshua Nkomo.” According to the fifty eight percent of the above respondents from ZIPRA, “they felt as if they were brought to that place to be killed after a few weeks, they ran away back to KGIV and they were not even punished as should have been the case under normal circumstances.”

Then at the end of the range, there was a mound of soil and then a kilometre before there was inscription written in white washed bricks “down with imperialists, down Joshua Nkomo and Bishop Abel Muzorewa.” Raphael Khoza, a medic in the ZNA who survived torture for refusing to make slogans had this to say “a lot of individuals in this country do not appreciate how evil ZANU PF system is, even you, the researcher will never understand these things. I went through hell and so did most ex-ZIPRA combatants as well as Ndebele People at the hands of ZANU PF” (Interview with Raphael Khoza, 6 November 2015, Sizinda Suburb Bulawayo)

According to sixty six percent of respondents, it was the time that the issue of reconciliation was being touted and spoken on daily basis yet the prime Minister was clandestinely doing such things when the process of unity and reconciliation was supposed to be in action. In the view of the respondents, it shows high levels of hypocrisy.

According to Joseph Nkathazo formerly with Catholic Commission of Justice and Peace for twenty years, to a large extent, ZANU PF Government played with people’s emotions. After Gukurahundi, Government adopted a more silent approach of dealing with divergent views and the opposition adopted more silent approach. (Interview with researcher 6 November 2015 Luveve Suburb Bulawayo)
5.12 LINK OF THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND FINDINGS

The argument by Lederach (1997) for an all-inclusive process in peace-building is very important and the findings of this research do indicate that the process of peacebuilding was a failure in the Matebeleland provinces. The findings do indicate that this was a result of the process that was only top down approach which did not take into considerations the needs and aspirations of the people at the lower levels of Lederach (1997) strongly argued that a successful peacebuilding strategy in all honesty must reach all sectors of society and not only focussed on high-level political actors. Hence his argument that “if we are to move beyond settlement and toward reconciliation or toward what I refer to as sustainable peace processes, we must not limit our lenses to only the highest level of political actors and the peace negotiations they forge.”.

In the same vein, Galtung (1996) is of the strong view that conflict is dynamic and inter-related and so is peacebuilding. As a result, peace processes must be all inclusive if the process is going to be truly transformative or indeed sustainable. Thus, the conflict in Zimbabwe as per findings is that, it was indeed very difficult to extinguish and improve relationships among the various stakeholders that the government, ZANU PF, PF ZAPU and the Ndebele people.

Reconciliation has been a failure in Zimbabwe according to the findings of this research and it consolidates the views of Lederach (1997) and Worthington (2001) that contend that reconciliation will only take place under circumstances where there is truth telling, forgiveness, mercy and justice. The failure of reconciliation was direct result of refusal by ZANU PF Government to acknowledge the killings and make apologies to the people in the region of Matebeleland North and South because government’s admission that “it was a moment of madness” is not sufficient and it smacks of mockery to thousands who died and several thousands.

The process of reconciliation is not one that a certain section of the society can say “we are revoking the process because the Whites have not reciprocated.” Robert Mugabe cited in Nemavhandu (2008:49). The process of reconciliation was not sustainable from the beginning and there was no strategic framework that would have capacitated people in order to ensure
that the process would be successful and that the leadership threw spanners in the work of peacebuilding and reconciliation as the findings show.

Non-state actors were not allowed to participate in the process with material, financial or political support. The reason being that the government does not trust anybody and it wanted to maintain power at all costs including loss of thousands of lives and the displacement of thousand more and left the population traumatised. Research findings show that ZANU PF Government according to Rudney (2008) strongly believed that “promoting reconciliation and the strengthening of civil society” would weaken its resolve of building a one part state after demolishing PF ZAPU.

Peacebuilding failed in Matebeleland North and South Provinces and Zimbabwe in general as Lizzie (1996:178) notes that other than having the capacity to “bridge the divide between conflicting parties,” there is serious need for citizen diplomacy which has the ability to bridge “critical divides that complicate and often retard the process of conflict transformation ... including the divisions between government and civil society, between elite and grassroots levels within communities, and between different cultural worldviews and assumptions about how to manage conflict and change.”

Lederach (2007) and Lizzie (1996) concur that modern peacebuilding must focus on reconciliation, and on rebuilding relationships. In this vein, a focus on the process of reconciliation will recognize that conflicts are generally centred on relationships. Hence the truthfulness of the findings that ZANU PF did not consider working on the relationships and refused to return all confiscated properties from ZAPU and they are being used by government in different capacities.

Paris (1997) supports Lederach’s approaches of peacebuilding which describes the actors and issues in conflicts in terms of levels of leadership and nested foci. He regards the leadership as taking place at three particular levels and these include top level, the middle-range, and grassroots. Unfortunately, there was no involvement of the other two types of leadership and it was on top level actors consist of political, military. Hence the process was a complete failure.

Hart (2006) is of the strong view that peacebuilding as an approach should be all encompassing and all stakeholders and must do all necessary things which include trauma healing amongst those people involved. Furthermore, there is serious need to do training
through education in polytechnic colleges, universities as is the example of University of Peace, National University of Science and Technology, Africa University and Solusi University.

Galtung (1997) supports the above ideas and adds that justice must prevail so that there is distributive justice and the affected societies benefit from the process. Otherwise retributive justice will end up with more problems than anticipated. Peacebuilding processes must include human rights and human security as well as humanitarian assistance. This is only possible when a lot of non-state actors are involved in the process. Thus, the involvement of NGOs, Human Rights Organisations, traditional leaders, churches will lead to success of the process irregardless the duration the process will take.

5.13 Peacebuilding and development in Matebeleland

There have been significant challenges with regards to peacebuilding in Matebeleland North and South Provinces. In an interview with this researcher, Senator David Coltart (12 November 2015 Kelvin Industrial Site, Bulawayo) maintained that conflicts in Matebeleland Provinces, have had developmental consequences. The rest of the country from 1980s experienced development in many areas while there was conflict in this side of the country. He argued further “that while the rest of the country witnessed massive development in education in primary schools, secondary schools teachers colleges and technical colleges, health infrastructure, and road infrastructural development. Matebeleland provinces have not seen the same levels of development. The schools in the region are far below in terms of infrastructure and teaching staff training and qualifications. ”

Sixty five percent of the respondents have argued strongly that Matebeleland experienced nothing in terms of development. The argument goes further that ZANU PF Government had a deliberate policy of not even trying to develop the provinces.

According to former Member of Parliament for Gwanda South Constituency, Paul Themba Nyathi, from 1983 to 1987 development was arrested. The government under the pretext of fighting the dissidents in Matebeleland North and South ensured that no development would take place at all. Up to this point nothing on the ground suggest that something is being done or will be done any time soon. (Interview with Paul Themba Nyathi Suburbs Bulawayo 5 November 2015)
**Road network**

Elsewhere in Zimbabwe, there are much better roads and better accessibility and development comes through accessibility to the outside world. With regards to road development, there are no major roads for example in Nkayi, Tsholotsho, Kezi and Lupane. There is not even a link road to Binga, the rest of the country road infrastructure is much better as compared to Matebeleland North and South. See the picture below of the main road that links Bulawayo and Nkayi.

**Figure 16: State of Bulawayo-Nkayi road**

![Image of road](image)

*Source: Primary Data (11/10/2015)*

This scenario has been exacerbated by a deliberate cooperation from the Central government in Harare. There is a strong view by residents of Nkayi and region (in focus group discussion with the researcher Nkayi, Matebeleland North Province 29 November 2015) that the people in the Region are fundamentally disenfranchised and have since given up. In addition, all elected representatives are serving own interests at the expense of the electorate. In the Focus
group discussion, the participants argued that all elected members of parliament have failed the people. However, fifty percent of respondents in this discussion were of the view that there was nothing these members of parliament could do. The Central Government in Harare is the one that makes priorities in development terms. Thus, no-matter how vocal the members of parliament are, if the government does not give its nod, there is nothing that can be done.

Dr and Rev Ray Motsi, Director of Theological College of Zimbabwe commented that that Matebeleland has four major roads and these are: Plumtree Road, Harare road, Gwanda Road and Victoria Falls Road. The rest of small roads do not go very far at all and they do not link major areas at all. In this vein, ZINARA gave less money for road development for Matebeleland Provinces citing that there were very few roads in the area and that it did not warrant disbursement of a lot of money. ZINARA goes further to argue that funds are disbursed as per road requirements and plans according to councils as well as projects that require funding. (Interview 2 November 2015 at Theological College of Zimbabwe, Bulawayo)

**Figure 17: State of road in Mapisa, Matebeleland South**

Roads are extremely bad and it makes the movement of people and goods very difficult and even transportation becomes very difficult let alone during rain-season. Buses and Lorries
have resorted to using longer routes in order to get to their destinations. Bridges have been broken since 1980s up to 2015. People have to travel long distances in order to get home or town. This becomes costly in terms of fuel and time when doing business.

**Mineral resources**

The provinces have economic potential in terms of minerals, climate, and water resources. Most areas are very dry regions. While cattle-ranching was a booming business, it suffered from sanctions and fast track land reform of 2000. The Zambezi Water Project has lost steam because most industries were closing in Bulawayo. (Interview with Honourable Eddie Cross, 20 November 2015)

The reason why the area is lacking in development is more to do with politics and commonly believed political theory around Matebeleland Provinces is that people are being punished for not supporting ZANU PF. According to fifty eight percent of the respondents, since independence in April 1980, government has created very limited economic opportunities for citizens. For instance, Lupane has abundant gas reserves that could be exploited for the benefit of the district, province and the whole country. In addition, this can also assist the country with revenues that are greatly needed. These reserves are believed to be of the best quality on earth but it is plentiful somewhere else for cheaper prices.[Coltart, D 2016]

There is a lot of wildlife in the provinces. There should be plough back into the communities so that they are developed by the resources from the area. Even Camp Fire program that was run by NGOs and benefited the communities is no longer in place and the net result is that the villagers have no reason to protect the wildlife because there are no benefits associated with it. (Campfire Report No.19, 16 July 2007)

Furthermore, at least fifty nine percent of respondents strongly believe that all proceeds from mining activities in the provinces have not been ploughed back into the society in order to improve standards of lives of these rural people. However, the funds realised from mining licences, royalties are channelled elsewhere away from the real beneficiaries. All proceeds from mining go to Harare and the distribution is rather eschewed in favour of other provinces at expense of Matebeleland Provinces. Eighty percent of the respondents interviewed are extremely bitter about the attitude of government and what happened to these regions from 1980 to 2010 in terms of development. It is the belief of these respondents that the government could have done better for these provinces.
Coltart [2016] has argued that ZANU PF wanted to buy votes they could use development as a carrot. Unfortunately, punishing the people in any way the government has done has not helped matters at all. In fact, it has hardened the attitudes of the people in the provinces and the people have developed negative perceptions that government will not be able to deal with in future. These research findings affirm the above views. He concludes by arguing that general corruption in the country is the course of underdevelopment in most if not all parts of the country as most resources are diverted to save individual use.

There is no framework to follow in implementation from national to village level of all developmental projects. To make matters worse, the people are appointed corruptly and patronage system is deeply embedded in the government system. In fact fifty one percent of respondents have strongly argued that all posts have been allocated for ZANU PF supporters from other provinces even where there is need for “cleaners, the government will bring them from elsewhere to ensure that the locals in the Matebeleland are deprived of employment and livelihoods.” The above respondents cite general cleaners at Victoria Falls Airport, Hwange Local Board, Victoria Falls Zimra offices, Gwanda Ministry of National Housing, Plumtree Boarder Post. This is done at the expense of the local people be they Ndebeles or Kalangas or Tongas.

**Availability of water in the provinces**

The province has great potential for development as it can easily have irrigation though construction of canals from Zambezi. There is lack of serious commitment by Central Government to embark on development of water systems dams and pipelines that can supply water to Matebeleland North province as well as Bulawayo industries. Sixty percent of the respondents are of the strong view that shortages of water in the region, is artificial in the eyes of the Ndebeles. They feel that it is part of sustained campaign to make the region a wasteland. The government is dodging the real issues in Matebeleland which is marginalisation and underdevelopment. (Interview with District Administer of Lupane, Mr Abednigo Bhebhe 18 December 2015 Lupane Centre Matebeleland North)

The Zambezi Matebeleland Water Project has been on the cards from 1982 and according to sixty percent of respondents, “the issue is always brought towards general and presidential elections and there is no budget for such critical project.” It has been argued further by fifty
two percent of the above respondents that it took government less than five years to engage
donors and other stakeholders to bring water from Pungwe River into Mutare which was not
in a serious water predicament as compared to Matebeleland North or South. Hence, if
government can adopt the same zeal with regards to other provinces Matebeleland included it
would have been much better.

Sixty percent of the respondents are of the strong view that the leadership from Matebeleland
has let down the people and are of the view that if the Shonas were elected as representatives
of the people here, they would do something in order to alleviate the problems because they
would want to make a point or prove a point that their predecessors were not doing anything.
Thus, Paul Themba Nyathi a former Member of Parliament concludes by saying, “people
with limited leadership abilities find themselves at the top because they are being promoted
for their loyalty and not for competency.” (Interview with Paul Themba Nyathi Hillside
Suburbs Bulawayo, 5 November 2015)

Educational development in the Provinces

Two thirds of the respondents strongly felt that the provinces had lost opportunity twice.
During the liberation struggle, the area suffered. However, at that point, it was being
appreciated because people were fighting for the independence but after independence it was
completely different. There was destruction of infrastructure schools deep, clinics and tanks
because government believed that people of these regions supported “dissidents and hence
they deserved that kind of treatment.” (Interview with Archbishop Pius Ncube, 21 October
2015, Dete, Matebeleland North)

According to former ZAPU Director of Education in Zambia during the struggle (1970-
1979), Mary Ndlovu, widow of national hero-Edward Ndlovu, Matebeleland North and South
have been negatively affected by lack of peacebuilding. She goes further to say, Gwanda
ZINTEC College resources were diverted from the institution and were sent to develop some
colleges in Masvingo. Thus, the Gwanda ZINTEC College was never developed until it
became part of Joshua Nkomo Polytechnic College. (Interview with Mary Ndlovu, Suburbs,
Bulawayo 5 November 2015)

These views were echoed by Senator David Coltart, former Minister of Primary and
Secondary Education who observed that curriculum in Matebeleland North and South is
seriously deprived. There are very few science and maths teachers in the province. For example out of 748 part one students at National University of Science and Technology in Bulawayo, only one hundred and eleven students are from the two Matebeleland Provinces. (NUST Admission Records 2015 Academic year Report 2015)

Senator Coltart further argued that as a result of this deficiency in Science and Mathematics teachers, there are very few students who pass Mathematics and Science at Ordinary Level and this negatively impacted on the Advanced Level results. For instance, among the top 100 secondary schools, there are less than five high schools from both Matebeleland and North and South Provinces. Yet Manicaland account for the largest numbers that is 337 students and the followed by Masvingo Province in second place and the three Mashonaland Provinces are the last in terms of enrolment.[Coltart, D. Bulawayo12 November 2015, Interview with Foya]

Other key informants such as Webster Sibanda {retired Provincial Education Director}(interviewed on 3 November 2015 Parklands Suburbs, Bulawayo) strongly argued that Matebeleland North for example, has no technical college, there are no renowned high schools that produce the best Advanced Level results nor Ordinary Level results, no teachers’ college, no government hospital that trains nurses. Sixty percent of respondents are of the view that government should have done something concrete about this situation. They concluded that this situation is serious and detrimental to the province with regards to developmental issues. St Luke’s Hospital is Roman Catholic owned and not government. In terms of funding it suffers from neglect by the government more so because it belongs to the Roman Catholic Church whose Bishops have been very critical to the governance or lack of it by ZANU PF Government.

The schools in the provinces are far apart from each other because the population is sparsely populated making it very difficult to have schools close by so that pupils and students do not have to walk long distances to learn. The other option according to the respondents is to have boarding schools built to cater for the students. Even if that was to be the case, the parents from the region would not afford to pay fees for the boarding facilities. It therefore, mean that parents from outside Matebeleland provinces will have their children in these schools and the locals will not benefit as should be the case. These long distances have social impact in that girl children are abused while they travel to school by fellow students as well as villagers.
The Provisional Education Directors for Matebeleland North and South Provinces concurred that the total number of schools in both Matebeleland North and South is far less than that of Manicaland Province. Manicaland has a total of 441 secondary/high schools while Matebeleland North has 180 and Matebeleland South has 151 giving it a total of 431 schools.

As of 31 December 2014, both Matebeleland North and South had a total of 137 untrained teachers in different schools, most of these teachers in the secondary schools. These districts have resorted to moving primary trained teachers to teach in the secondary schools. [Mr Sikhosana Dube and Bernard Maforo at Gwanda Education Offices, Gwanda 20 October 2015 Interview with Foya]

The major constraint with regards to development is that the resources are controlled from the Central Government in Harare. The whole of Binga has very few primary and secondary schools to service the population. Binga District has 17 schools out of these four are not registered with the Ministry of Education and Culture. To make matters worse, the Tonga language is never examined at Grade Seven and even at Ordinary Level. The Tonga People in Binga do not want Ndebele teachers. Their argument is that Tonga is not the same as Ndebele. They want their language to be taught in schools so that it does not die a natural death and become extinct. They are of the strong opinion that they have been let down by the government hence their voting patterns show that they have been voting for the opposition MDC since 2000.[Interview with Councillor for ward 3, Cllr Tomuyambilani, 9 August 2015, Manjolo Rural Business Centre, Matebeleland North]

Schools are poorly resourced and understaffed especially trained teachers at primary schools. The worst affected are secondary schools which do not have science and mathematics teachers and this has compromised standards as well as those Advanced Level results. Nkayi District Education Officer, has argued that “Matebeleland North and South has very few schools both primary and secondary and sixty percent of the schools in Nkayi District have less than twenty percent of degreed teachers and most of the teachers” [Nkululeko Ncube, 10 October 2015, Nkayi [District Offices, Interview with Foya]

The schools in Matebeleland are failing to produce students who qualify for university entrance. In view of the poor schools, there are very few students who make it to university. In all the universities, there are very few students from Matebeleland provinces. Thus, the universities in this region have most of its students from outside the provinces. According to interview with Admissions Senior Assistant Registrars at National University of Science and
Technology and Lupane State University, eighty five percent of the students are from other outside Matebeleland North and South Provinces. According to the above Senior Assistant Registrars, this means that in the long run, these provinces will lag behind in terms of human resource development capacity [Interview with Mr L.J. Hadebe of NUST and Mrs F. Mlotshwa of LSU, Bulawayo 13 October 2015]

**Developments**

In 1980, Zimbabwe adopted the concept that rural areas had to be developed by starting growth points. The idea was to ensure that people would not flock to urban areas. Thus, the concept was well thought out indeed but there was no incentive to attract businesses to these rural growth points. For example growth points such as Murambinda, Dewedzo Beitbridge, Deweri Chiendambuya in Manicaland Province, Gokwe, Zvishavane, Mberengwa, and Mataga in Midlands Province, Thslolotsho, and Lupane Nkayi have developed more than other growth points. Growth points such as Nkayi, Lupane Tsholotsosh have not been developed to the same extent as those mentioned above. The reasons are varied. Some of the reasons include, funding from Central Government, better leadership that promotes development in their areas. Furthermore, there is better road network that allows better access to these areas. This is even made better by excellent networks of communication which is not the same as is the Matebeleland North province. Econet, Telecel, NetOne and Tel One are not within reach in these areas. [Marxwell Madondo Mlalazi 18 October 2015, Lupane Matebeleland North Province, Interview with Foya]

**5.14 GPA (2009), Reconciliation and National Healing**

There was a golden opportunity for the country to move forward from the ruins of the past in terms of peacebuilding and reconciliation. The idea was too noble to have ministers responsible for National Healing and reconciliation. This was critical in that according to Charles Mungoshi, “everyone has some kinds of wounds” and these have to be healed, Some of these wounds are psychological, some emotional, while others are physical. The healing is needed by both the victim and the perpetrators of the violence that was experienced from the time of liberation to0, through Gukurahundi up to 2000 violence as well as those who
suffered from Murambatsvina. (Charles Mungoshi, Book- Some kinds of Wounds, College Press Harare, 1987)

According to Pious Ncube, former Archbishop of Bulawayo, the failure of the whole programme of Reconciliation and National Healing was a result of a number of factors and these include the fact that the GPA Government had too much on its hands and there were too many issues to be taken care of by the government. (Interview with Pious Ncube Marist Dete, Hwange 21 October 2015)

Furthermore, fifty percent of respondents argued that the ZANU PF part of the GPA was very much insincere and not willing to promote the process. The reason was simply because they “had too many skeletons dating from liberation war, Gukurahundi, land invasion of 2000, 2005 Murambatsvina and 2008 election violence.” The above respondents feel that nothing practical was done by the government to ease tensions and suspicious relationship between the government and the people in these provinces. The government continued with its attitude of “business as usual.”

Sixty percent of the respondents maintain that GPA Government could not be trusted in that the key ministries such as Home Affairs, Defence, Security, Agriculture and Land Reform, Foreign Affairs were in the hands of ZANU PF. Therefore, the ministers in these ministries made life difficult and they deliberately did not seriously commit themselves to change that would benefit the people of the country. For in so doing they would stand to lose ground and it would show that what they did in the past was not right at all. The Government of Global Political Agreement came as a result of rigged elections in 2008. It is from this point that SADC brought in South African President Thabo Mbeki as a peace broker to come up with a compromise peace deal that would bring peace to Zimbabwe.

This was the opportunity for PGA Government to tackle important and sensitive issues once and for all. Such issues would have included 1982-1987 Gukurahundi which is still emotive and fresh in the minds of the people in Matebeleland Region as well as Midlands. They should have tackled Gukurahundi. This researcher strongly thinks that this would have been a golden opportunity for the government to redeem itself of this crime against humanity. It could therefore mean that the reason why they were unwilling to deal with such critical issues raised above was that it served the interests of ZANU PF government very well and it fits in their scheme of things of manipulating people and instilling fear.
Cephas Msipa has argued that “unity was of the leaders and not of the people.” In this vein, Vitalis Gutu Governance Officer with Public Affairs and Parliamentary Support Trust commented that “besides talking on podiums and coming out holding hands, the government has not succeeded in healing the people in the aforesaid areas.” [Dr Cephas Msipa 22 October 2015, Gweru in Midlands Province, Interview with Foya]

Sixty percent of the respondents have argued that the Organ on National Healing and Reconciliation was set up at national political level but there has been no implementation. In fact it is argued by the respondents that it was a façade to hoodwink the world to believe that the government was serious about national healing and reconciliation. In fact the intentions are similar to those in the 1980s. When the government of National Unity came to an end in mid-2013, the whole thing evaporated. This researcher strongly feels that the fact that the Organ on National Healing and Reconciliation had no budget and secretariat at provincial and district levels shows lack of seriousness on the part of the powers that be.

In addition, government attempted to play down the role of other stakeholders in the process. Other stakeholders were invited to propose a framework and the churches which include Roman Catholic Church, Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe and Zion Christian Church sat in meetings and stakeholder meetings all over to map a way of doing peace building and reconciliation but it all died in the bud after government without notice and or reason stopped all the meetings. Joseph Nkathazo of Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace argued that although GPA had the Organ on National Healing and Reconciliation, “it was the right remedy but wrong methods of doing things.” [Interview with Joseph Nkathazo 6 November 2015, Magwegwe. North, Bulawayo]

With regards to Organ on National Healing and Reconciliation, the GNU tried as much as it could but it was handicapped by illness as two ministers who eventually died. These ministers are John Landa Nkomo (ZANU PF) and Gibson Sibanda of the Movement for Democratic Change. [Coltart, D. 2016]

One of the grave mistakes was that the ONHR focused on current struggle rather than historical root cause of conflict. It has been argued by fifty percent of respondents in focus group discussion that there was no political will to get to the bottom of the matters that had been accumulating since the liberation struggle. ZANU PF on its part had no political will while MDC Members of Parliament were too young and immature to fully master critical issues that took place in the 1980s and then articulate them. Furthermore, most of these
Members of Parliament did not come from the Matebeleland Region hence did not have strong picture and views on the matter. For example, Thokozani Khupe and Gordon Moyo

5.15 Involvement of Non-State Actors in Peacebuilding

Seventy percent of the respondents in focus group discussion were of the same view that government of Robert Mugabe was very uncomfortable in working with independent minds and other stakeholders for fear of unknown. This may be attributed to its past history of violence and the effects that violence has had on the people. In this regard, Pious Ncube, former Archbishop of Bulawayo is of the view that some non-state actors who were involved in these issues included Mafela Trust, which tried to pay school fees for the affected school. In addition, Amani Trust carried out reburials of the dead people in affected Matebeleland Provinces and government seemed to accept this process until 1999 September when the opposition MDC came into the political scene.[Pious Ncube, 21 October 2015, Marist Dete, Hwange Matebeleland North Interview with Foya]

The fear of refusing reburials and commemorations of Gukurahundi could be explained by the fact that government felt that the opposition could capitalise on this matter and gain political mileage. After 1999, government was no longer kin or was not accepting the reburials anymore due fear of non-state actors unearthing a lot of dirty things that government did. [Legal Resources Foundations Report 1998p141]

Furthermore, the belief in the government thinking was that all NGOs were supporting opposition parties. This could be true to some extent as all the NGOs rallied behind the opposition in the period under discussion. Dumisani Nkomo of Habakkuk Trust explained that several non-state actors were involved in these issues but they were hindered by government informers and sell outs as well as CIOs. [Dumisani Nkomo 3 November 2015, Bulawayo, Interview with Foya]

Mary Ndlovu former lecturer at Hillside Teachers College in Bulawayo was of the view that non-state actors present in the Matebeleland North as well as South these include churches, Red Crescent, Plan International, Cadec, World Vision, as well as Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace. There would have been many non-state actors but the playing field was not level and these organisations withdrew their operations from these affected provinces. The sixty seven percent of respondents felt that there was serious violence and threat to life to
people working for these organizations thus making it difficult to carry out effective work. [Mary Ndlovu, 5 November 2015, Suburbs, Bulawayo Interview with Foya]

This researcher is of the opinion that the peacebuilding process requires a multi-sectoral approach in order to come up with lasting effective process which is community based and the role of the Central Government should be to facilitate and provide a framework to work to be carried out. In this regard, eighty percent of respondents are of the idea that there is need to set up structures that are made of competent professionals who are able to deal with critical issues such as reconciliation and national healing so that there is building of peace in the nation. It therefore, follows that if precolonial issues between the Shona and Ndebeles were settled then Gukurahundi would not have arisen. The reason for this belief is that there are pre-colonial issues that are harboured by the majority ethnic group which has been a recurring theme in the discussion.

Non-state actors most likely not going to make progress because these issues have to be addressed in a holistic manner with government playing a critical role of providing framework, lawyers and creating a conducive environment that allows this work of healing the nation and reconciling people to be a successful programme. In Matebeleland North virtually all villages were affected by Gukurahundi so there is need for the process to be broadened to include many people.

The work of non-state actors has been seriously hampered by the government which deliberately threw spanners in the work being done by the non-state actors. Government refused commemoration of Gukurahundi in the past. In past that is 2001 and 2004, 2007 and 2009 all commemorations were deliberately sabotaged by government. For instance, some of the invited guests that included the three ministers oh National Healing and Reconciliation that John Landa Nkomo, Moses Mzila Ndlovu, and Sekai Holland. The two others ministers did not turn up for reasons that are not clear. When the commemorations were about to begin in Lupane, riot police arrived and arrested the organisers as well as the minister Moses Mzila Ndlovu. He was detained for several days at Northern Police Station in Bulawayo. No Charges were laid for his arrest. According to Moses Mzila Ndlovu, the arrested minister:

This approach of stopping events that had obtained all necessary police clearance

is meant to instil fear into citizens and should not take in a state that claims to

be democratic. They have something to hide.it is a result of this threat that
people especially in Matebeleland that fear is entrenched. If they can arrest a cabinet minister and get away with it, how about an ordinary villager?

[Moses Mzila Ndlovu, 18 November 2015, Bulawayo, Interview with Foya]

This researcher is of the strong view that such attitudes do not promote the role of other non-state actors in working with communities. In addition to the above case the photographic exhibition at Bulawayo National gallery was stopped by the police who had instruction from Harare. The purpose was simply show photos of the dark period.

Ray Motsi Director of Theological College of Zimbabwe has argued that ZANU PF Government has since maintained its stronghold on the rural areas through instilling fear and violence. This has been done through chiefs and headmen and network of informers who include ward officers who spy on behalf of the government. He adds that in rural areas there are strong traditional values and this perpetuates tribalism. He thus proposes a theory “Supply and Demand” in his theory; he argues that ZANU PF Government sought to control everything. These things include: information, food, developmental aid, emails, monitoring of citizens call, movement of people, it also determines who gets food, it controls statistics as well as who are the vulnerable and determines which international aid organisations including WFP and Red Crescent, Goal operate where and when. Even if organizations follow all the protocols, it does not follow that an organization will be free to operate in any given rural area. [Dr Ray Motsi 23 October 2015, Theological College of Zimbabwe, Bulawayo, Interview with Foya]

In the same region there are many Shonas who work for various organizations and have dubious political credentials and they have wrong ideas about patriotism because of their training and brainwashing that they have gone through. As such, they do not understand the intricacies of the issues at hand. In fact their presence tends to open the wounds of Gukurahundi more than anything. Most of these functionaries are graduates from the Border Gezi Training Colleges have been taught eschewed views of patriotism. Fifty one percent of these trainees are very arrogant and very difficult to deal with. They openly say “we were brought here by big office and don’t treat us like ordinary student nurses if you still need your job sister”. It must be understood that some of the graduates from these Border Gezi institutions are sober and human enough and pleasant to work with. However, this is only
forty five percent of all the graduates. They are not that bad but are shadowed by the bad ones who happen to be the majority.[Interview with Sister Mapako, Senior Tutor at St Lukes Nurse Training Centre Matebeleland South Province, 28 August]

Non-state actors who work in the communities are heavily affected by the Central Intelligence organisation and its network of informers which instil fear and controls people for the benefit of the ruling part ZANU PF. Shona people are seen as part of the problem by the locals. According to sixty five percent of respondents this view is justified in the sense that even in deep down Matebeleland, there are some non-Ndebele people working for the government. There is anger and hatred not even focused towards perpetrators but towards another ethnic group for the calamity and in this context-the Shona. The above views were echoed by Cllr Dumisani Ndlovu, MDC Counsellor for Ward Nine in Kezi Matebeleland South Province. [Interview 21 August 2015, Kezi, Matebeleland South]

The reasons according to sixty eight percent of respondents are that most of the Fifth Brigade operatives spoke Shona and no other languages. These, in their view strengthen the ethnic dimension that ZANU PF Government wanted to eliminate the Ndebele as an ethnic group. This is supported by statements that the late Defence Minister made that “the Ndebeles were foreigners and they should go back to South Africa and join other Nguni People. They should be treated in the same manner as the Whites.” Statement like the one above did not assist matter of nation building let alone reconciliation. (Source: Interview with Dr Cephas Msipa, 2 November 2015 Gweru, Midlands Province)

5.16 Conclusion
This chapter critically looked at the analysis and interpretation of various issues that came up during interviews and focus group discussions with various people who included villagers in the Matebeleland North and South Provinces, and key informants who served in various capacities during the time of Gukurahundi and its aftermath.

A lot of issues came to the fore during discussion, analysis and interpretation. It was noted that there were numerous challenges to both peacebuilding and reconciliation process which ultimately led to its failure resulting in the civil strife that led to several deaths of innocent civilians especially in Matebeleland North and South Provinces and in selected districts of the
Midlands Province. These districts include Zhombe and Silobela as well as those districts neighbouring Matebeleland North and South Provinces.

The findings do indicate that several thousands of people migrated to South Africa, Botswana and into diaspora as a result of the conflict in these provinces. This migration has deliberately depopulated the areas and most of the professionals have since left the provinces from beginning of the 1980s and the net impact is that both primary and secondary have no qualified teachers and secondary schools are worst hit areas are Binga, Nkayi, Tsholotsho, Maphisa, Hwange Plumtree Rural. There are very few trained teachers in Sciences, Mathematics, and English. The vacuum that was created has been extremely difficult to fill since early 1980s up to date. To make matters worse, teachers have continued migrated from these areas as a result of policy of retribution by ZANU PF militias because people have not been voting for the ruling party.
CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Introduction
The previous chapter critically analysed and interpreted data that was collected using questionnaires, focus group discussion and interviews. This chapter derives the conclusions from the findings in the previous chapter. The chapter further provides the detailed recommendations as way forward to resolving issues that surfaced during discussion and analysis of data.

6.2 Conclusions
The researcher would like to draw the following conclusions from the findings in the previous chapter:

The Matebeleland North and South Provinces suffered so much during the period 1982 right through 1989 because of the Gukurahundi which had disastrous effects on the population of the region. The findings do indicate that over thirty five thousands of people were brutally killed by the Gukurahundi operatives between 1983 and 1989. In addition, nearly two thousand and six hundred and eighty of professionals left the provinces and the country to Botswana and South Africa while others went to diaspora.

There was a lot of displacement of people especially from the rural areas of Matebeleland. These rural areas were left with old men and women who have no option but to remain where they are. Some of these old people lost all sons and daughters and their livelihood during the dark period of Gukurahundi.

The findings do indicate that government has not made an apology to the victims and people of the region about Gukurahundi atrocities and there is no formal official acknowledge of its past deeds and it appears that as long as there is no acknowledgement, there is no way peace can be built.

Furthermore, this researcher would like to conclude that reconciliation policy was just an announcement and it only assisted the Whites and ZANU PF Government to co-exist between 1980 and 1990. There was no policy framework for dealing with the past and how to
handle these sensitive matters. There was no department within the government that would attend to issues of reconciliation. In addition, there was no-one was in charge or responsible for the process.

The process seemed to have ignored that there were many social and ethnic groups that should have been involved in the peacebuilding and reconciliation process. There was no reconciliation between ZANLA and ZIPRA and non whatever between the ZANU PF and Matebeleland people.

Another conclusion drawn from the findings is that the confiscation of ZAPU farms, buildings and other properties after the discovery of arms caches and the subsequent refusal by the government to return those properties was a major blow to peacebuilding and reconciliation. Government if was sincere about peacebuilding and reconciliation, it should have returned the properties to its rightful owners after the 1987 Unity Accord between ZANU PF and PF ZAPU.

The provinces are lagging behind other provinces with regard to development of infrastructure such as roads, bridges. There are no connecting roads from one district to the other. Communication networks, rural clinics and hospitals; schools both primary and secondary are old with collapsing infrastructure. Furthermore, they are poorly resourced and there are no qualified teachers especially the science and mathematics teachers.

There have been serious challenges to peacebuilding and reconciliation in the provinces. One of the major reasons is that the government is not sincere in building peace in the region as witnessed by lack of faith and commitment by the Central Government to avail funds for development purposes.

The study concludes that the government must allow people to do proper reburials as per cultural practices of the people in the regions and to further allow the people or communities to hold commemorations of Gukurahundi in the way that they will be able to express themselves within the constitutional limits and in a peaceful manner.
6.3 Recommendations

Following the findings and conclusions above, this researcher would like to make the following recommendations:

1. The is need for government to make full acknowledgement of the killings that took place in Matebeleland North and South Provinces and parts of Midlands Province such as Silobela, Zhombe and Gokwe districts. The government must take responsibility for its actions and the consequences that it caused.

2. This should be followed by setting up of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission so that all issues are fully investigated and dealt with once and for all so that in future there are no unresolved issues that remain in latent stage which has a tendency to resurface. The reason for this is that some of the issues that arose during discussion with respondents are of historical nature and have been pending for a long time without anyone in government doing something positive about it.

3. The study recommends that national outreach programmes to communities such as holding public hearings on what they want for them to move on should be done. It therefore follows that if the solutions come from the people and they realise they have been consulted, they will respect that approach. Council of Elders to work and conduct this process.

4. This study recommends that there is need to come up with all well thought out process of paying the communal reparations to all these affected area and this may be in the form of development aid to these areas. This can be, in the form of government embarking on construction of schools, clinics and other related rural infrastructure, deep tanks, road network and communication infrastructure and this can be done in conjunction with other stakeholders. This will enable the whole communities to benefit from these schemes.

5. The conflict that raged in these provinces (1980-1987) created numerous problems for the survivors. Some of the problems include failure to obtain all forms of documentation such as birth certificates, death certificates and national identity documents. People were not able to obtain providing documentation in the form of death and birth certificates to
victims and survivors. This study recommends that government must issue all forms of documentation to these people in these regions in order to cover up all the problems it created.

6. The researcher strongly recommends the return of ZAPU properties, farms and buildings to its rightful owners that are ZIPRA ex-combatants. This will enable them enjoy the fruits of their contributions and economic empowerment. The findings indicate that peacebuilding and reconciliation have not been possible and one of the critical reasons is that after discovery of arms caches on ZAPU properties, all ZAPU properties were confiscated by the government in early 1982 and have never been returned to their rightful owners. In line with the above, it is recommended that all documentation and ZAPU history confiscated from their offices by CIO/ZANU PF Government in Matebeleland and Midlands Provinces should be returned to ZAPU so that their history can be kept for posterity and to enable future generations to understand the roles played by ZAPU and other liberation movements.

7. In order to cool down tempers and emotions amongst the population in Matebeleland and Midlands, it is critical to allow national, provincial and district commemorations of Gukurahundi and other events without fear of reprisals as has been the case in the past. Citizens should be allowed to express themselves in any way as they deem as long as it is constitutional and peaceful.

8. There is need for constitutional reforms that will assist to safeguard the interests of the people in these marginalised provinces and the rest of provinces but in the rest of Zimbabwe. The media in White ruled Rhodesia as in black ruled Zimbabwe has been largely controlled by the government. From 1982 to 1989, government media was very silent about the conflict and killings in these provinces as if nothing was happening. There was a complete blackout. The media should be impartial and unbiased so that it portrays all ethnic groups in positive light and avoid hate language such as “Ndebele is dissident Language.” Furthermore, the media, newspapers, radio and television must focus on peacebuilding and promote reconciliation rather than divide the population along ethnic lines. There must be enforceable constitutional provisions that guarantee human rights and their enjoyment. In this regard, the National Human Rights Commission must be empowered.
9. In addition, it is further recommended that universities such as National University of Science and Technology in Bulawayo and Lupane State University in Lupane should design programmes that trains and retrains teachers in the critical areas that need serious attention. This will go a long way of alleviating shortages of teachers in sciences and mathematics.

In connection with the above, government must release funds to enable designing and implementation of these programs. These funds will also assist in paying the lectures and the assessments of the student teachers who are in the programs. The researcher is of the strong opinion that once universities try this approach, it will be very greatly improve the standards in the provinces.
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APPENDICES

RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS

Appendix 1- INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. Give a brief characterisation of Matabeleland Provinces.
2. Why are the provinces different politically from the rest of the country?
3. To what extent was reconciliation implemented in the Provinces?
4. What are the major reasons for failure of the reconciliation process in the provinces?
5. Could reconciliation process have been handled differently?
6. How can failure of peacebuilding process be explained?
7. Is there a nexus between failure of peacebuilding and the operations of the Fifth brigade in the area from 1982 up to end of civil unrest which culminated in the 1987 Unity Accord between ZANU PF and PF ZAPU?
8. To what extent were NGOs involved in the process?
9. What factors hampered the effective inclusion of NGOs in the process of peacebuilding in Matabeleland Provinces?
10. List six factors that hindered the process of peacebuilding in Matabeleland Provinces
11. What was the impact of hounding, arrests and killing of the opposition PF ZAPU especially the top leadership to peacebuilding, reconciliation and development in the provinces?
12. In what ways have these disturbances sharpened the perceptions of people in these provinces?
13. To what extent were reforms (that is) legally, economically and politically were carried out to promote peacebuilding.
14. What recommendations would you make to improve the process of peacebuilding and reconciliation?
Appendix 2: QUESTIONNAIRE

Section A: Personal details

1. Age
   a) 20-29 
   b) 30-39 
   c) 40-49 
   d) 50-59 
   e) 60+

2. Gender: Male □ Female □

3. Profession

4. Position in the community

5. Position in the organisation

Section B: Questions

1. Describe the general characteristics of the Matabeleland Provinces in terms of population make up.

2. How would you describe these provinces politically during the liberation struggle and post independent Zimbabwe?

3. In your opinion, how was reconciliation process handled in Matebeleland North and South Provinces?

4. Could the reconciliation process have been done differently and if so, how?

5. What are the major factors that have contributed to the failure of the reconciliation process?
7. Could the operations of the Fifth Brigade (between 1982-1988) have worsened the weak and frosty relationship between the ruling party ZANU PF and the opposition PF ZAPU and thus contributed to failure of breakdown of peacebuilding process? Explain your response.

8. Do you think that the Unity Accord of 1987 did promote peacebuilding process? Explain your response.

9. Explain reforms if any that were carried out in the legal/judicial, political and economic spheres that would have promoted peacebuilding process in Matebeleland North and South and Midlands Provinces between 1980 and 1990?

10. To what extent do you agree with the assertion that there has been a deliberate slowdown of development in the Matebeleland North and South Provinces as a way of punishing the people in the area for not supporting government since 1980?

11. Published reports and books talk of several thousands of people who were killed during the period 1983 and 1987. Elaborate the details.

12. In which districts of Matabeleland South and North Provinces was Gukurahundi most serious and why?

13 In what ways have these disturbances sharpened the perceptions the people in the above provinces?
14. Did the Unity Accord of 1987 between ZANU PF and PF ZAPU attempt to heal the nation, promote reconciliation and build peace?
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15. How far were other non-state actors involved in the process of nation healing, reconciliation and peacebuilding?
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16. Give recommendations on how peacebuilding can be carried out successfully in the Matebeleland North, South and Midlands Provinces?
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18. Any other comments?
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Appendix 3: OFFICE FOR THE HEADMASTER AT DONGA PRIMARY SCHOOL

One of the offices (top and bottom) at Donga Primary School in Binga In the background are classrooms

Sources: http://www.sundaymail.co.zw-double-tax-for-school-pupils/accessed 8 December 2015
Appendix 4: School Pass Rate

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Appendix 5: Matabeleland schools record awful results

by Staff reporter
27 January 2015

MATABELELAND provinces schools once again failed to impress in last year's Advanced Level examinations, with no school making it into the top 10, while only six made it to the top 100.

According to Zimbabwe Schools Examination Council 'A' Level rankings for secondary schools, the best institution was Tongwe Government Secondary School ranked 16 nationally with a 100% pass rate, followed by Zezani Secondary which is ranked 18.

Manama and Empandeni Secondary schools, both in Matabeleland South, are ranked 78 and 97 respectively. Usher Secondary School is ranked 121, Mzingwane High 150, Mtshabezi High 169, Thekwane High 191, Phakamani High 228 and Filabusi High 248. Matabeleland North, which includes Bulawayo, only had two schools which featured in the top 100 nationally, Mpopoma and Tshabanda High in Lupane.

Mpopoma High is ranked 63, while Tshabanda Secondary School is position 75. Nkulumane High is ranked number 107, Maranatha Adventist School 116, Lusulu Secondary 118, St Columba's High 123, Founders High 146, Pumula High 157, Magwegwe High 165 and St Bernard's Secondary 173. While there are a number of fancy schools in the region, it is the high-ranking of schools such as Nkulumane and Lusulu that will surprise many.

In primary schools ranking, Bulawayo's Riverside Stimulation Centre and Coalfield from Hwange managed to sit on pole position with 40 other schools that took the same position, while Mpumelelo from Mpopoma was position 54, with Maranatha Primary on position 72, and Dominican Convent 89, and Mahatshula Primary on position 100.

In Matabeleland South, schools that made it into top 100 include Sacred Heart at 45, Rhodes Estate at position 65, while Gwanda's St Christopher's is 69th. The 2013 Grade 7 results revealed that about six schools in Gwanda, Matabeleland South, failed to record a single pass. The cause of such failures was attributed to poor sanitation and lack of accommodation. Poor school infrastructure and facilities were also contributing to the low pass rate.
Matabeleland North revealed that they did not have adequate classrooms and some children were learning under trees. This was most common in Binga, where schoolchildren walk long distances. The quality of education has been compromised by a shortage of qualified teachers. Most teachers are reluctant to teach at remote rural schools


POOR ‘O’, ‘A’ LEVEL RESULTS: Where are govt schools getting it wrong? [23 February 2014]

By LINDA CHINOBUVA
OWN CORRESPONDENT

‘O’ and ‘A’ Level results are finally out and again church-run and private schools performed better than government schools. Why have government schools been performing so poorly and what are church-run and private schools doing so differently that have made them continue producing outstanding results? A survey conducted by Southern Eye revealed that the best performing schools in Bulawayo at both ‘O’ and ‘A’ Level are church-run with their government counterparts are lagging far behind.

For example, the Anglican Church-run St Columbus High School in Makokoba produced the best Zimbabwe School Examination Council (Zimsec) ‘O’ Level results in Bulawayo and was ranked 33rd nationally. The only other school from Bulawayo that made it into the top 100 nationally is another church-run school, Maranatha Adventist High School in Nketa which was ranked 57th.

Some of the city’s former top performing government schools such as Mpopoma High, Mzilikazi High, Milton High and Luvuve High are no longer counted among the elite performers. It is the same at ‘A’ Level with private and church schools dominating. Educationists have attributed the high pass rate at private and church-run schools to low enrolment which balances the teacher-pupil ratio, whereas government schools have high enrolment and the teacher-pupil ratio does not balance.

“Private schools attain better pass rates compared to government schools because the enrolment at private schools is lower and this enables all pupils to get attention from the teacher unlike in a government school where there is a high enrolment and not all the pupils’
academic special needs are addressed,” said former Education minister David Coltart. Coltart also said private schools had sufficient finances to cater for pupils’ academic needs while government schools are underfinanced to the extent that they do not have enough textbooks for all students.

“The government is failing to fund its schools and as a result, you find five students sharing a text book, which automatically makes it hard for all of them to fully make use of the textbook. “Students who suffer the most are those doing science subjects. Most of the government schools have insufficient or no laboratory equipment to carry out practical tests,” he said. Coltart said it was rare to find even two students sharing a book in private schools and this made their learning process easy and comfortable.

He also singled out infrastructure as a major contributing factor to poor performances of pupils in government schools. Coltart said when he embarked on a tour of some schools; he was devastated by the dilapidated state they were in.

“When I was still in office, I carried out a tour to some local schools and the infrastructure is not conducive for pupils to learn. There are more of broken glass windows, broken chairs, shortage of furniture and rugged roofs. That on its own dismisses the serious mood of learning resulting in poor performances,” Coltart said.

He also said the low remuneration for teachers at government schools demotivated them from fully and wholeheartedly delivering while their counterparts at private schools were competitively remunerated and motivated to execute their duties passionately. He said the only way to bridge the gap between government schools and private schools was for the government to fully fund its schools.

Admissions also play a crucial role in pass rates as Southern Eye discovered that while government schools are forced to admit below-average students, private and church-run schools put in a place a mechanism that ensures they get the cream to maintain academic excellence.

An official at the Bulawayo Dominican Convent said prospective learners go through a rigorous admission process that includes an intensive interview process followed by a written entrance test. That way, the school weeds out potential poor performers from the outset. “It’s
a policy in the school that before a child is admitted for Form One, they go through an interview and entrance test. But for one to qualify for the interview, they must have not more than eight points Grade Seven,” said the official.

She said for ‘A’ Level, the school gave first preference to its learners before considering outsiders and they would have performed very well to be admitted. “The reason why our students are excelling is because we provide the best for them and they are so exposed to the extent that they all have big dreams. Recently a group of ‘A’ Level students went to Europe on a trip and that on its own motivates them,” she said. An official at St Columbus High School said church-run schools performed well academically because the students were socialised in Christian values which in turn shaped their characters.

“As a parish school, everything that we do is based on Christian values and as a result more of our students are shaped into decent individuals and they have self-motivation within themselves without having the teachers pushing them,” the official said. In contrast, a teacher at the government’s Townsend Girls High School said they admitted Form 1 pupils who have as much as 36 points at Grade Seven.

“The reason why government schools are lagging behind in terms of results is because we admit children who have dismally failed Grade Seven. We only screen them internally according to their grades,” the teacher said. “That is why you find that government schools have special classes because those who would have performed dismally at Grade Seven are put in their own class,” she said.

Another teacher from Founders High School said the reason most government schools performed dismally was because they admitted anyone who applied without any conditions.

“The school admits everyone who applies as long as there is a vacancy. Different children from different walks of life are enrolled into the school and generally they are uncontrollable as the majority are morally unstable,” said the teacher.

“The majority of students have since found it fashionable to drink beer and smoke weed (mbanje) within the school premises. Most of the children have turned immoral activities into their extra curriculum activities because they are not exposed to the other side of education which is going out for social trips,” she said.
Over the years, there have been many scandals of school children allocating themselves leisure time during school hours as many can be seen loitering at the Centenary Park engaging in immoral acts that they visibly enjoy. It was reported last week that Montrose Girls High schoolgirls engaged in immoral activities like drinking beer and indulging in sex close to the school’s premises during learning hours.

Source: http://www.southerneye.co.zw/2014/02/23/poor-o-level-results-govt-schools-getting-wrong/

Appendix 6: ZANU PF UNITY ACCORD DOCUMENT
Agreement of Unity between the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) and Patriotic Front-ZAPU

This is the full text of the Unity Agreement signed by Comrade Robert G. Mugabe, First Secretary and President of ZANU (PF); and Comrade Joshua M. Nkomo, President of PF ZAPU in Harare on December 22, 1987. This agreement was ratified by ZAPU at their Congress in Harare on Saturday, April 2, 1988. It is now being presented to the Extra-Ordinary Congress of ZANU (PF) for consideration and discussion.

Preamble

Conscious of the historical links between ZANU (PF) and PF ZAPU in the struggle for national independence and democracy through the strategy of armed struggle and their alliance under the banner of the Patriotic Front;

Cognisant of the fact that the two parties jointly command the support of the overwhelming majority of the people of Zimbabwe as evidenced by the general election results in 1980 and 1985 respectively;

Notwithstanding that ZANU (PF) commands a greater percentage of the said overwhelming majority of the people of Zimbabwe;

Desirous to unite our nation, establish peace, law and order and so guarantee social and economic development and political stability;
Determined to eliminate and end the insecurity and violence caused by dissidents in Matabeleland;

Convinced that national unity, political stability, peace, law and order and economic development can only be achieved to their fullest under conditions of peace and the unity primarily of ZANU (PF) and PF ZAPU;

We, the two leaders of ZANU (PF) and PF ZAPU, that is to say, Comrade Robert Gabriel Mugabe, First Secretary and President of ZANU (PF), and Comrade Joshua Nkomo, President of PF ZAPU, assisted by a sub-committee of equal members of ZANU (PF) and PF ZAPU, held 10 meetings to discuss the possible unity of our two parties as follows:-

1st meeting: 2nd October, 1985 — Parliament Buildings.
10th meeting: 10th December 1987 — Parliament Buildings.

Consequent upon these meetings, and paying due regard to all the principal issues raised thereat, we have agreed as follows:-

The Agreement
1. That ZANU (PF) and PF ZAPU have irrevocably committed themselves to unite under one political party.
2. That the unity of the two political parties shall be achieved under the name Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front), in short ZANU (PF).
3. That Comrade Robert Gabriel Mugabe shall be First Secretary and President of ZANU (PF).
4. That ZANU (PF) shall have two Second Secretaries and Vice-
Presidents who shall be appointed by the First Secretary and President of the Party.
5. That ZANU (PF) shall seek to establish a socialist society in Zimbabwe on the guidance of Marxist-Leninist principles.
6. That ZANU (PF) shall seek to establish a One Party State in Zimbabwe.
7. That the leadership of ZANU (PF) shall abide by the Leadership Code.
8. That the existing structures of ZANU (PF) and PF ZAPU shall be merged in accordance with the letter and spirit of this Agreement.
9. That both parties shall, in the interim, take immediate vigorous steps to eliminate and end the insecurity and violence prevalent in Matabeleland.
10. That ZANU (PF) and PF ZAPU shall convene their respective congresses to give effect to this Agreement within the shortest possible time.
11. That in the interim, Comrade Robert Gabriel Mugabe is vested with full powers to prepare the implementation of this Agreement and to act in the name and authority of ZANU (PF).

Signed at State House, this 22nd day of December, 1987

JOSEPH MUGABO NKOMO
President, (PF) ZAPU

ROBERT GABRIEL MUGABE
First Secretary and President of ZANU (PF)